

THE PERIODICAL PRESS AND THE PULLMAN STRIKE:
An Analysis of the Coverage and Interpretation
of the Railroad Boycott of 1894
by Eight Journals of Opinion and Reportage

BY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	iv
Chapter	
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT	1
The Periodical Press of the 1890's	1
The Journals of Opinion and Reportage	4
The General Labor Situation	17
The Situation at Pullman	26
The Situation at Chicago	30
II. THE STRIKE AND THE PERIODICALS: A SUMMARY OF COVERAGE	39
The General Managers and Federal Attorneys	41
Federal Intervention, Official Protest and Violence	48
The Collapse of the Strike	57
III. THE ISSUES: AN EXPLANATION	74
Immediate Issues	77
Underlying Issues	88
Related Issues	91
IV. THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIKE: IMMEDIATE AND UNDERLYING ISSUES	119
V. THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIKE: RELATED ISSUES	144
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	183
Evaluation of Coverage and Interpretation	183
An Explanation for Inadequate Coverage	191
The Social Role of the Journals of Opinion	196

Suggestions for Future Research	202
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Appendixes

I. LANDMARK HISTORY OF THE PULLMAN STRIKE AND BOYCOTT	207
II. EXTRACT FROM <u>OUTLOOK'S</u> COVERAGE	212
III. RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE JOURNALS TO END OR PREVENT LABOR DISPUTES	214
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	223

INTRODUCTION

The catastrophic depression of 1893-1897 vividly dramatized the failure of the existing financial system and emphasized the widening chasm between the rich and the poor.

The Pullman Strike of 1894 symbolized the social effects of an economic system rationalized in terms of Social Darwinism. The strike began as a local dispute, but gradually expanded into a nationwide railway boycott. Soon the federal government was involved. For these reasons the strike was of great public interest and attracted much comment in the magazines.¹

The 1890's were an important decade for periodicals. Of all the mass media, "none experienced a more spectacular enlargement and increase in effectiveness than the magazines."² Furthermore, in both the general monthly and weekly journals of opinion and reportage, an increasing number of articles dealt with current events and public affairs.

This is a historical study of the performance of the periodical press in the 1890's. Specifically, this study examines the reporting and interpretation of eight journals of opinion and evaluates their coverage of the Pullman Strike.

The fundamental purpose is to contribute an historical perspective to the evolution of interpretative reporting.

Robert B. Harper has studied the development of news interpretation in five case studies involving labor conflict during the period 1914 to 1966. Harper points out that several journalism historians have agreed on when interpretative reporting became an important journalistic development; but these same historians "have not very thoroughly answered the question of when interpretative reporting first began or how it developed." Harper believes there may have been different forms of news interpretation prior to World War I.³

Journalism historian Theodore Peterson, assessing the role of magazines, concludes that they have "not only interpreted issues and events but also put them in national perspective." Another scholar, Roland E. Wolseley, comments: "A newspaper informs mainly by printing the news. A magazine informs chiefly by printing explanations of news and descriptions of conditions." Similarly, journalism professor John Schacht notes that journals of opinion often provide a fuller interpretative treatment than other media: "Where these magazines may claim primacy, then, is not in spreading information, but in assessment of information and in their conclusions regarding it."⁴

According to journalism historian Edwin Emery, several magazines of opinion, at the turn of the century, were important in the trend toward interpretative reporting which emerged after World War I and became significant in the 1930's.⁵

This study examines the proposition that the journals of opinion in the 1890's were instrumental in the development of interpretative reporting. This proposition is examined by evaluating the manner in which these journals covered the Pullman Strike of 1894. The study focuses on the nature, adequacy and extent of their interpretative reporting. Journals of opinion--as opposed to other types of magazines--were selected for analysis because of their emphasis on public affairs. The Pullman Strike was selected as an historical event because it attracted nationwide interest and extensive comment in the press.

A second and broader purpose of this study is to develop knowledge about the magazines of the 1890's, an area of study that has been overshadowed by emphasis on the sensational newspapers of the period, and the muckrakers which came to prominence after 1900. Historian Allan Nevins asserts there is a need for research into the role of the press--its public service function.⁶ In a sense, this analysis of the periodical press provides a case study of the role played by journals of opinion in explaining the social issues of the 1890's.

This study cannot definitively assess the social role of the journals of opinion during this period. Nevertheless, an attempt is made, not only to evaluate the interpretative reporting of these periodicals, but also to determine what functions they performed with respect to the public during and immediately after the strike.

As a matter of interest, it should be noted that this study complements an existing thesis, John R. Finnegan's "The Press and the Pullman Strike: An Analysis of the Coverage of the Railroad Boycott of 1894 by Four Metropolitan Daily Newspapers," completed in 1965. Finnegan found strike reporting in the daily press to be highly distorted and sensationalized.⁷

Objectives

This study evaluates the performance of eight journals of opinion and reportage and examines the manner in which they interpreted the Pullman Strike and associated issues.

Three questions have been posed to guide the investigation:

- (1) How did the coverage provided by the journals compare with the Report on the Chicago Strike by the U. S. Strike Commission, and related sources?
- (2) What were the significant differences, if any, between the weeklies and monthlies in their reporting and interpretation of the issues compared to historical evidence?

(3) What social functions were performed by the journals of opinion during and immediately after the strike?

Periodicals and Content to be Studied

Professor John Schacht has described the characteristics of a "journal of opinion and reportage;" its content deals primarily with public affairs in a broad sense, involving politics, economics, and social and cultural relationships:

This interest involves both the reporting of such affairs (though in some cases on a limited scale) and an analysis and evaluation of—and recommendations concerning—its own news and that of other sources.⁸

These are the journals studied:

<u>Monthly Reviews</u>	<u>Weekly Journals</u>
<u>Arena</u> (1889-1909)	<u>Harper's Weekly</u> (1857-1916)
<u>Forum</u> (1886-1930)	<u>Independent</u> (1848-1928)
<u>North American Review</u> (1815-1940)	<u>Nation</u> (1865—)
<u>Review of Reviews</u> (1891-1937)	<u>Outlook</u> (1870-1935)

Four historians are in substantial agreement that these particular journals are of primary importance for their coverage and discussion of public affairs in the 1890's.⁹

Chapter I provides background concerning these journals, as well as an historical perspective of the strike.

Content to be evaluated consists of all pertinent articles, editorials and "letters to the editor" relating to the strike during the period June 1894 to June 1895.

Methodology

Comparatively little research has been conducted in the field of periodical press performance. A review of Journalism Abstracts, the Journalism Quarterly Index, and other bibliographic aids reveals that only four of seventeen press performance studies discovered involved a qualitative evaluation of the periodical press.¹⁰

In establishing an appropriate research method for this study, the author has drawn from procedures developed or explained in three other studies.¹¹

Definitions

For purposes of this study the definitions of "interpretation" and "issue" are as follows:

(1) "Interpretation" is defined as the attempt to report or explain cause or effect relationships.¹²

John E. DeMott summarizes the distinctive characteristics of interpretative news stories: they have many kinds of opinion, especially concerning cause and effect; they have greater depth, extensive background, exposition and description. According to Curtis D. MacDougall, interpretation involves explaining "why;" it is an objective appraisal that provides perspective; it explains the social background--the root causes--of an event.¹³

(2) "Issue" is defined as a topic of controversy.

For purposes of analysis there are three types of

issues:¹⁴ (a) immediate issues are those discussed by the participants in the event; (b) underlying issues are those issues which, though possibly recognized to some extent by the event's participants, were subject to far less attention and discussion; (c) related issues are those which emerged from the basic event and were discussed primarily by the Strike Commission, historians, or the mass media.

Historical Standard

An historical standard is established by constructing a chronology of the "landmark history" of the Pullman Strike.¹⁵

Sources for the standard include: the Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July 1894, a document prepared by the U. S. Strike Commission which investigated the dispute; President Grover Cleveland's The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894; Almont Lindsey's comprehensive study, the Pullman Strike: The Study of a Unique Experiment and of a Great Upheaval (1942); and several other primary and secondary sources.

Analysis of Coverage

An historical narrative is developed in Chapter II; the landmark history is established and the reporting of the journals of opinion is summarized. During the discussion, three types of deviation from the historical standard are noted: (1) inaccuracies of fact (e.g., who, what, when

and where); (2) significant omissions of information; and (3) judgments not consistent with the historical record.¹⁶ The landmark history of the strike is extrapolated and presented in Appendix I.

Analysis of Interpretation

The important issues in the strike have been identified by inspection of the historical record and the content of the articles and editorials included in the study. These issues are explained in Chapter III, an interpretative analysis of the strike which expands the historical standard.

Chapter IV is an appraisal of the adequacy and extent to which the journals attempted to explain cause or effect relationships concerning the immediate and underlying issues in comparison to the historical standard. Chapter V is a similar analysis of the related issues as explained by the journals.

Evaluation of Coverage and Interpretation

Chapter VI evaluates the performance of the journals qualitatively against the following framework: (1) extent of coverage—significant omissions; (2) interpretative distortions and inaccuracies of fact; (3) objectivity and fairness, including qualities such as "tone" (the general extent to which content revealed emotionality, concern, or reassurance), and "authority" (particular groups referred to with approval or disapproval); (4) incomplete interpretations.

Following the performance evaluation, several reasons are offered to explain weaknesses in coverage and interpretation. The journals are assessed in terms of editorial values (e.g., economic, political or humanitarian) and the extent to which advocacy may have impeded objective interpretation.

As the strike began to collapse, the journals proposed a variety of recommendations concerning labor relations. These are summarized in Appendix III and discussed in relation to the social role of the periodical press in the mid-1890's.

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FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

¹Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905 Vol. IV (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 156, 218.

²Ibid., p. 2.

³Robert B. Harper, "Reporting Social Strife in Five Labor Conflicts" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), quotation, p. 2; p. 181.

⁴Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 394; Roland E. Wolseley, The Magazine World: An Introduction to Magazine Journalism (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 4; John H. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage: An Assessment (New York: Magazine Publishers Association, 1966), p. 75, quotation, p. 77.

⁵Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretative History of the Mass Media (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 562, 569.

⁶Allan Nevins, "American Journalism and Its Historical Treatment," Journalism Quarterly XXXVI (Fall, 1959), 421.

⁷See Chapter V for an assessment of the relationship between weeklies and the daily press.

⁸Schacht, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁹Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. IV, pp. 51-52, 57-62; Emery, The Press and America, pp. 290, 403; Harold U. Faulkner, 1890-1900: Politics Reform and Expansion (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1963), pp. 281-82; Schacht, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

¹⁰Robert K. Bellinger, "Protest from the Right Wing: How the National Review and American Opinion Magazines Covered the Civil Rights Issue from 1955-1969" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Syracuse University, 1972). Dennis Berrett, "Coverage by Five National Magazines of the Growth of the Use of Drugs in America" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Brigham Young University, 1969); Paul B. Parham, "Vietnam 1958-1961: U. S. News Magazine Coverage" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Missouri, 1971); Eugene J. Rossi, "How 50 Periodicals and the Times Interpreted the Test Ban Controversy," Journalism Quarterly XL (Autumn, 1964), 545-54. For a quantitative analysis, see James R. Hickey, "Interpretation in the Weekly Press," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1962).

¹¹This study follows the same procedure used by Harper (op. cit.) in analysis of the issues; first an historical standard is established in which issues are explained; then press performance is compared to this standard. The historical standard developed in this study was established in accordance with the method explained by John L. Martin and Harold L. Nelson: "The Historical Standard in Analyzing Press Performance," Journalism Quarterly XXXIII (Autumn, 1956), 456-66. This study also uses certain elements of the analytical framework for evaluation of interpretative writing developed by Rossi (op. cit.). The method used by Rossi involves evaluation of content in terms of qualities such as "tone," "values," etc.

¹²Harper, op. cit., p. 2.

¹³John E. DeMott, "A Content Analysis of Newspaper Stories Described as Interpretative" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1971), cited in Journalism Abstracts IX (1971), 16; Curtis D. MacDougall, Interpretative Reporting (5th ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 197-202.

¹⁴Definitions of immediate and underlying issues are derived from Harper, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹⁵Martin and Nelson, "The Historical Standard in Analyzing Press Performance," p. 460.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 461, 465.

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Periodical Press of the 1890's

The 1890's were a decade of hard times in the midst of a period of extraordinary industrial and financial development. "American society was growing more and more complex, and economic and political problems were multiplying as the century approached its end."¹

The number of newspapers and magazines was rapidly increasing during these years. Journalism expanded into every field and area. In 1890 there were slightly more than 4,400 periodicals. By 1900 that number had increased to somewhat more than 5,500. Popular education was producing an increasingly literate public during the eighties and nineties. The technology of printing was steadily improving. Postal rates were more favorable. National marketing and magazine advertising were beginning to provide periodicals with a broader financial base. And middle-class readers were taking more of an interest in the socio-economic problems associated with the new industrial order.²

During this period several highly successful, low-priced magazines began to appear. In 1892, Frank A. Munsey began issuing Munsey's Magazine, a fully illustrated monthly costing twenty-five cents. The following year the Ladies

Home Journal, at ten cents a copy, reached a circulation of seven hundred thousand. McClures began publication. Two years later it was being sold at ten cents a copy, along with Cosmopolitan. From 1895 onward there were many ten cent magazines in the field. Several of these became leading muckrakers in the 1900's.³

By 1894, the North American Review was well established, having been founded in 1815. It was the first general monthly to seriously discuss topics of current public interest. Between the years 1886 and 1891, however, it found competition from three new monthly journals of opinion: the Arena, the Forum, and the Review of Reviews. These news-oriented magazines became increasingly concerned with coverage of current events. By the time of the Pullman Strike they had circulations ranging from 25,000 to 85,000. Symposiums, in which authorities presented varying points of view on a leading issue, were common among these journals in the nineties.⁴

Several weekly journals of opinion and commentary were also beneficiaries of the rising demand for magazines. Less timely than the newspapers, but featuring more reporting than the monthlies, were the Nation, Harper's Weekly, the Independent and the Outlook. These were the leading weeklies in the coverage of current affairs. Founded during the years 1857 to 1870, by the 1890's their circulations were in the 12,000 to 75,000 range.

Both the weeklies and the monthlies were active in reform movements that reached their fruition in the muckraking era. Throughout the nineties they printed an increasing number of articles exposing political corruption in city, state and national government. The Arena, Forum, and North American Review were especially active in this field; Harper's Weekly and the Independent fought for reform of the civil service.⁵

The threads of the muckraking tradition were evident in all the magazines of the 1890's. "In various forms, exposure of social ills appears in both general and specialized periodicals." Poverty, slums, monopolies and factory conditions came under attack.⁶ The hard times following the Panic of 1893--the march of "Coxey's Army" and the violent strikes of the period--brought discontent into the open, focused public attention on economic and political problems, and furnished material for magazine articles. Animated discussions of these issues were conducted mostly in the journals of opinion and reportage.⁷

These periodicals, which had relatively small but influential audiences, along with certain newspapers were the direct forerunners of progressive muckraking.⁸

In the newspaper press, two developments contributed to the rise of muckraking. (1) The "New Journalism" of Pulitzer and Scripps emphasized the social service function of the press. "Editorial support for the common man and for the community interest, rather than for a particular

party or group, grew widespread in the 1880's and 90's."⁹

(2) Sensationalism such as that found in the yellow journals--Pulitzer's World and Hearst's Journal--"thrived on crusading forays into the underworld of vice and scandal; its rapid development . . . worked to the incidental advantage of reform."¹⁰

The reporters who covered such stories of social conflict as the Pullman Strike, and lesser ones, gained experience which unquestionably prepared them for a later role in muckraking.¹¹

Events during President Cleveland's second term, 1892-96, in Mott's words, "called forth voluminous magazine commentary." Current affairs were followed more closely. Of particular interest to the public was the Pullman Strike.¹² Several magazines of this period were instrumental in forcing the serious consideration of social issues upon the American people. These were the monthly and weekly journals of opinion and reportage.

The Journals of Opinion and Reportage*

The Weeklies

Two important weeklies of the period which dealt with public issues (yet are not included within the scope of this study) were the Literary Digest and Public Opinion. They

*A summary of the characteristics of these journals is presented in Table 1, page 11.

"were not, in basic intention, current-events periodicals, but rather weekly eclectics that surveyed editorial opinion and condensed and arranged it for the information of readers."¹³ Nevertheless, since they contain useful opinion summaries, they may be cited infrequently during the study when necessary for the purpose of comparison or contrast.

According to historian Frank Luther Mott, four weekly journals of opinion and commentary were early leaders in the movement toward coverage of current events or analysis of news. Three of these--Harper's Weekly, the Independent and the Outlook--could also be classified as "general illustrated miscellanies." These were not "pure" journals of opinion; all printed some fiction and included articles on subjects other than current affairs. However, few of the leading weeklies of the 1890's were strictly concerned with discussions of public affairs.¹⁴

The fourth journal to be studied, the Nation, was a weekly edition of the New York Evening Post. Although seldom illustrated, it was often more timely than its competitors.¹⁵

The Nation--the only 19th century journal of opinion now surviving--was established in 1865 under the editorship of Edwin L. Godkin. In the original prospectus, Godkin emphasized that his journal would provide a critical scrutiny of current events. It would discuss important

issues, especially in their legal, economic, and constitutional phases, with more moderation than the party press:¹⁶

The Nation will not be the organ of any party, sect, or body. It will, on the contrary, make an earnest effort to bring to the discussion of political and social questions a really critical spirit, and to wage war upon the vices of violence, exaggeration, and misrepresentation by which so much of the political writing of the day is marred.¹⁷

In 1881 Godkin sold the Nation to the New York Evening Post; for the next thirty-three years it was issued as a weekly edition of the Post. Wendell Phillips Garrison became the general editor and was primarily concerned with current literature. Godkin, however, remained as political and advisory editor.¹⁸

Although the Nation's circulation in the 1890's was never above 12,000, it was a journal of substantial influence. According to Frank Luther Mott, "The power of the Nation came not from the number of its readers, but from their station and influence and from the frequency which it was quoted."¹⁹

Godkin's social and political views permeated the Nation. A believer in Victorian English liberalism, Godkin stood for a laissez-faire economy and the highest possible standards for public officials. He advocated unrestrained capitalism, women's suffrage, public education and civil service reform. He consistently opposed the abuse of power.²⁰

In labor disputes, Godkin's attitude was that "labor must not be allowed to usurp the prerogatives of the natural aristocracy of a free society."²¹ The Nation took capital's side against labor, attacked trade unionism, and opposed the eight-hour working day. Godkin believed that the "iron laws of supply and demand" dictated wages; he denied labor's right to dictate its own price.²²

The Nation enthusiastically supported President Cleveland. According to historian John Chamberlain, "the true apostles of laissez-faire in the eighties and nineties were the Cleveland Democrats." Many of them were also followers of Godkin's commentary.²³

Harper's Weekly was founded in 1857 by Fletcher Harper, who managed it until his retirement in 1875. One of several "general illustrated miscellanies," it was called a "Journal of Civilization" and was the best of its class. Offering news, editorials, pictures and essays, it provided a vital illustrated history of the years from 1857 to 1916. It became a strong political and social force.²⁴

James Playsted Wood credits the journal with contributing to the development of modern pictorial journalism. Harper's Weekly used full page pictures that always told a story. The aim of its pictures and illustrations was accurate graphic reporting. Wood calls it "the precursor of today's weekly pictorial and news magazines."²⁵

Somewhat more popular than its monthly cousin (founded in 1850), the weekly had been designed largely as a vehicle for the political discussion which Harper's Monthly eschewed.²⁶

Political cartoonist Thomas Nast was hired in 1862. His illustrations of events, persons and social conditions had a powerful impact. His greatest work consisted of a cartoon campaign against the famous Tweed Ring of Tammany Hall in New York. Nast also popularized the Republican elephant and the Democratic donkey as political symbols.²⁷

During the Pullman Strike, Harper's Weekly featured many superb illustrations of the federal troops and railroad violence in Chicago by the famous artist, Frederic Remington.

In 1894 Henry Loomis Nelson became general editor. Carl Schurz, an independent, wrote the leading political editorials. Although Harper's Weekly was intended to be an independent forum, "it is as a vigorous political journal of conservative tendencies that it was most noteworthy."²⁸

Two weeklies, originally oriented to religion, became journals of opinion before their demise. One was the Independent, begun in 1848 as a weekly Congregationalist paper. Published in New York, it was edited from 1870 to 1896 by Henry C. Bowen.²⁹

Although it featured interdenominational religious news, it also gave attention to current events and the

issues of the day. The Independent printed some fiction and had departments devoted to fine arts, education, and science; but it emphasized public affairs. Normally it supported Republican candidates for President.³⁰

With a circulation of approximately 15,000, the Independent maintained an important position among American periodicals. In Mott's evaluation, "It was one of a very small group of religious papers to hold a comparatively general audience in a period which saw most such periodicals degenerate into denominational news letters."³¹

In October 1928 it was merged in the Outlook, a journal which had paralleled the Independent in various phases.³²

The Outlook grew out of the Christian Union, founded in 1870 by Henry Ward Beecher. Like the Independent, it was published in New York and began as a specialized religious journal. When Lyman Abbott became managing editor in 1881, he made the weekly somewhat more a journal of opinion and reportage. "There was some political commentary, Republican in sympathy, yet denunciatory of official corruption."³³

In 1893 Abbott discarded the old name and christened the weekly the Outlook. This marked a major change in emphasis from religious news to the broader field of public affairs. Circulation gained and passed the 30,000 mark in 1894. By then the journal had correspondents in Washington, Boston and Chicago. Under Abbott's editorship the Outlook

became strong in comment on national affairs, as well as biography and literary criticism.³⁴

Although Abbott was sympathetic to reform and to the social gospel, his weekly did not engage in the exposure of corruption as a practice.³⁵ Nevertheless, "the editorials and articles he published helped to shape the rising sense of dissatisfaction with politics and industry in America." The Outlook, according to historian C. C. Regier, helped pave the way for the rise of the muckraking movement.³⁶

The magazine reached a peak of circulation, and of influence, in the Theodore Roosevelt era; Roosevelt himself served as a contributing editor from 1908 until 1914. The Outlook merged with the Independent in 1928. Because of declining circulation, the Outlook and Independent, as it was then called, became a monthly. A victim of the Depression, it finally ceased publication in 1935.³⁷

The Monthlies

Four non-fiction monthly reviews of the 1890's contained articles, the majority of which dealt very closely with the critical issues of the day: the Arena, the Forum, the North American Review and the Review of Reviews. Some of the greatest editors in the history of American magazines, according to Mott, worked for these journals during the 1890's.³⁸

TABLE 1--LEADING JOURNALS OF OPINION AND REPORTAGE - 1894

<u>A. Weeklies:</u>		<u>Harper's Weekly</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Outlook</u>
1. Est. circ.*		75,000	12,000	15,000	30,000
2. Editor(s)		Carl Schurz Henry L. Nelson	Wendell P. Garrison Edwin L. Godkin	Henry C. Bowen	Lyman Abbott
3. Illustrations		yes	no	some	some
4. Religious background		no	no	yes	yes
5. Politics		Conservative	Conservative	Republican	Republican
6. Fought corruption		yes	yes	yes	yes
7. "Pre-muckraker"		---	---	---	yes
<u>B. Monthlies:</u>		<u>Arena</u>	<u>Forum</u>	<u>North American Review</u>	<u>Review of Reviews</u>
1. Est. circ.*		25,000	30,000	75,000	85,000
2. Editor		Benjamin O. Flower	Walter H. Page	Lloyd Bryce	Albert Shaw
3. Politics		Liberal	Bipartisan	Bipartisan	Republican
4. Fought corruption		yes	yes	yes	yes
5. "Pre-muckraker"		yes	---	---	yes
6. Debate format		no	yes	yes	no
7. Summaries		no	no	no	yes

*Estimated circulation

The Arena "was more bold and persistent in its presentation of current social issues than any other review of the nineties." Founded in 1889 and published in Boston, this monthly was edited by Benjamin Orange Flower, whose chief interest was in social reform.³⁹

Flower, a believer in "Progress," aimed at promoting happiness for all people. He hoped the Arena would

. . . present great vital movements and theories of the hour, giving emphasis to the sides and views which, because of their conflicting with entrenched privilege or the rising tide of reaction, or on account of their being too new and unconventional to be popular, were for prudential and financial reasons denied a free hearing in current periodical literature.⁴⁰

The editor of a competing journal said of Flower's monthly, "It is an open arena for the discussion of subjects tabooed by the Forum and the North American. There is more audacity about the Arena than its older rivals."⁴¹

The Arena played a pioneer role in the development of muckraking. Without hesitation it exposed corruption and urged social, economic and political reform. During the 1890's it was a crusading magazine; it adopted the technique of multiple crusades which had been developed by Pulitzer. Particularly during the hard times of the mid-nineties, the Arena attacked the evils of poverty, sweatshops, slums, unemployment, and child labor; it crusaded against trusts and other combinations of wealth. And it urged reforms such as the initiative, referendum and recall, to increase popular influence upon government.⁴²

Unlike Godkin, the editor of Arena did not subscribe to laissez-faire doctrine. Flower was dedicated to the goal of making American industry "democratic." He waged an unceasing war upon "the interests"--the powerful corporations that decreased economic freedom and corrupted the political process. An advocate of social justice, Flower generally defended labor unionism, usually without reservation; he favored the ends sought by labor, but opposed the use of violent or oppressive measures in attaining those ends. He supported government ownership of utilities and transportation lines.⁴³

In 1894 the Arena's circulation was about 25,000. To further the spread of its ideas among the educated community, up to 2,000 copies were sent each month to magazine and newspaper editors. In subsequent years, although its circulation once exceeded 30,000, the journal became financially weak. It was last issued in August 1909.⁴⁴

According to Mott, "On the whole the Arena was a truly liberal and significant journal. Its circulation was never large, but it reached many leaders of American thinking and (through schools, editorial offices, and libraries) many leaders-to-be."⁴⁵ It was the only journal to muckrake consistently by plan in the 1890's.⁴⁶

Less radical than the Arena were two monthlies that discussed the great questions of the day, the Forum and the North American Review.

Founded in 1886, the Forum was first edited by Loretta S. Metcalf, a man trained on the North American staff. Metcalf's editorial policy consisted of four basic principles: (1) to present articles by experts on topics of greatest timely significance; (2) to provide a symposium for debates on a variety of social, political and economic problems; (3) to print several articles in each issue designed to attract reader interest; and (4) to edit severely all manuscripts.⁴⁷

When Walter Hines Page became editor in 1891, he said the purpose of the Forum was "to provide discussion about subjects of contemporary interest, in which the magazine is not partisan, but merely the instrument."⁴⁸ Page continued to emphasize the use of expert writers and the magazine debate technique. He concentrated on articles dealing with economics, sociology and politics, with secondary emphasis on education, religion, science, history and literature.⁴⁹

The influence of the journal was probably greater than its circulation indicated. By the time Page quit as editor in 1895, the Forum had attracted some 30,000 subscribers. The prestige of the magazine in the 1890's was extensive. It was used in schools and colleges in connection with academic exercises which made use of its debates and symposiums.⁵⁰

The Forum absorbed Century in 1930, then was itself absorbed by Current History in 1940. It was last published

in 1950. In its best days, writes Mott, "the Forum made an admirable contribution to free and open discussion of great public questions."⁵¹

The North American Review, similar in its editorial policies to the Forum, was established in 1815. When Lloyd Bryce became editor and publisher in 1889, the North American had a circulation of 17,000. Under his direction the journal reached its peak circulation of 76,000, several years before the Pullman Strike. Like Page at the Forum, Bryce emphasized controversy, symposiums and joint debate.⁵²

As Mott described the editor,

Bryce was a Democrat in politics, while his predecessor had been a Republican; but the [North American] Review was kept nonpartisan—or rather bipartisan, for it continued to present both sides of most controversial questions. The new editor was a man of wealth, a novelist, a liberal, and a member of Congress from New York.⁵³

While Bryce was editor, until 1896, the North American Review was lively, successful, and frequently contained important discussions of current issues. It was a publication of real power and influence because it was read and studied by the leading men of the country.⁵⁴ In the words of a competing monthly, it was regarded by many to be "at once the highest and most important platform upon which current public issues can be discussed, than is any other magazine or review."⁵⁵

Following the Depression, the North American Review finally ceased publication in 1940.⁵⁶

Different in concept and format from the other three monthlies was the Review of Reviews. A forerunner of the modern newsweekly, the Review emphasized informed discussion of current events and contributed to the trend toward timeliness in the contents of popular magazines. It began in 1891 as the American version of W. T. Stead's London Review of Reviews, which was intended to be an international review.⁵⁷

Stead founded the original magazine in England in 1890. A year later, Dr. Albert Shaw began publishing the Review in New York as an American affiliate. Each Review was independent of the other in editorship and method, yet there was a close relationship between the two journals. In the estimation of Frank Luther Mott, the American version was "far superior to its English parent in nearly every respect."⁵⁸

The Review, unlike the monthlies mentioned above, used digests of articles which had appeared in other periodicals, though it also printed articles of its own. The section, "Leading Articles of the Month," presented condensations from the chief reviews and magazines of the world. In its department entitled "The Progress of the World," the Review included an editorial analysis of current events. This section was devoted mainly to politics and economics.⁵⁹

Albert Shaw, who was editor of the Review until its

end in 1937, maintained a high standard of fairness and unemotional rationality in his news and comment. Although he avoided exposes and all-out attacks on social evils, Shaw kept his readers informed of muckraking revelations. Gradually he built up the Review's circulation. By 1894 he had nearly 85,000 subscribers. By 1906 circulation more than doubled that figure.⁶⁰

The problems attendant on the hard times of the early nineties, plans for the relief of the unemployed, agrarian unrest, the free coinage of silver proposal, and social reforms in the cities were prominent [in the Review].⁶¹

Shaw approached these topics from a fairly consistent Republican viewpoint.

The Review of Reviews, by summarizing, explaining and judging the news, was a pioneer newsmagazine. By providing historical background, and delving into areas neglected by newspapers, the Review contributed to the development of news interpretation.⁶²

As the Review observed in 1929:

Its aim has always been to bring to its readers a monthly statement of events at home and abroad, with a reasonable interpretation of those transactions that constitute history in the making. We have sought to support an intelligent and high-principled conduct of the governmental and social affairs of the United States, regardless of party.⁶³

The General Labor Situation

The Pullman strike began as a local dispute in the town of Pullman, several miles south of Chicago. It

escalated by stages into a general strike of the railroads centered in Chicago, and it spread westward until it covered two-thirds of the United States.

Freight trains ground to a halt. Mails were delayed. Property was destroyed. Perishable foods rotted in boxcars. People were killed. Mobs rioted. Nearly all the forces of law and order, civil and military, were involved.

"The fury with which labor and capital battled in 1894 was the outgrowth of years of mutual distrust and hate. . . ." Workers had long suffered such conditions as miserable slum housing conditions, long hours, dangerous and unsanitary working conditions, and inadequate wages.⁶⁴

During the post-Civil War period, laissez-faire economic doctrines permitted few restraints upon capitalists, except those imposed by vigorous competition. It was the job of big business to make profits. One way to increase profits was to keep down costs. Since the cost of labor was substantial, one sure way to reduce expenses was to slash wages paid to workers.⁶⁵

Following the Panic of 1873, strikes assumed the character of major industrial upheavals. In July 1877 the nation was shaken by a railway dispute of major proportions. Angered by repeated wage cuts, the employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad precipitated a series of spontaneous strikes that broke out in dozens of localities.⁶⁶

These strikes were the first to induce massive federal intervention. U. S. troops were ordered into the states of Maryland, Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Missouri and Illinois. In Chicago, police and state militia battled 5,000 enraged rioters. Six companies of the 9th U. S. Infantry and two more companies of the 22d Infantry were standing by. The governor had formally requested military assistance from President Hayes. After some hesitation, the President had authorized the use of regulars against Chicago rioters. A precedent was set: the U. S. Army had been used to back up police and state militia. This procedure became a vital part of the strategy of the federal government in 1894.⁶⁷

Upon termination of the strikes of 1877, there was no consensus as to what should be done to prevent such disorders in the future. There was some serious discussion concerning the problem of creating better relations between employers and their men.⁶⁸ However, as far as the editors of Nation and Harper's Weekly were concerned, one conclusion was clearly evident: the need for a larger U. S. Army.⁶⁹

The years 1878 to 1885 were relatively quiet. But violence returned again to Chicago with the Haymarket Riot in May, 1886. Following a bomb explosion at Haymarket Place, eight leading anarchists were placed on trial and pronounced guilty. Though four of the anarchists were hanged, three lived to receive their pardons from Governor

John P. Altgeld in 1893. Conservatives were shocked. As a result, Altgeld was bitterly criticized as an "anarchist," a label that was reapplied by some journalists during the Pullman Strike.⁷⁰

The outbreak of the Burlington Strike in February 1888 brought the nation once again face-to-face with the threat of a major transportation tie-up. But the railway workers lacked unity. They failed to fight together in boycotting the Burlington; the dispute never got beyond the "serious threat" stage. Nevertheless, the strike had several important consequences: (1) the Burlington Railway established an insurance system, the purpose of which was to give employees a financial stake in the company and deprive them of a financial stake in organized labor; (2) the use of the judicial injunctive process to suppress strikes began to develop; (3) the first federal railroad labor act was signed; it provided the alternative of voluntary arbitration or of a presidential fact finding commission which might recommend a settlement.⁷¹

As will be demonstrated in later chapters, these outcomes have relevance for the Pullman Strike. George Pullman could have established some means of providing his employees a financial stake in the Pullman Company. He did not. The injunctive process became an essential component in the federal strategy. And President Cleveland could have either encouraged arbitration or established a fact-finding commission to facilitate a settlement. The President did

neither. Instead, he appointed a commission to investigate the strike--after it had substantially run its course.

There was little labor peace in the half-dozen years following the Burlington Strike. During the 1890's, the primary period of great strikes was that of 1892-1894. In the silver and lead mines of the Coeur d' Alene district of Idaho in 1892, a dispute over unionization led to violence that was put down by federal troops. Benjamin Harrison was the first President since Hayes to use the U. S. Army in a labor dispute. Grover Cleveland would do the same, two years later.⁷²

The year 1892 was also the year of the great Homestead Strike. Steel-mill workers clashed with the Carnegie Steel Corporation over reduced wages. Pinkerton guards backed by the Pennsylvania militia forced workers to call off the strike and return to the mills as non-unionists.⁷³ Like Carnegie, the Pullman Company was vehemently opposed to organized labor unions.

A milestone development for labor was the formation of the American Federation of Labor in 1886, an alliance of a number of trade unions of skilled workers. During the Pullman Strike, the A.F. of L. would voice sympathy for striking workers, but otherwise would remain aloof from the struggle.⁷⁴

By 1892, labor leader Eugene V. Debs was convinced that the trade union idea had ceased to be useful. He

thought it fostered divisiveness and competition, rather than cooperation for the collective good. Since the problems encountered by railroad employees were common to all, Debs believed they ought to belong to one organization--a union capable of asserting its united strength in the protection of every member. Accordingly, he resigned from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen to establish such a union.⁷⁵

The American Railway Union (A.R.U.) was organized at Chicago on 20 June 1893. Its purpose: "to protect and promote the interests of its members as wage earners through organization and legitimate cooperation." Membership was open to all white employees who served on railroads, except high officials. The A.R.U. consisted of a general union and of local unions. The general union was formed of representatives of local unions. A strike could be declared only by a majority vote of the locals involved.⁷⁶

Under the leadership provided by Debs, the American Railway Union by 1894 was powerful. About 150,000 railroad employees were members. The A.R.U., representing labor, would become the major contestant against capital during the Pullman Strike.

In establishing the A.R.U., Debs was prompted by one other vital consideration. Railroad capital and management--at least in Chicago--had become an organized coalition. Debs felt that a management concentration of power demanded a like union of employees for the purpose of mutual protection.⁷⁷

The twenty-four railroads terminating in Chicago had formed the General Manager's Association (G.M.A.) in 1886. Its aim was to take united action concerning railroad or labor problems centering at Chicago in which members had a common interest. By 1893 one of its primary concerns was to establish approximate uniformity in wages and to develop a firm policy toward labor. In March, 1893, the G.M.A. successfully prevented a switchmen's union from initiating a strike. The men abandoned their demands and accepted the old wage schedule.

By the time of the Pullman Strike, the General Manager's Association had developed effective strike-breaking machinery. Its members operated more than 40,000 miles of road and employed over 220,000 men. The combined net earnings for the 24 member roads in fiscal year 1894 exceeded \$100 million. The G.M.A., representing organized capital, would be a formidable opponent in the fight against Debs' A.R.U.⁷⁸

The Panic of 1893 signalled the beginning of an acute depression that would be severely felt by Pullman workers. The industrial market collapsed, business operations were drastically curtailed, and unemployment increased sharply. As historian Almont Lindsey notes, "The winter of 1893-94 was filled with tragedy for thousands, and during such a crisis the people grew restless and critical of the economic order."⁷⁹

Two lesser disorders and a general strike of coal miners preceded the onset of the Pullman Strike.

One of these disorders was an eighteen-day strike against the Great Northern Railway involving the newly organized American Railway Union. When James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern, refused to discuss the matter of wage cuts with A.R.U. officials, the union called a strike on 13 April, 1894. Not one freight train moved over the line during the tie-up; no blood was shed. The strike ended on May 1 when both sides accepted the ruling of a board of arbitration. The decision was almost a complete victory for Debs' A.R.U. Seventy-five percent of current pay cuts were restored.⁸⁰

This triumph for the young A.R.U. gave its members a false sense of confidence that the union could deal effectively with management in the subsequent Pullman Strike.

In response to the widespread unemployment emerging from the Panic of 1893, Jacob S. Coxey, a manufacturer-reformer from Ohio, sponsored a march by an army of unemployed to petition Congress for appropriate legislation. Thousands of idle men travelled to Washington D. C. from various parts of the nation. Though peaceful in intention, the movement assumed lawless proportions when other industrial armies from the West began to seize trains and to run them toward the nation's capital.

The United States government was swift in retaliation. Attorney General Olney dealt with Coxeyites who stole trains

by court injunctions enforced by federal troops. President Cleveland was apparently determined to use the full force of his authority to crush the spirit of rebellion. "Common-wealers" who had seized trains were arrested by federal agents for obstructing and retarding the passage of mails. In Washington, Coxey's petition went largely unheard. The government refused to let him speak at the capitol.⁸¹

Magazines took the movement more seriously than newspapers. The Review of Reviews reported that marchers had the sympathy of the American people, who recognized the protest as a gesture of economic desperation. In contrast, the North American Review was alarmed; it said Coxeyism was a "menace."⁸²

The final prelude to the Pullman Strike was a general strike of coal miners, called by the United Mine Workers on 21 April 1894 while the Coxeyites were still marching. In five states the militia were called out to suppress violence. Again the federal government intervened to prevent interference with mail.

In Illinois, Governor Altgeld demonstrated his willingness to use state troops in meeting emergencies. In response to requests for help from sheriffs in various parts of the state, "Altgeld sent troops when there seemed the slightest basis for anticipating trouble." Troops were authorized to assist local officials in preserving the peace, quelling riots and executing the law, but they were not allowed to guard private property. Nor were they

allowed to be used for strike-breaking purposes. The governor was "unalterably opposed to the practice of using the armed forces in the interest of one economic group against another. . . ." ⁸³

Altgeld's position regarding the use of federal troops would become a significant issue in the Pullman Strike.

The Situation at Pullman

The United Mine Workers went on strike in April, 1894, when mine owners refused to restore wages to the previous year's level. Like the miners, workers at the Pullman Palace Car Company, in Pullman, Illinois, had suffered severe wage cuts as the Depression deepened. The Pullman Strike broke out in May, 1894, after George Pullman had tried to reduce the wages of his workers without effecting a corresponding reduction in the rents charged in the company's "model" town.

The Pullman Palace Car Corporation was organized in 1867. Over the years George Pullman had built up a unique and highly successful business. The company constructed, rented and repaired Pullman "palace cars" (dining, parlor and sleeping cars). It also manufactured and sold on contract general types of cars. In 1894 Pullman sleeping cars were operated on about 125,000 miles of track, three-fourths of the railway mileage of the United States. The Pullman Company was financially sound; its financial reserves exceeded \$25,000,000. ⁸⁴

Following the Panic of 1893, wages were drastically reduced, but profits distributed as dividends actually increased.

	<u>Wages Paid</u>	<u>Dividends</u>
Fiscal year 1893	\$7,220,000	\$2,520,000
Fiscal year 1894	\$4,470,000	\$2,880,000
Change	-\$2,750,000	+\$ 360,000

From July 1893 to July 1894, wages had declined by more than \$2,000,000, yet dividends had increased by \$360,000.⁸⁵

Wage reductions per se might not have been so hard on the workers if rents had correspondingly declined. But this was not the situation at Pullman, where the entire town--land, houses, churches and all--was owned by George Pullman. The town, built between 1880 and 1884, was established for several reasons: (1) to consolidate repair and construction facilities; (2) to accommodate the thousands of Pullman workers in an attractive, well-planned community which would prevent labor unrest over bad housing; and (3) to be a business investment expected to earn at least six percent on the entire cost.⁸⁶

The town of Pullman included repair shops, a hotel, an arcade, athletic grounds, a library, paved streets, parks, and brick tenements. The town had a complete sewage and water system. Under the paternalistic regime of George Pullman, the company town was kept neat and attractive. About 5,000 of its residents were employees.⁸⁷

In the spring of 1894 these workers were not happy. Pullman had reduced their pay five times in less than a year, without at the same time reducing rents in his "model" town. For many workers, their income was so small that every bit was needed for food and clothing; after paying their rents they had from \$1.00 to \$6.00 left on which to support their families for two weeks. Rents were 20 to 25 per cent higher in Pullman than in Chicago.⁸⁸

Gradually the employees became convinced that their grievances could be redressed only through a united effort. The American Railway Union offered a tremendous appeal to the restless men at Pullman. They were able to join the union because the Pullman Company owned several miles of railroad. In March and April 1894 the workers at Pullman joined the A.R.U. in large numbers.⁸⁹

Although the A.R.U. strongly advised against a strike, the Pullman employees decided to present their demands to the corporation: reduction in rent, correction of shop abuses and the restoration of wages to the pre-depression level.

On May 7 a forty-six member grievance committee called on a vice president of the Pullman Company, Thomas H. Wickes, to whom the demands were presented. A spokesman for the group asked that wages be restored to the June 1893 level, or that a reduction in rent be made (along with a raise in pay) to enable workers both to meet their rental payments and to support their families.⁹⁰

The company refused, maintaining that business conditions did not justify any change. Wickes said that reduction in rent was impossible since the company was earning only three per cent on its rental investment. Wages could not be raised since the company was losing money on its construction contracts. Although Wickes offered to let the committee review the financial records of the company, the offer was ignored because the men felt the records had been falsified.

The committee met with George Pullman on May 9. He reiterated the position taken by Wickes: rents could not be lowered; wages could not be raised.⁹¹ Pullman's uncompromising attitude increased the determination of the workers to strike.

On May 10 three members of the grievance committee were laid off by a foreman for alleged lack of work. That night the grievance committee, disregarding the advice of the A.R.U., voted unanimously to call a strike. On May 11 the strike began. Some 4,000 employees walked out. To demonstrate their intention that the strike remain non-violent—that no Pullman property would be destroyed—300 strikers were assigned to guard production and repair facilities. George Pullman promptly closed his shops and left for the East.⁹²

During the period May 11 to July 4, 1894, no violence or destruction of property by strikers or sympath-

izers took place at Pullman. Not until late June did many persons except the Pullman employees give more than passing attention to the strike. For its first month, the dispute was of major interest only to the Chicago press, which generally was sympathetic to the cause of the workers. The American Railway Union, striving to gain the support of public opinion, urged workers to avoid unruliness. By mid-June the strike had lasted over a month, yet workers had nothing to show for their efforts.⁹³

The Situation at Chicago

Beginning on June 12, however, pressure began building in Chicago to force the Pullman Company into a settlement—even if it meant escalating the strike on a wider scale. On that day over 400 delegates representing the 465 local unions of the American Railway Union met to begin their first regularly scheduled convention. Several days later the delegates voted to consider the Pullman situation. A committee of strikers appeared before the convention and submitted a long list of their reasons for the strike. Wage reductions, high rentals, and Pullman's failure to redress grievances were the main issues.⁹⁴

The A.R.U. recognized that wrongs must be corrected in lawful and orderly ways. It was carefully geared to settle grievances in a harmonious fashion. In the event issues could not be resolved by mediation, only a majority vote of the locals could decide to strike. The convention

decided to seek arbitration with the Pullman Company. On June 16 a committee of delegates met with Vice President Wickes and requested arbitration. He told them the Pullman Company would never arbitrate. Similarly, when the Civic Federation of Chicago urged conciliation, Wickes rejected the plea; under no circumstances would the company arbitrate.⁹⁵

On June 21 the delegates, under instructions from their local unions, unanimously voted that the members of the A.R.U. would refrain from handling Pullman cars on June 26 unless the Pullman Company would consent to arbitration. Eugene Debs, president of the A.R.U., later testified that "the strike was practically ordered by the rank and file of the membership . . . the delegates acted by their express authority and instruction." He emphasized that the delegates--not Debs--had ordered the strike. According to historian Harry Bernard, the A.R.U. members had nothing to gain for themselves by risking their jobs to help the Pullman workers; the local unions voted to boycott because of sympathy for their class.⁹⁶

The next day three members of the A.R.U. called upon Wickes and presented their ultimatum. The Pullman Company flatly refused to deal with the A.R.U. or to submit anything to arbitration.⁹⁷ At that moment the Pullman Strike changed from a local issue to a matter of national concern.

The General Manager's Association responded quickly to the threat. The G.M.A. resolved to resist the proposed

boycott by a united effort among its members in the interest of railroad contracts and "for the benefit of the travelling public. . . ." ⁹⁸

On June 26 the boycott was initiated.

Switchmen would refuse to couple Pullman cars, inspectors to examine them, and engineers and brakemen to haul any train carrying the cars. Service would be tied up until the Pullman Company negotiated, or the railroads stopped using Pullman cars. ⁹⁹

The boycott started slowly, but then spread rapidly. Switchmen at the Illinois Central refused to attach Pullman cars to trains. Their subsequent discharge resulted in a strike of the remaining union men.

The General Manager's Association adopted the policy of discharging any man who refused to handle Pullman cars, even though he may be willing to do all his other work. Although no strike was declared against the railroads, employees voluntarily initiated a strike in retaliation against railroads who implemented this policy. As the boycott spread it became a contest between the A.R.U. and the G.M.A. ¹⁰⁰ But once initiated, the boycott also became a matter of increasing concern for the public, the government and the press.

CHAPTER I -- FOOTNOTES

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⁴Ibid., p. 13.

⁵Ibid., pp. 207, 211.

⁶Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, pp. 282-288.

⁷C. C. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers (Glocester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957), pp. 26, 31, 42.

⁸Emery, The Press and America, p. 403. Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, pp. 282, 283, 286, 287, 294.

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¹⁰Harold U. Faulkner, 1890-1900: Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 19.

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¹²Mott, Magazines IV, p. 156.

¹³Ibid., p. 65.

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¹⁶Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines Vol. III, 1865-1885 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 331. Hereinafter Mott, Magazines III. Carey McWilliams, "One Hundred Years of the Nation," Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Spring, 1965), 193.

¹⁷Godkin's statement, quoted in McWilliams, "One Hundred Years of the Nation," p. 195.

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²⁰Roland E. Wolseley, The Magazine World: An Introduction to Magazine Journalism (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 61. Hereinafter, Wolseley, Magazine World; Aaron Miller, "The Paradoxical Godkin, Founder of the Nation," Journalism Quarterly XLII (Spring, 1965), 201; McWilliams, "One Hundred Years of the Nation," pp. 196-97.

²¹Miller, "The Paradoxical Godkin," p. 201.

²²Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 367; Mott, Magazines III, p. 342.

²³John Chamberlain, Farewell to Reform (New York: Liveright, Inc., Publishers, 1932), p. 9.

²⁴James P. Wood, Magazines in the United States (3d ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1971), p. 80; Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines Vol. II, 1850-1865 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 469. Hereinafter, Mott, Magazines II; Mott, Magazines IV, p. 57.

²⁵Wood, Magazines in the United States, p. 81.

²⁶Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 248. According to the American Newspaper Directory: 1896 (New York: George P. Rowell & Co., 1896), p. 201, Harper's Monthly in 1895 had a circulation exceeding 75,000.

²⁷Mott, Magazines II, pp. 474-82.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 486-87.

²⁹Mott, Magazines II, p. 367.

³⁰Ibid., p. 376; Mott, Magazines IV, p. 59.

³¹Mott, Magazines II, p. 376.

³²Ibid., p. 379.

³³Mott, Magazines III, pp. 422-23, 426.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 428-29. Mott, Magazines IV, p. 59.

³⁵Grenier, Progressive Muckraking, p. 38.

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⁵⁷Mott, Magazines, IV, p. 52. Lloyd J. Graybar "Albert Shaw and the Review of Reviews," Journalism Quarterly XLIX (Winter, 1972), 692.

⁵⁸Mott, Magazines IV, pp. 657-59.

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⁶⁴Almont Lindsey, The Pullman Strike: The Story of a Unique Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Chicago Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 1-3. Hereinafter, Lindsey, Pullman Strike. Lindsey's book is thoroughly documented and provides supplementary information not contained in the Report of the United States Strike Commission (1895).

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⁶⁶Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 8. Gerald G. Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes: The Beginnings of Federal Strike Policy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 24. Hereinafter, Eggert, Labor Disputes.

⁶⁷Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 7, 8. Robert V. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (New York: The New Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 247-51.

⁶⁸McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. 267.

⁶⁹Nation, XXV (August 2, 1877), 68. Harper's Weekly XXI, (August 11, 1877), 618.

⁷⁰Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 9.

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⁷²Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 108. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence, p. 319.

⁷³Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 108. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 9-10.

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⁷⁵United States Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July 1894, (Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1972), p. XXIII. Hereinafter, Strike Report. This volume is a reprint of the original, published in 1895. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 109.

⁷⁶Strike Report, pp. XXIII, XXIV. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 110. Concerning dates, when the year is included in a date, the sequence used is day, month, year; when the year is not cited, the sequence used is month, day.

⁷⁷Strike Report, p. XXIII.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. XXVIII, XXIX. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 114-19.

⁷⁹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 12.

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⁸⁴Strike Report, p. XXI.

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⁹²Ibid., pp. XXXVII, XXXVIII; p. 417. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 122-23.

⁹³Strike Report, p. XXXVIII. Stanly Buder, Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning, 1880-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 169-70, 177. Hereinafter, Buder, Pullman Experiment.

⁹⁴Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 128. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 178.

⁹⁵Strike Report, pp. XXV, XXXVIII; p. 590. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 111, 129.

⁹⁶Strike Report, p. XXXIX; Debs' quotation, p. 140. Bernard, Life of Altgeld, p. 282.

⁹⁷Strike Report, p. 590.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. XLII.

⁹⁹Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 180.

¹⁰⁰Strike Report, p. XLIII. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 134.

CHAPTER II

THE STRIKE AND THE PERIODICALS:

A SUMMARY OF COVERAGE

On June 26 Debs sent telegrams to all parts of the nation. He told local unions Pullman cars were not to be handled and he urged non-violence, since violence could alienate the public and provide justification for military intervention. With his headquarters at Uhlich's Hall in Chicago, Debs coordinated the boycott and resulting strike until he was arrested in July.¹

Railroads could have left Pullman cars off their trains, thereby avoiding trouble but at the same time accomplishing the strike's purpose. The General Manager's Association, however, decided to resist the boycott. In a resolution issued to the public, the managers set forth their reasons for this decision: to discontinue the use of Pullman cars on passenger trains would be not only an inconvenience to the travelling public, but also a violation of existing contracts with the Pullman Company.²

Railroad workers were in general sympathy with the cause of the Pullman employees, and predisposed to strike. They were, according to the Strike Commission, in a

. . . disturbed and apprehensive condition . . . resulting from wage reductions on different lines, blacklisting . . . and from the recent growth and development of the General Manager's Association, which seemed to them a menace.³

When some employees were fired for refusal to handle Pullman cars, many local railroad unions took the opportunity to express their own grievances.

Hence the Pullman Strike was rapidly transformed from a boycott to a general strike against the railroads. There were several contributory factors: (1) sympathy for the Pullman workers among railroad union employees; (2) the firing of railroad employees who refused to handle Pullman cars; and (3) the frustrations of railroad workers brought on by bad working conditions.

As the boycott spread it became an issue of national concern. The first big story of the Pullman Strike to reach readers in the East was printed in the New York Times on June 27.⁴ In early July the journals of opinion began serious coverage of the strike.

Editorially, the four weeklies were unanimous in their denunciation of the A.R.U. and the boycott. The Outlook declared:

The issue is an absolutely simple one: it is whether the highways of the Nation are to be controlled by the American Railway Union, reinforced by murderous mobs, and the right to travel . . . is held at the pleasure of the American Railway Union and its officers.⁵

The Nation asserted that "the present boycott is an attempt to starve out society."⁶

The Independent called the boycott "senseless and inhuman," and added, "The railroad companies must resist it to the bitter end."⁷

Harper's Weekly denounced the boycott as the "basest of crimes," and said it was "an attempt at blackmail on the highest scale."⁸ The Weekly probably expressed the sentiments of most of the conservative press when it exclaimed, "Until the rebellion is suppressed, all differences of opinion concerning its origin . . . are irrelevant to the issue of the hour, and must wait for the future."⁹

The General Managers and Federal Attorneys

The employees of the Northern Pacific and Santa Fe lines joined the strike on June 27.

By then Mayor John P. Hopkins had ordered his entire 3,000 man police force to total readiness, with orders to preserve the peace, protect property and prevent violence.

The strike expanded rapidly. By June 28 almost 18,000 workers on six railroads had walked off their jobs.¹⁰

The General Manager's Association, headed by Everett St. John, directed all efforts on behalf of the railroads toward victory over the American Railway Union. In daily meetings to plan strategy against the strike, the G.M.A.:
(1) began to coordinate with civil and military authorities;
(2) set up a committee of lawyers to initiate legal proceedings; (3) started hiring replacements for strikers; and

(4) established a publicity bureau to provide the press with information designed to build public support for their cause.¹¹

To manage anti-strike activities, the General Managers appointed John M. Egan "director of resistance" on June 28. Everett St. John presided over the daily meetings, but Egan was charged with executing all strike policies. The next day, 4,500 railroad workers met at Blue Island. More than one-third decided to support the American Railway Union. In response, the General Managers promised they would blacklist any worker who joined the A.R.U. strike or refused to perform any of his duties.¹²

On about June 29 the legal committee of the G.M.A. recommended immediate proceedings against the American Railway Union for interference with mail and interstate commerce; and it decided to seek injunctions to restrain the strikers. The General Managers agreed; federal assistance was needed. The association relayed its legal recommendations, along with a request for more federal deputies, to Thomas E. Milchrist, United States district attorney in Chicago.¹³

Milchrist was fully cooperative. He told the G.M.A. he would invoke the conspiracy section of the Interstate Commerce Law in prosecuting those who obstructed interstate freight. Furthermore, he asked the railways to supply his office with the names of any persons who interfered in any

way with the movement of trains carrying the mail, or who cut off Pullman or other cars from mail-carrying trains.¹⁴

During the Great Northern strike in April, the Justice Department had issued an opinion regarding mail trains; in effect, every car of any train carrying mail was part of the mail train and thus entitled to federal protection. Under this precedent, any employee who cut off a Pullman car from a train carrying mail was subject to punishment by the federal government.¹⁵

These preliminary dealings between the G.M.A. and U. S. District Attorney Milchrist received only slight coverage by the journals. The appointment of Egan as "strike manager" of the G.M.A. was reported only in Harper's Weekly.¹⁶

In a telegram to Attorney General Richard Olney on June 30, Milchrist reported that mail trains in the suburbs of Chicago were, on the previous night, stopped by strikers. He recommended that the U. S. Marshal in Chicago be authorized to appoint a special force of deputies to help protect the mail trains.¹⁷

Olney had served as attorney for the Chicago, Quincy and Burlington Railroad; he viewed the strike as an attack against railroad property and a threat to corporate control.¹⁸ Olney authorized the U. S. Marshal to swear in as many men as were needed, and he appointed Edwin Walker as a special attorney for the federal government.¹⁹

Walker had served as a general counsel for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad. He was then a legal adviser to the General Manager's Association.²⁰

The Outlook, though it omitted Walker by name, and referred to him simply as "a prominent lawyer at Chicago. . . ." was the only journal to report (correctly) that he had been appointed in response to a recommendation from the General Manager's Association to the Attorney General.²¹ Walker's appointment received no mention in the other journals.

Although Walker was assigned to assist Milchrist, it soon became evident that Walker, in close liason with the G.M.A., was the real director of affairs for the Justice Department in Chicago.²² Despite his importance to the federal strategy, Walker's role in the strike was almost completely ignored by the journals of opinion.

Before the day was over, U. S. Marshal John Arnold had begun to swear in a force of special federal deputies. During the period June 30 to July 5 several thousand men were deputized, many of them loyal railroad employees furnished by the G.M.A.²³

By 1 July 1894, nearly 50,000 men were on strike. Of the 24 railroads centering in Chicago, few escaped involvement. As the strike gained momentum, railway transportation became increasingly disrupted. Freight trains hauling boxcars loaded with perishable food supplies were soon unable to move.²⁴

Olney urged U. S. district attorneys to take all measures necessary to prevent the stoppage of mail and punish the guilty. He suggested that injunctions against the strikers be obtained that would, in his words, "have the effect of preventing any attempt to commit the offense."²⁵

The Attorney General's plan for suppressing the strike was not confined to strictly legal tactics. In a telegram to Edwin Walker, Olney said that he felt the best way of dealing with the matter was "by a force which is overwhelming and prevents any attempt at resistance."²⁶

Harper's Weekly, in one of several personality sketches, referred to Richard Olney as "the moving spirit of the government . . . his cool and steady brain has discovered and given vitality to a doctrine of the authority of the national government."²⁷

Walker and Milchrist drafted the petition for an injunction. They asked the federal court to enjoin all interference with the mail and to prohibit all interference with interstate commerce under the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.²⁸

The injunction, issued by a United States Circuit Court, was extremely comprehensive. Officials of the American Railway Union and all other persons "combining and conspiring" with them were "restrained, commanded, and enjoined absolutely to desist and refrain from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of

the business. . . ." of the railroads. The injunction listed a myriad of specific acts prohibited. It even restrained Debs, president of the A.R.U., from "sending out any letters, messages, or communications directing, inciting, encouraging, or instructing any persons whatsoever to interfere with the business. . . ." of the railways.²⁹

On July 2 the injunction was issued and served on Debs and other officials of the A.R.U. This was not the first time the union had faced such an order. The A.R.U. experienced a similar injunction during the Great Northern Strike and had successfully ignored it. Debs intended to ignore this one as well.³⁰

While federal attorneys dealt with Debs, the General Manager's Association decided to take more direct action in order to draw the U. S. government into the struggle. Part of the G.M.A.'s policy had been to arouse the anger of the travelling public by aggravating the transportation tie-up. On July 2 the General Managers decided gradually to withdraw passenger trains from service.³¹ This decline in railway traffic would be attributed to the boycott and strike "instigated" by Debs and executed by members of the A.R.U.

Part of the strategy developed between Walker and the G.M.A. involved the rationale that the A.R.U. was interfering with the mails. On July 1, however, the mail trains had free passage. In fact, the A.R.U. had even offered crews to move mail trains that included no Pullman cars.³²

None of this strategy or this collusion between the G.M.A. and Walker was reported in the weeklies. They apparently accepted at face value "strike manager" Egan's assertion that the strikers had "fought" the railroads to a "standstill."³³

Before the day was over, Special Attorney Edwin Walker had telegraphed Olney: "It is the opinion of all that the orders of the court cannot be enforced except by the aid of the Regular Army." In response, President Grover Cleveland directed that federal troops be prepared to move to Chicago.³⁴

The next day U. S. Marshal Arnold wired Olney. A mob of several thousand had rioted in the Rock Island yards at Blue Island, Illinois. A mail train had been ditched. The marshal had read the injunction to the mob and commanded it to disperse. The mob responded with jeers and hoots, then threw several baggage-cars across the tracks. Arnold reported:

I am unable to disperse the mob, clear the tracks, or arrest the men who were engaged in the acts named, and believe that no force less than the regular troops of the United States can procure the passage of the mail-trains, or enforce the orders of the courts.

Attorneys Walker and Milchrist, plus a federal judge endorsed Arnold's message.³⁵

At this time, Illinois Governor Altgeld was sending troops to various points as requested by local authorities. He was prepared to move state troops to Chicago if the need

arose. Arnold's telegram, however, made no mention of the availability of local police or state militia.³⁶

In Washington, the President met with his Cabinet. Secretary of War Daniel Lamont, General Nelson A. Miles, and Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham opposed the use of federal troops. Attorney General Olney, however, was in complete agreement with the telegram he received from Chicago. President Cleveland decided to intervene. He ordered troops to Chicago under the authority of sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Governor Altgeld had not requested U. S. troops, nor had President Cleveland consulted with the governor in arriving at his decision.³⁷

Federal Intervention, Official Protest and Violence

At 4:00 p.m. 3 July 1894 Army Headquarters telegraphed the order to Fort Sheridan that directed Colonel R. E. A. Crofton to move his entire command to Chicago. Olney wired Walker and Milchrist to ensure that troops were used "within the limits provided by the Constitution and laws." Troops were ordered to protect federal property, prevent obstruction of the mails, prevent interference with interstate commerce, and enforce the mandates of the federal courts.³⁸

During that night some 1,200 U. S. Army regulars were brought into Chicago, "the Fifteenth Infantry, Troops B and K, Seventh Cavalry, and Light Battery E, First

Artillery . . .," according to the official report. The only journal to provide an accurate summary of these units was Outlook.³⁹

By the morning of Independence Day the regulars had set up camp on Chicago's lake front. General Miles arrived and assumed command.⁴⁰

Harper's Weekly described Miles as "a man . . . of perfect loyalty, of trained capacity, of sound judgement, unmoved by fear or passion, independent of political pressure, uninfluenced by prejudice, a ruler of others and of himself."⁴¹

According to Almont Lindsey, "Prior to July 4 the situation in Chicago did not go beyond some sabotage and an occasional demonstration that was quickly suppressed by the police." As the troops arrived the city was quiet. Although many trains did not move, this was in no way due to threatening mobs; it was due to insufficient crews.⁴²

Soon, however, the workers heard of the arrival of the federal troops. Aggressive crowds began to form. Vandalism increased, and mobs at the Union Stock Yards halted the movement of all railway cars containing meat or livestock.⁴³

Outlook was the only weekly to report that disorder in Chicago increased after the arrival of the regulars.⁴⁴

Attorney General Olney told reporters, "We have been brought to the ragged edge of anarchy and it is time to see whether the law is sufficiently strong to prevent this condition of affairs."⁴⁵

On the tenth day of the boycott, July 5, Governor Altgeld wired President Cleveland a long, vigorous protest on the presence of federal troops in Chicago. The Governor said it was "entirely unnecessary and . . . unjustifiable." He pointed out that a marshal in southern Illinois had twice requested state troops, that the troops had been quickly provided, and that the same course of action was open to the marshal at Chicago. Altgeld asked for the immediate withdrawal of federal troops and said:

Should the situation at any time get so serious that we cannot control it with the State forces, we will promptly and freely ask for Federal assistance. . . .⁴⁶

Cleveland made a terse, formal reply. He said that troops were sent to remove obstruction of the mails, to enforce the processes of the federal courts, and to cope with "conspiracies" against interstate commerce.⁴⁷

The Nation said Altgeld's protest was perfectly understandable. He was the "anarchist" governor who had pardoned three Haymarket prisoners a year earlier; "it is only natural that he should sympathize with anarchists who have not yet been sent to prison."⁴⁸

Harper's Weekly was equally outspoken: "In the light of burning property and amid the howls of furious throngs bent on cutting off the food of his citizens . . ." Governor Altgeld informs the President that federal interference is unjustifiable.⁴⁹

The Independent and the Outlook both supported the President, but were more moderate in their denunciation of Altgeld. The Independent referred to Altgeld's protest as an "untimely and impertinent rebuke . . .," and justified federal intervention with the assertion that for a week or longer "the strikers have gone on . . . destroying property at a rate of two or three million dollars a day."⁵⁰

Outlook less passionately declared, "It is no time for a public debate concerning the powers of the Federal Government," and urged men of all parties "to sustain the President . . . in enforcing law and punishing crime."⁵¹

That afternoon General Miles reported a mob of more than 2,000 had overturned about 20 freight cars, which obstructed all freight and passenger traffic in the vicinity of the stock yards. He added,

The injunction of the United States court is openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action of the police or they are fired upon by United States troops, more serious trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and becoming more defiant.⁵²

Commanding General J. M. Schofield replied, telling Miles to protect U. S. property, but to leave the preservation of peace to city and state authorities.⁵³

The Rock Island railroad reported having trouble from a mob of several thousand which was moving eastward along the line, overturning cars, burning station houses and destroying property. The Outlook, in an exaggerated report, said that mobs up to 25,000 obstructed tracks.⁵⁴

Mayor Hopkins telegraphed Governor Altgeld and asked that the First Regiment of Chicago be alerted for possible duty within 24 hours. Altgeld complied with Hopkins' request immediately and ordered Brigadier General Horace A. Wheeler to take appropriate action in support of the mayor. By then the police force had increased to 3,500 men and was fully engaged in breaking up mob violence. And Hopkins had issued a proclamation prohibiting riotous assemblies and directing the police to stop people from interfering with the railroads.⁵⁵

Late that night, a colossal fire of unexplained origins destroyed the seven largest buildings remaining from the 1893 World's Fair in Jackson Park. The result: one man dead and four injured. Harper's Weekly was the only journal to report the fire. It accurately declared that the "origin of the fire is a puzzle that will never be solved."⁵⁶

On Friday, July 6, Governor Altgeld renewed his protest against federal intervention. In an even longer, even stronger objection, he wired the President:

Your answer to my protest . . . evades the question at issue--that is, that the principle of local self-government is just as fundamental in our institutions as is that of Federal supremacy.

Altgeld charged the President with assuming a legal right to order federal troops into any community of the United States,

. . . whenever there is the slightest disturbance, and . . . without any regard . . . as to whether the community is able and ready to enforce the law itself.⁵⁷

The governor repeated his belief that state troops were adequate to deal with the situation and again asked for the withdrawal of federal troops.⁵⁸

Cleveland sent a one sentence reply. He denied that he had transcended his authority and concluded:

. . . it seems to me that in this hour of danger,
. . . discussion may well give way to active
efforts on the part of all in authority to restore
obedience to law and to protect life and property.⁵⁹

Following Cleveland's response to Altgeld's second telegram, the Nation declared:

President Cleveland's method of dealing with Governor Altgeld is a model one. He wastes no time in arguing with him or in defending himself against his attacks, but . . . sets him before the country in his true light as the friend and champion of disorder.⁶⁰

Harper's Weekly expressed similar views. It called Altgeld a "demagogue" and a "crank;" said he has made himself a "counsel for those opposed to law;" and asserted that his protest to Cleveland "wholly misrepresented the facts as they were known to exist in Illinois . . ."⁶¹

The Independent made no mention of Altgeld's second protest. The Outlook, however, gave a concise, objective account of the incident.⁶²

By then the struggle involved 27 states and territories. The federal government had sworn in thousands of deputy marshals; over 16,000 federal troops were being used to protect the nation's railroads. Although the American Railway Union had advised against strikes on roads that did

not use Pullman cars, some of the local unions had decided to strike on their own initiative based on local grievances.⁶³

Governor Altgeld was not alone in his protests against Cleveland. The governors of Missouri, Colorado, Texas, Oregon and Kansas issued similar complaints that federal intervention was unwarranted.⁶⁴

Prior to the rioting on the Rock Island line and the overturned freight cars at the stockyards, damage to railroad property amounted to less than \$6,000. None of the railroads had asked either Governor Altgeld or Mayor Hopkins for help. On July 6, however, railways began to request state troops and police.⁶⁵

That morning, Governor Altgeld received a telegram from officials of the Illinois Central that indicated a riot was in progress. He told the president of that railroad to ask the mayor to seek assistance from the state. Then he relayed a message urging Hopkins to ensure that police and state troops dealt with the situation before federal troops could be reinforced. Shortly thereafter, the mayor wired the governor with a request for four additional regiments of state militia. Altgeld responded promptly. Over 4,000 state troops were ordered into the city.⁶⁶

The weeklies differed in their accounts of this episode. None mentioned that the additional Illinois troops were requested by the mayor after Altgeld had urged him to do so. According to Harper's Weekly, Mayor Hopkins "called

on the Governor for militia, which were rather reluctantly furnished. . . ." The Outlook accurately reported that "the State militia was immediately ordered out." The Independent and the Nation failed to report the incident.⁶⁷

Despite Hopkin's proclamation, lawlessness was prevalent along the railroad lines. Rioting mobs had demolished train stations, cut telegraph lines, and set fire to more than one hundred box cars. Incendiaries had ignited the cars with torches and the wind had fanned the flames through row upon row of tightly packed cars, stored in the outlying yards. Railroad property valued at \$340,000 was destroyed.⁶⁸

United States soldiers were kept busy in four locations dispersing mobs and supporting the marshals in making arrests of those violating the court injunction.⁶⁹

The artist Frederic Remington, with the U. S. Army in Chicago, covered the strike for Harper's Weekly in several features with accompanying illustrations of the military. In one account he related,

When infantry must walk through a seething mass of smells, stale beer, and bad language, they don't understand. The soldier idea would be to create about eleven cords of compost out of the material at hand.⁷⁰

That afternoon, in a telegram to the Secretary of War, General Miles reported:

Of the twenty-three [sic] roads centering in Chicago, only six are unobstructed in freight, passenger and mail transportation. Thirteen are at present entirely obstructed, and ten are

running only mail- and passenger-trains. Large numbers of trains moving in and out of the city have been stoned and fired upon by mobs, and one engineer killed.⁷¹

Late that night at the railroad yards in South Chicago, an epidemic of fires destroyed some seven hundred cars. As the devastation reached its climax, more and more state troops were deployed to clear the tracks, protect property and restore order.⁷²

The most serious incident of the strike occurred on July 7. A crowd had gathered at 49th and Loomis Streets. A company of state troops stood guard as a work crew attempted to raise an overturned box car. After a time, the mob threw stones and fired several shots at the guards. The soldiers were told to load their weapons. When four of the troops were wounded, orders were given to fire at will. The result: four persons killed and 20 wounded. This was the peak of violence in the Chicago phase of the struggle.⁷³

Three weeklies reported this confrontation. The Outlook and Harper's Weekly each reported that it was the state militia which had engaged with the rioters. Their accounts differed as to the number killed and wounded, with the Outlook's estimate closest to official reports. The Independent was vague as to which troops were involved (i.e., "the soldiers meant business"), and said the incident happened on July 8.⁷⁴

While the militia was engaged with rioters, General Miles and Marshal Arnold had decided to use 40 deputies and

eight U. S. Army companies to protect trains bringing food and mail to the city. They began to clear the tracks.⁷⁵

As the day drew to a close it became evident that the violence of the past 48 hours was waning. Chicago had survived several tragic, but limited spasms. The city was shaken, but police and Illinois troops, with slight backing by the regulars, had effectively put down most of the mob disturbances. Sensational news stories, however, distorted these developments beyond their true perspective. Many newspapers gave the impression that most of Chicago was convulsed by revolution and that President Cleveland and the federal troops were saving the city.⁷⁶

The Collapse of the Strike

On July 8 President Cleveland issued an Executive Proclamation. He warned all persons having anything to do with unlawful assemblages to disperse and return home by noon on the following day.⁷⁷

All the weeklies reported the proclamation. According to Harper's Weekly, it "fairly electrified the country. There had been nothing like it since Lincoln's call for volunteers. . . ." Remington, in a separate article, probably expressed the military reaction to the proclamation when he remarked, "Chicago should have been put under martial law immediately; a few rioters shot, and this would all have been over before now."⁷⁸

At Uhlich Hall, headquarters of the American Railway Union, representatives from more than 100 locals of the Chicago trade unions met. They decided that another attempt should be made to induce the Pullman Company to accept arbitration. If the grievances of the Pullman workers were not settled by July 10, a city-wide general strike would be called.⁷⁹

The following day a subcommittee composed of representatives from the Chicago trade unions and aldermen from a committee appointed by Mayor Hopkins called upon the Pullman Company. They proposed the creation of a board of arbitration consisting of two judges, two Pullman officials, and a fifth member acceptable to both sides. This proposition was flatly rejected; the Pullman Company again asserted there was nothing to arbitrate.⁸⁰

The only journals to report the Pullman refusal were Outlook and Harper's Weekly.⁸¹

On July 10 Illinois troops at the Union Stock Yards succeeded in clearing a blockade which had halted the movement of boxcars loaded with meat. Trains on the Rock Island Railroad began to run. Additional federal troops arrived in Chicago, increasing the total there to nearly 2,000.⁸²

Milchrist and Walker met with a special grand jury and asked for indictments against Eugene Debs and other A.R.U. officials on the grounds of conspiracy in the obstruction of mails and interstate commerce. Two hours

later, Debs and three of his associates were indicted. They were quickly apprehended, but a few hours later they were released on bail.⁸³

While Debs and his associates were in the custody of the court, several law officers raided his headquarters, seized his books and papers, and delivered them to the office of U. S. District Attorney Milchrist. The following day, however, a federal judge declared this to be an illegal procedure and ordered all of Debs' personal papers returned.⁸⁴

Although all the weeklies reported Debs' indictment, none reported the illicit aspects of the raid on his headquarters. The Nation observed:

The fact of the arrest of the head of the conspirators, the swift measures taken to collect overwhelming evidence against them, and the practical certainty that they will be convicted in due time . . . could but have an immediate and powerful effect. Debs . . . could not palm himself off as a Dictator much longer.⁸⁵

Harper's Weekly reported:

The United States attorney had some of the best legal talent in the city to assist him in his work . . . The papers and official documents of the union were seized by the Federal authorities, and the quartet was jailed. They were soon bailed out.⁸⁶

Elsewhere the Weekly proclaimed:

When men combine to effect an unlawful purpose, even by acts each of which may be in itself no offense, they are guilty of conspiracy, and all who abet them, knowing their purpose, share their guilt.⁸⁷

Outlook's account included an explanation of the legal rationale upon which Debs was indicted. Rather than urging

a hasty conviction, however, Outlook cautioned,

A serious danger, now that the strike is over, is that the law will be stretched, if not violated, in popular passion against the strikers. . . . It is a great deal better that the officers of the American Railway Union be acquitted of crime, despite the injury they have inflicted on American commerce, than that they should be convicted by stretching the law. . . .⁸⁸

As for the Independent, its report was concise and straightforward.⁸⁹

Out of sympathy for the cause of the A.R.U., labor leader James Sovereign issued a call on July 10 for a general strike of the Knights of Labor. It proved a futile gesture, however, for the Knights refused to act.⁹⁰

All the weeklies except Nation reported this incident involving the Knights. Harper's Weekly reported it in a separate feature about Sovereign. The Independent gave it a brief mention. The Outlook, however, was the journal to offer Sovereign's reasons for declaring the strike in sympathy with the A.R.U.⁹¹

The congress of Chicago trade unions soon learned that Pullman had refused to arbitrate. A city-wide general sympathy strike was called, effective July 11. It failed miserably. With Debs under arrest and the military in firm control of the city, only about 25,000 workers responded to the call. Most returned to work the following day.⁹²

Meanwhile, in Washington, the Senate adopted a resolution expressing full endorsement of the "prompt and vigorous" measures taken by the President to deal with the strike disorders. An attempt was also made to add an

amendment supporting the principle of arbitration in resolving labor disputes, but it failed to pass.⁹³

The Nation was quite pleased: "The Senate had . . . shown that there is no sympathy with anarchy outside the three or four Populist cranks" who tried to weaken the resolution.⁹⁴

On July 12, Mayor Hopkins of Chicago and Mayor Pingree of Detroit called upon Vice President Wickes at the Pullman Company. They presented telegrams from 50 other mayors throughout the country concerning the strike and asking George Pullman to arbitrate differences with his men. Wickes repeated the official Pullman position that there was nothing to arbitrate. He told them the question of "reopening the shops at Pullman, and carrying them on at a ruinous loss, was not a proper subject for arbitration."⁹⁵

That same day, the executive officers of labor unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor met at Chicago. The purpose of their meeting was to consider all aspects of the strike and to decide what policy, if any, should be adopted. Samuel Gompers presided over the meeting.

Debs, freed temporarily on bail, appeared before the conference and explained the position of the A.R.U. He asked Gompers to deliver a message to the G.M.A. from the A.R.U. proposing an end to the boycott on condition that the strikers be permitted to return to their jobs; if the offer were rejected a general strike should be ordered.⁹⁶

The conference, though sympathetic with the cause of the American Railway Union, rejected Debs' request. As the Strike Commission explained:

The conference concluded that the strike was then lost; that a general sympathetic strike throughout the country would be unwise and inexpedient. . . .⁹⁷

Furthermore, the A.F. of L. delegates recommended that all striking men return to work. They were, however, in favor of a rapid settlement. That afternoon they wired President Cleveland, urging him to bring an end to the strike with fairness to both sides. The President neither acknowledged nor answered their request.⁹⁸

Having failed to gain the full support of the American Federation of Labor, Debs asked Mayor Hopkins to deliver to the General Manager's Association the A.R.U. proposal which Gompers had declined to transmit. The mayor was willing to try.

The next day, July 13, Mayor Hopkins and a Chicago alderman called on the General Manager's Association and presented the document to G.M.A. chairman Everett St. John. A short time later the document was returned to the mayor with the explanation that the G.M.A. was unwilling to accept any communication from the A.R.U. John Egan, strike manager of the G.M.A., asserted that the document was insulting: it originated with the A.R.U. which had "attacked railway companies," was "whipped," and yet sought to "dictate the terms of the surrender."⁹⁹

In the opinion of Eugene Debs, the proposal was returned because the G.M.A. "wanted to crush and annihilate the American Railway Union at whatever cost to the public."¹⁰⁰

The Independent and Harper's Weekly each reported this final effort to end the strike by an agreement, but both reports were sketchy.¹⁰¹

The Weekly criticized Mayor Hopkins, who "instead of putting forth, at the beginning, his whole power to enforce the laws, played the dawdling part of a feeble mediator." Neither the Weekly nor the Independent reported the earlier effort of Hopkins and Pingree to secure arbitration with Pullman. The Outlook, however, covered both incidents, and did so in a more complete account.¹⁰²

As Friday, July 13, came to a close there was little doubt that the strike in Chicago had been virtually broken. All rioting had ended and most trains were running on schedule. Mobs had succumbed to the combined forces of the police, militia, marshals and U. S. troops. With the arrest of Eugene Debs, the courts had deprived the A.R.U. of effective leadership.¹⁰³

On July 16 a resolution was introduced into the U. S. House of Representatives. Similar to the Senate resolution of July 11, it expressed approval of the efforts of President Cleveland and his Administration to end the strike. Representative Lafe Pence, a Colorado Populist, argued against the measure. He said it was improper for

Attorney General Olney, as a former railroad lawyer, to order indictments and injunctions against union officials. Congressman Richard P. Bland of Missouri also opposed the resolution. He protested the "omnibus" nature of the federal injunction and asserted, "The whole arm of the State authority should be used in suppressing violence before the Federal Government should intervene. . . ." ¹⁰⁴

Despite these objections, most congressmen felt that Olney was merely performing his duty; the resolution was adopted.

Before the day had ended, the New York Times proclaimed: "Strike is Dead." ¹⁰⁵

Harper's Weekly criticized Congress for its tardy support of the President:

It was only after the popular response to the President's order to the troops and his telegrams to Altgeld that Congress found its voice sufficiently to denounce violence and commend the President for enforcing the laws of the United States. ¹⁰⁶

The Nation, in a similar editorial tone, concluded: now that the emergency is past, "no one will have any feeling but amused contempt for a House that falls a-fighting a fortnight too late." ¹⁰⁷

On July 17, one week after Debs and his top A.R.U. officials had been arrested and charged with conspiracy, they appeared again in federal court. This time they were charged with contempt of court in having disobeyed the injunction issued July 2. The defense requested sufficient

time to prepare its case. Despite the strenuous objections of Edwin Walker, the court deferred the hearing until July 23. Bondsmen were present, but the defendants waived bail and spent a week in jail.¹⁰⁸

The weeklies made brief mention of the incident, but gave fuller coverage of the legal proceedings as they later developed.

Throughout the major struggle in Chicago, the Pullman strikers had remained quietly in the background. On 18 July, 1894, the management of the Pullman Company posted a notice on the gates of the shops:

These shops will be opened as soon as the number of operatives taken on is sufficient to make a working force in all departments.¹⁰⁹

All former employees, except strike leaders, had the opportunity to reapply for work provided that they would renounce their membership in the A.R.U. The strike had gained the workers nothing, and cost them a great deal; they were forced to accept their old wage scale and pay the same rents as in April.¹¹⁰

Pullman employees lost some \$350,000 in wages; striking Chicago railroad employees lost over \$1,000,000 in wages. The cost to Chicago railroads was nearly \$700,000 in property damage and expanses, and more than \$4,600,000 in passenger and freight revenue. By the time the strike ended in Chicago, 12 persons had been killed, 71 indicted, and 515 arrested on charges of murder, arson, burglary, assault and rioting.¹¹¹

After the strike collapsed, Independent commented, "The act of the American Railway Union was an impudent attempt at dictation and coercion, and the whole country rejoiced in its failure."¹¹²

A summary of the key events in the Chicago phase of the Pullman Strike, the "Landmark History," is included as Appendix I.

CHAPTER II--FOOTNOTES

¹Strike Report, pp. 140-41. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 244-45.

²Strike Report, p. XLII. Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 156-57. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 180.

³Strike Report, p. XL.

⁴John R. Finnegan, Sr., "The Press and the Pullman Strike: An Analysis of the Coverage of the Railroad Boycott of 1894 by Five Metropolitan Daily Newspapers," (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1965), p. 82. Hereinafter, Finnegan, "Press and Pullman Strike."

⁵"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46.

⁶"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5.

⁷"A Senseless Strike," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 858.

⁸"The Boycott of the Pullman Company," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (7 July, 1894), 627.

⁹"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 651.

¹⁰Strike Report, p. 354. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 293. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 134.

¹¹Strike Report, p. XLII. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 138.

¹²Strike Report, p. 251. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 138-39, 204.

¹³Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 141. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 161.

¹⁴Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 153. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 159.

¹⁵Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 158.

¹⁶"The Situation in Chicago," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 655.

¹⁷Grover Cleveland, The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894 (Princeton, N. J.: The Princeton University Press, 1913), p. 14. Hereinafter, Cleveland, Chicago Strike.

¹⁸Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 148-49.

¹⁹Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 14.

²⁰Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 154.

²¹"The Week," Outlook L (7 July, 1894), 5.

²²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 154.

²³Strike Report, p. 343. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 165-66.

²⁴Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 181. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 203.

²⁵Olney's quotation cited in Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 163. Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 15.

²⁶Olney's quotation cited in: Jerry M. Cooper, "The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in American Labor Disputes, 1877-1900" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 228. Hereinafter, Cooper, "Military Intervention."

²⁷"Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 678.

²⁸Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 164.

²⁹The full text of the injunction is presented in the Strike Report, pp. 179-80.

³⁰Strike Report, pp. XL, 114. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 295.

³¹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 142.

³²Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 183. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 293.

³³Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 144. The close relationship between the G.M.A. and Justice Department officials Walker and Milchrist in Chicago is clearly evident in the Report of the U. S. Strike Commission, pp. XIX, XXVIII, XXX-XXXI, XL-XLIII.

³⁴Walker's quotation cited in Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 296. Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 21-22.

³⁵U. S. Marshal Arnold's telegram is printed in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 25-27.

³⁶Barnard, Life of Altgeld, pp. 290-91.

³⁷Ibid., p. 293. Strike Report, p. XX. Lindsey Pullman Strike, pp. 164, 171.

³⁸Strike Report, p. XX. Olney's telegram, printed in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 28; order to Crofton, pp. 27-28.

³⁹U. S. Congress, House, Executive Docs., Report of Major General Nelson A. Miles, 1894, Vol. IV, Part 2, 53d Cong., 3d sess., 1894-95, p. 109. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

⁴⁰Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 29. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 293.

⁴¹"Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 678.

⁴²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, (quotation) p. 203; p. 172. Superintendent of Police Michael Brennan's testimony, Strike Report, p. 293.

⁴³Strike Report, pp. XLV-XLVI.

⁴⁴"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

⁴⁵Olney's quotation cited in Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 172.

⁴⁶Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 186. Altgeld's telegram, Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 40-41.

⁴⁷Cleveland's telegram to Altgeld, Cleveland Chicago Strike, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁸"Governor Altgeld and the President," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 22.

49 "Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650.

50 "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (12 July, 1894), 897. The Strike Commission said railroads lost less than \$700,000 in destroyed property; Strike Report, p. XVIII.

51 "The Strike: Our Present Duty," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 49.

52 Telegram, Miles to Schofield, reprinted in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 30-31.

53 Ibid., p. 31.

54 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 195, 206. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 297. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

55 Strike Report, p. 347. Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 31-32. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 196-97.

56 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 207. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 306. "The Burning of the World's Fair Buildings," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

57 Telegram exchange between Altgeld and Cleveland, reprinted in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 43-45.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 "The Week," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 19.

61 "Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679. The issues raised by Altgeld are discussed in "State Rights and State Duties," same issue, p. 674.

62 "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

63 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 239-40.

64 Wish, "Industrial Warfare," pp. 303-4.

65 Ibid., p. 305. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 308.

66 Strike Report, p. 347. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 198-99. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," pp. 304-5.

67 "Men In Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 45.

⁶⁸Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 32. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 207.

⁶⁹Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 32.

⁷⁰Frederic Remington, "Chicago Under the Mob," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 681.

⁷¹Telegram, Miles to Lamont, reprinted in Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 31-33.

⁷²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 208.

⁷³Ibid., pp. 208-9. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," pp. 306-7.

⁷⁴M. A. Lane, "The Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687. "The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46. C. B. F. Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

⁷⁵Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 210. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 185.

⁷⁶Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 211. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 311.

⁷⁷Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 34-35.

⁷⁸"A Word to the Workingmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698. Frederic Remington, "Chicago Under the Law," Harper's Weekly, same issue, 703.

⁷⁹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 223-24. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 185.

⁸⁰Mayor Hopkins' testimony before the U. S. Commission, Strike Report, pp. 350-51. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 224-25.

⁸¹"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85. M. A. Lane, "The Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

⁸²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 174, 233.

⁸³Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 36. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 277-78.

⁸⁴Strike Report, pp. 143-44. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 278-79.

- ⁸⁵"The Week," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 39.
- ⁸⁶M. A. Lane, "The Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.
- ⁸⁷"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650.
- ⁸⁸"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85.
- ⁸⁹"News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 921.
- ⁹⁰Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 268.
- ⁹¹"The General Master Workman," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679. "News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1893), 921. "The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85.
- ⁹²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 225. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 174. Euder, Pullman Experiment, p. 185.
- ⁹³Marion M. Miller, ed., Great Debates in American History, Vol. X (New York: Current Literature Publishing Co., 1913), pp. 402-7. Hereinafter, Miller, Great Debates. This work includes verbatim transcripts of the Senate and House debates concerning federal intervention.
- ⁹⁴"Common Sense in the Senate," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 41.
- ⁹⁵Strike Report, p. XIXIX; Wicke's testimony, p. 591; Hopkins' testimony, p. 351.
- ⁹⁶Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 226-27.
- ⁹⁷Strike Report, p. XL.
- ⁹⁸Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 226.
- ⁹⁹Egan's statement, Strike Report, p. XLI. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 229-30.
- ¹⁰⁰Strike Report, p. 147.
- ¹⁰¹"News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 921. "Samuel Gompers, Labor Leader," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 702.

- 102 "A Word to the Workingmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698. "The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85-86.
- 103 Strike Report, p. XLII. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 175.
- 104 Miller, Great Debates, pp. 407-9.
- 105 Finnegan, "Press and Pullman Strike," p. 226.
- 106 "Legislators and Organized Labor," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (11 August, 1894), 722.
- 107 "The Week," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 39.
- 108 Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 37. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 281-82.
- 109 Strike Report, p. 591.
- 110 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 268-69.
- 111 Strike Report, p. XVIII.
- 112 "Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503.

CHAPTER III

THE ISSUES: AN EXPLANATION

On 19 July 1894, state and federal troops began to leave Chicago. On August 6 the last of the Illinois militia was ordered home. At the height of the struggle, more than 14,000 armed forces, including police and deputies, had been on duty.¹

Elsewhere throughout the country the strike gradually collapsed. Grand juries were summoned, indictments drawn, and hundreds arrested for contempt. Few persons were actually found guilty.²

With Debs under indictment, the American Railway Union steadily declined in power.

At Pullman, Illinois, most of the workers who quit the A.R.U. were re-employed and by August 24, more than 2,300 men were back at work.³

To place the Pullman Strike in proper perspective, three topics remain: (1) the legal action against Debs; (2) the Report of the U. S. Strike Commission; and (3) repercussions of the strike.

Eugene Debs and the Federal Courts

Although Debs had been charged with conspiracy to obstruct mails and interstate commerce, proceedings related

to these charges were never completed. On 14 December 1894, however, Judge William A. Woods—one of the judges who had issued the injunction against the strikers—found Debs and his associates guilty of contempt. Debs was sentenced to six months in prison.⁴

Following an appeal to the Supreme Court, hearings began in March 1895. Two basic questions were raised:

(1) whether the government had the authority to prevent forcible obstruction of the mails and interstate commerce; and (2) whether a U. S. court of equity was authorized to issue injunctions. On 27 May 1895 the Supreme Court issued its decision: both questions were answered in the affirmative and the proceedings of the lower court were upheld.⁵

Eugene Debs returned to prison to complete serving his sentence. By the time he was released from confinement he had become a determined Socialist, convinced that only a thorough revision of the prevailing economic system could right the wrongs of the working class.⁶

The Report of the U. S. Strike Commission

Under the provisions of a federal law passed in 1888, President Cleveland on 26 July 1894 appointed a three-man commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the strike. Carroll D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, was in charge of the investigation. Hearings began in Chicago on 15 August 1894, and for the next two weeks more than 100 witnesses were examined.⁷

In addition to its findings, the U. S. Strike Commission made specific recommendations, several of which were: (1) that a permanent federal strike commission be established, with authority to investigate, make recommendations and decisions concerning railway disputes;⁸ (2) that states be encouraged to consider the adoption of some system of conciliation and arbitration;⁹ (3) that labor unions be fully recognized by law in order to "prevent their follies by conferring upon them the privileges enjoyed by corporations, with like proper restrictions and regulations;"¹⁰ (4) that employers be urged to recognize labor unions, since "while the interests of capital and labor are not identical, they are reciprocal;"¹¹ (5) that employers should voluntarily raise wages when economic conditions permit such a change, but that if wages are reduced, workers should be given the reasons.¹²

The Strike Commission did not favor government ownership of railways as an immediate solution to the problems of labor. However, if railroads continued to consolidate, there would "at least have to be greater Government regulation and control of quasi-public corporations than we have now."¹³

The Report of the Strike Commission was made public in November, 1894, and provoked much comment in the press.

Repercussions of the Strike

The Pullman Strike challenged many of the laissez-

faire economic assumptions prevailing in the 1890's. It created precedents, implications and controversies that influenced the course of labor relations long after 1894.¹⁴

First, the strike led to the death of the American Railway Union. Labor began a shift to trade unions.

Second, the use of federal court injunctions in dealing with labor disputes became institutionalized, a trend that was not reversed until the 1930's.¹⁵

Third, states began to experiment with the creation of boards of arbitration and eventually enacted legislation responsive to the needs of laborers.¹⁶

Fourth, in 1898 Congress passed the Erdman Act, which provided for the voluntary arbitration of railway labor disputes by a three-man ad hoc commission. According to one historian, this law was evidence of a changed attitude on the part of the government, that force was no longer accepted as the ultimate answer to railroad strikes.¹⁷

Finally, in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (and related New Deal legislation), industrial workers were guaranteed the right to organize and bargain collectively through their own representatives.¹⁸ As recommended by the Strike Commission, labor unions were at last "fully recognized by law."

Immediate Issues

Arising from the "original" strike at Pullman,

Illinois, were the issues of wages, rents, shop abuses, and the refusal of company officials to arbitrate.

Wage Reductions

The principle cause of the Pullman Strike of 1894 was a radical reduction of wages fostered by a depression in business conditions. Following the Panic of 1893, the market for Pullman cars decreased; employment dropped from 4,500 men to less than 1,100 workers by 1 November 1893.¹⁹

From September 1893 through April 1894, in order to meet the competition and keep the plant running, Pullman reduced the prices for his cars an average of 25 per cent. Because of this drastic policy, the company managed to secure sufficient contracts to keep the construction shops operating. As of April 1894, the working force had increased to nearly 4,200 men.²⁰

During this period the Pullman Company lost almost \$52,000 on its construction work. In comparison, the loss to labor by the reduction of wages paid on this work was over \$60,000—an average pay cut of 25 per cent.²¹

Concerning this reduction in wages, several questions need to be asked.

(1) Could the Pullman Company have absorbed the \$52,000 loss in revenue without reducing wages? The construction department, in which the company suffered this financial loss, was a small portion of the total business

conducted by the company. It employed only about 20 per cent of the total work force. The majority of the employees worked in the operating division, which, despite the depression, continued to earn substantial profits.²²

According to historian Almont Lindsey,

The revenue from the operating division in 1894 was sufficient to have absorbed all losses sustained in the construction department, to have permitted the payment of regular dividends, and in addition to have left a surplus of over \$2,000,000.²³

(2) Was the financial loss to the company fairly shared between management and labor? The evidence suggests it was not. As noted above, the Pullman Company did contract work during September 1893 to May 1894 at a loss of \$52,000 below shop cost for labor and materials. The cost of building a car was about 75 per cent of total production cost. Yet the company passed more than its entire loss--\$60,000--to labor in the form of reduced wages.²⁴

As the Strike Commission observed, "Three-quarters of the loss for the company and the balance for labor would have more fairly equalized the division of the loss on these contracts."²⁵ Had Pullman shared the loss to his company in this manner with his employees, they would have lost in reduced wages only about 25 per cent of the \$52,000, or \$13,000. The average wage reduction would have been closer to five per cent.

(3) In justifying his refusal to increase the wages of his employees, Pullman argued,

. . . the aggregate cost of a piece of work must not exceed its selling price. . . . This company can not control the selling price of cars, and it can not pay more for making them than it can contract to sell them for.²⁶

Pullman claimed he was selling his cars at a price below the cost of building them. Assuming the cost of materials to be a "fixed" expense, in what ways other than wage reductions could he have reduced construction costs?

He could have reduced the "cost" of his managers. While Pullman workers in the shops lost about 25 per cent in wages, the salaries of officials, supervisors and foremen were not reduced at all. Reductions in these salaries, said the Strike Commission, "would have relieved the harshness of the situation and would have evinced a genuine sympathy with labor in the disasters of the times."²⁷

Second, Pullman could have accepted a lower level of corporate profit. Despite declining revenue, the Pullman Company suffered no loss on its own earnings. During fiscal year 1894, the company had a surplus of \$2,320,000 and paid dividends of eight per cent.²⁸ Commenting on this matter before the Strike Commission, a leader of the employee grievance committee said: "Mr. Pullman claimed he was losing money, and then two days afterward declared a [quarterly] dividend of \$600,000, and that made the men much more determined to strike."²⁹

(4) How did Pullman distribute the wage reductions among the various departments? The Strike Commission concluded that wages were cut in every department, regardless

of its financial condition, "to the lowest point possible to be reached in the department most seriously affected by the depression;"³⁰ the commissioners asserted that such a reduction was not relatively fair to repair shop employees.

Moreover, the percentage of wages reduced in each workshop varied considerably. Painters, for example, lost an average of 18 per cent; freight-car builders lost 41 per cent.³¹ As Reverend William H. Carwardine, pastor of a church in Pullman at the time of the strike, noted,

The cuts seemed to fall unequally on different classes of employees, the scale changed so often that the men were in a constant condition of wonderment as to what would be the next move. The worst feature was that . . . they did not have the opportunity to put in full time.³²

(5) Why had Pullman continued to operate his factory if he was losing money on construction contracts? Pullman asserted that he had done so mainly for the unselfish reason of keeping his men employed.³³ The Strike Commission, however, rejected this contention:

The commission thinks that the evidence shows that it [the company] sought to keep running mainly for its own benefit as a manufacturer, that its plant might not rust . . . that it might be ready for resumption when business revived with a live plant and competent help, and that its revenue from its tenements might continue.³⁴

(6) Was it fair for the employees to demand their old wage scale? The Strike Commission blamed the company for reducing wages excessively, but said, "The company was hardly more at fault therein than were the employees in insisting upon the wages of June, 1893."³⁵

According to Reverend Carwardine, however, the employees never really expected to obtain the old wage scale; they did, however, expect that at least "the Company would agree to lessen the severity of the cut in wages . . . , and then to reduce their rents. . . ." ³⁶

Rents

Concerning George Pullman, one observer in 1894 wrote: "The wages he pays out with one hand, the Pullman Palace Car Company, he takes back with the other, the Pullman Land Association." ³⁷ The company controlled both wages and rents, yet the two were not coordinated to insure residents had something to live on. Wages were sharply reduced but rents remained constant.

The average rental in Pullman was \$14.00 including the water fee. During the depression, rents had gone down elsewhere, but not in Pullman. This the workers considered unfair. Rents were up to 33 per cent higher than in other nearby towns and 20 to 25 per cent higher than in Chicago. One Pullman employee testified before the Commission that comparable accommodations in a nearby town could be obtained at about \$8.00 a month. ³⁸

The Pullman Company maintained that its rents could not be reduced. The company expected to earn a six per cent return on the cost of its tenements, but claimed to be earning less than four per cent. Furthermore, said Pullman, if employees were dissatisfied with rents in his town, they

were free to live elsewhere and were not required to rent in the company town.³⁹

In the opinion of the Strike Commission, "The Company's claim that the workmen need not hire its tenements and can live elsewhere if they choose is not entirely tenable."⁴⁰ Reverend Carwardine said that workers were expected to rent company houses. He cited instances of employees who had told him they were urged to live at Pullman or be laid off. One strike leader testified that men were "required" to live at Pullman as a condition of employment. The Strike Commission found that employees believed they would be given work preference by renting at Pullman; thus they felt some compulsion to rent in the model town.⁴¹

Residents of Pullman were also subjected to several abuses in connection with their rentals. For instance, as the Strike Commission noted, tenants were required "to pay for all repairs which are either necessary . . . or which the company chooses to make."⁴²

To increase the probability that the company would collect its rentals on time, workers would be given two checks: one for the amount of rent; the other for the balance due in wages. Although employees were free to cash their checks elsewhere, the Pullman Bank, where they were paid, also collected the rents. The town bank, as the Commission explained, "presses for the rent and is aided in

collecting it by the knowledge on the part of the tenant that by arrears he may lose his job."⁴³

Some witnesses before the Strike Commission testified that at times workers received checks for as little as four cents to \$1.00 above their rent. The Pullman Company produced no evidence to counter this charge. Although the company was lenient toward those who could not pay their rent, and attempted no evictions during the strike, tenants felt they could be evicted on short notice.⁴⁴

Concerning this grievance, the Strike Commission concluded:

The demand for some rent reduction was fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Some slight concession in this regard would probably have averted the strike, provided the promise not to discharge men who served on the committee had been more strictly regarded.⁴⁵

Shop Abuses

In addition to wages and rents, a third category of employee grievances was that of shop abuses, what Carwardine described as "unfair and tyrannical dealing on the part of certain foremen . . .," toward the Pullman workers.⁴⁶

Blacklisting, nepotism, favoritism, intimidation, and arbitrary dismissal of laborers were among the complaints prevalent. "There is a constant feeling of insecurity," wrote Carwardine; "Men have put in years of hard, laborious work only to be dismissed without a moment's warning, and then scarcely to receive a word of thanks."⁴⁷

When Pullman cut wages, yet left rents unreduced, discontent among the workers sharply increased. Inequality in wage cuts and lack of full time regular employment exacerbated this discontent. As workers became more rebellious, shop rules became more stringent. When friction mounted between well-paid foremen and under-paid laborers, shop abuses became a major complaint.⁴⁸

What made these abuses seem so intolerable, was that no system existed by which employee complaints could be registered and investigated impartially. Apparently, no adequate structure for the expression of grievances was ever considered.⁴⁹

As one historian put it, "The Company was determined not to share power with the employees, and in consequence, few opportunities for meaningful communication between labor and management were developed."⁵⁰

The workers of the Pullman Company, after months of frustration, finally presented their complaints to the management on 7 May 1894. The grievance committee that met with Vice President Wickes, and subsequently with George Pullman, was told that rents and wages could not be adjusted, but that complaints of shop abuses would be promptly investigated.⁵¹

Wickes testified that he began the investigation on May 10 and that he had intended to devote "half of each working day to that business until completed." That night,

however, after three men of the committee were laid off for alleged lack of work, the local unions voted to strike and the investigation was dropped.⁵²

Pullman's Refusal to Arbitrate

Despite Pullman's promise to investigate shop abuses, he absolutely refused to submit the questions of wages and rents to arbitration. As far as he was concerned, wages could not be raised because the company was already losing on its contracts; rents could not be reduced because the company was not earning its six per cent return on the cost of tenements.

Four times following the onset of the strike, the Pullman Company was implored to arbitrate: first, a proposal from the Chicago Civic Federation in early June; second, an ultimatum from the American Railway Union--either arbitrate or suffer the consequences of a boycott; third, an offer from the Chicago trade unions; and finally a sincere appeal from two mayors in mid-July. Each plea was rejected. Company officials said there was nothing to arbitrate.

The mayors of Chicago and Detroit--with telegrams from 50 other mayors urging arbitration--were not the only public officials to express concern for the cause of labor. In the Senate on 10 July 1894, a Kansas Populist, Sen. William A. Pepper said, "The time has come for employers

themselves to learn that the best way to handle these situations [labor disputes] is by fair treatment of their men. . . ."53

Why did the Pullman Company consistently maintain this dogmatic position, that there was nothing to arbitrate? Pullman insisted that wages must be determined by the law of supply and demand, that management must be free to make economic decisions based upon business reality, and that these decisions must be made in a manner to safeguard capital.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, evidence concerning the issues of rents and wages suggests that Pullman could have at least compromised with his men. He could have slightly raised wages, slightly reduced rents, lowered his eight per cent dividends, or, if necessary, drawn upon his \$2,000,000 surplus from fiscal year 1894.

Ostensibly, Pullman was not willing to arbitrate because business conditions did not justify any adjustment in wages or rents. A more basic reason for refusing to arbitrate, however, was his hostility to the idea of conferring with organized labor. (This attitude was equally evident in the refusal of the General Manager's Association to consider an A.R.U. proposal to end the strike.)

When Wickes was asked by the Strike Commission whether employees had the right to have a union represent their cause to the company, Wickes replied: "They have a

right; yes sir. We have the right to say whether we will receive them or not."⁵⁵

Both Pullman and Wickes were fundamentally opposed to the idea of negotiating policy decisions with employees. Presumably, even if Pullman conceded the company was financially able to adjust wages or rents, he would have resisted efforts to arbitrate because a principle was involved. As Pullman expressed it, "A man should have the right to manage his own property."⁵⁶

Vice President Wickes, chief spokesman for the company during the strike, rejected one offer of arbitration in these terms:

There is a principle involved . . . It is that employers must be permitted to run their business in their own way, and without interference from their employees or from anyone else.⁵⁷

The Pullman Company did not recognize that labor unions had any place or necessity in the "model" town. The limit of a laborer's rights was to work or quit on the terms offered. The Strike Commission declared:

This position secures all the advantage of the concentration of capital, ability, power, and control for the company in its labor dealings, and deprives the employees of any such advantage or protection as a labor union might afford.⁵⁸

Underlying Issues

Although less frequently discussed by strike participants, the underlying issues of paternalism and a lack of democracy in Pullman, Illinois, contributed significantly to the discontent leading to the strike.⁵⁹

Paternalism

Pullman was a town in which the corporation was omnipresent and exerted a pervasive influence over the lives of residents.

The so-called "Pullman system" was intended to be a harmonious blend of industrial efficiency and a gracious, attractive living environment. In exchange for all the town's attractive features--a theater, a library, parks, gardens, churches and sanitary facilities--the inhabitants paid not only in high rents, but in a sacrifice of individual freedom.

Reverend Carwardine said the town was not what it pretended to be:

It is a sort of hollow mockery, sham, an institution girded with red tape, and as a solution to the labor problem a very unsatisfactory one . . . while it possesses some excellent features, still its deficiencies overbalance its beauties . . . It is a civilized relic of European serfdom.⁶⁰

What were some of these deficiencies?

(1) Pullman refused to allow employees the right to buy land or build homes in the company town.⁶¹

(2) Tenants were required to sign a lease having a "ten-day clause." It enabled the company on short notice to get rid of undesirable renters, and served as a powerful incentive to keep Pullman inhabitants from opposing company policies.⁶²

(3) As previously mentioned, the Pullman Bank issued two checks to employees, one of which was made out in the

amount of rent due. Before a worker could leave the bank he was pressured to pay his rent without delay.

(4) There was no system of public relief. Those who were unemployed, too old, or too poor to pay rent were expected to leave.⁶³

(5) Although the company normally provided medical care to employees who were injured, if the company determined an injury to be "unavoidable," the employee would be required to pay the full cost of his hospital bills.⁶⁴

(6) To insure that town residents conformed to company policies, a system of espionage and surveillance was maintained. Any deviant behavior was promptly reported to Pullman officials.⁶⁵

In summary, the company subjected Pullman residents to constant corporate control.

Absence of Democracy

Related to paternalism was the absence of democratic procedures by which residents might contribute to the policies affecting the town.

The Pullman Company maintained coercive political control over the town. All local officials, except members of the school board, were appointed by the corporation. When elections were held, and George Pullman felt that his candidates needed more support, he did not hesitate to influence voting.⁶⁶

The First Amendment rights of labor agitators and radicals were often violated; Pullman prevented them from speaking by refusing to let them rent or use public halls.⁶⁷

The Strike Commission said the exclusion of inhabitants from any participation in management of the town may have prevented their grateful acceptance of the advantages of living in Pullman.⁶⁸

Related Issues

Once the boycott and railway strike began, several related issues became prominent. These were discussed primarily by the Strike Commission, the mass media, politicians or historians. They include: (1) the Chicago Boycott and Strike, (2) the "Omnibus Injunction," (3) Federal Intervention, (4) Violence, and (5) the End of the Strike.

The Chicago Boycott and Strike

Why did the American Railway Union decide to boycott? The Pullman strike was a month old when delegates to the A.R.U. convention met in Chicago. None of the grievances expressed by Pullman workers had been resolved, and the company had refused even to consider a discussion of wages or rents.

Many of the men at Pullman had joined the A.R.U. during March and April, 1894, in an effort to gain a more powerful bargaining position vis-a-vis the corporation. In

mid-June, spokesmen for the workers presented the A.R.U. convention with their complaints against the company.

The officers and directors of the A.R.U. counselled against any further escalation of the dispute; they knew that the times were inopportune for a strike. Numerous men were unemployed and stood ready to accept almost any offer of work.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, A.R.U. delegates felt sympathy for the plight of Pullman workers. The union had been successful in its strike against the Great Northern and was overconfident. Acting upon instructions from their locals, the delegates voted unanimously to boycott Pullman cars if Pullman would not agree to discuss settlement of the workers' complaints.⁷⁰

What caused the strike among railroad employees? The boycott became a general railroad strike after the General Manager's Association decided to resist both the A.R.U. and the boycott. The G.M.A. declared it would fire any railroad employee who refused to handle Pullman cars, even though he might be willing to perform all other duties. It began to import workers from the East to fill positions vacated by those who struck or were fired, and initiated legal proceedings in cooperation with the U. S. attorney in Chicago.⁷¹

The employees of the 24 railroads subject to the unified decisions of the G.M.A. were predisposed to strike

sympathetically. Like the Pullman employees, they too had been the victims of repeated wage cuts and had similar grievances against their employers. When the railroads began firing A.R.U. members for their participation in the boycott, many local unions voted to strike in retaliation.⁷²

According to George W. Howard, vice president of the American Railway Union,

The cause of the trouble . . . between the railroad companies and their employees was the declaration on the part of the general managers of the various roads that they would back Pullman.⁷³

As the Strike Commission noted,

The contracts between the railroads and the Pullman Company as to the Pullman cars created such close relations between them as to increase the natural sympathy of organization between the members of the American Railway Union upon railroads and their brothers at Pullman.⁷⁴

Why did the General Manager's Association decide to resist the boycott? Officially the managers maintained that the boycott was intolerable because it would inconvenience the travelling public and it represented an attempt by a labor union to dictate which cars the railroads could or could not haul. Furthermore, to discontinue the use of Pullman cars would violate existing contracts.⁷⁵

According to historian Gerald Eggert, this statement concerning contracts was an excuse rather than a reason for resisting the boycott:

The sample contract presented to the United States Strike Commission at the close of the disorders . . . revealed that the companies had complete discretion in the use of Pullmans. The

contract made no mention of how many Pullman cars, or when, or on what classes of trains they were to be used. It simply provided that whenever sleeping cars were used they had to be leased from the Pullman Company.⁷⁶

One commissioner asked G.M.A. chairman St. John whether the railroads were free to leave Pullman cars off any class of trains they desired. St. John replied, "We are. We are not required to operate any of the Pullman cars upon trains where the cars are not required. It is entirely at the option of the company."⁷⁷

Quite naturally the managers were opposed to discontinuing the use of sleeping cars; it obviously would have been harmful to their business. Nevertheless, they chose to explain their resistance to the boycott, not in these candid terms, but with the rationale that contracts required continued use of Pullman cars.

Perhaps a more fundamental reason for G.M.A. opposition to the boycott was the managers' desire to protect their official prerogatives. The G.M.A. was hostile to the A.R.U. because it threatened those prerogatives.⁷⁸

This hostility to the union was evident in St. John's testimony before the Strike Commission:

As I understand it, . . . the American Railway Union is an effort to combine within its own order all employees of all branches of organized labor upon the various railroads. . . . I think there is no necessity for an organization of that kind.⁷⁹

To surrender to the A.R.U. boycott might have led to legal action against the managers by Pullman. Certainly the exclusion of sleeping cars would have inconvenienced

passengers. But more important, in the view of historian Gerald Eggert,

Surrender would have vastly strengthened the A.R.U. and Debs. Resistance, on the other hand, involved no legal risks whatever and promised to check, if not eliminate the power of the A.R.U.⁸⁰

Debs defended his union before the Strike Commission:

The General Manager's Association was instituted for the declared purpose of cooperating together in reducing wages. Now, then, we take the view that if they have a right to combine to reduce wages, we have a right to combine to resist the reduction. If a strike ensues . . . they are as much responsible as we are. If they make a reduction that results in a strike, they are at least as culpable as the employees.⁸¹

The Strike Commission implied that at least part of the blame for the railroad strike could be attributed to both George Pullman and the General Managers,

. . . employers who obstruct progress by perverting and misapplying the law of supply and demand, and who, while insisting upon individualism for workmen, demand that they shall be let alone to combine as they please and that society and all its forces shall protect them in their resulting contentions.⁸²

The "Omnibus" Injunction

The General Manager's Association--an organization the Strike Commission said was illegal and unjustifiable--was determined "to crush the strike rather than to accept any peaceable solution through conciliation, arbitration or otherwise."⁸³ The G.M.A. accordingly sought to create conditions that would lead to federal intervention.⁸⁴

The railroad managers found the Justice Department

to be fully cooperative. The G.M.A., in conjunction with the U. S. attorney in Chicago, Thomas Milchrist, decided that the federal government should first intervene through the courts. It was agreed that a court injunction was needed that would have the effect of making all strike-related activities illegal. This strategy was fully supported by Attorney General Olney.

The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and subsequent Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890, prohibited any combination in restraint of interstate commerce. They also provided the statutory basis for issuing injunctions by U. S. courts to prevent violations of these laws.⁸⁵ According to one historian, there is no evidence in congressional debates that Congress ever intended these laws to be evoked against labor. Nevertheless, in April 1894 a federal judge interpreted the Anti-Trust Law by ruling that a strike, when directed against a railroad, was a combination in restraint of interstate commerce, and hence, illegal.⁸⁶

Although the Sherman Act seemed designed to prosecute trusts, Attorney General Olney saw no reason why it should not apply to labor unions. This was quite natural. Olney had been a corporate railroad lawyer. As he himself declared, his motive was to "make it [the strike] a failure everywhere."⁸⁷

In pursuance of this objective, he appointed Edwin Walker as a special U. S. attorney in Chicago. Walker had been legal counsel to the G.M.A.; he was selected for his

job by Olney upon the recommendation of the G.M.A. Walker was thoroughly committed to the cause of the railroads and acted accordingly. Concerning Walker's appointment, Clarence Darrow, who defended Debs at his trial, declared, "The government might with as good grace have appointed the attorney for the American Railway Union to represent the United States."⁸⁸

With the full support of both Olney and the G.M.A., federal attorneys Walker and Milchrist drafted the petition for an injunction under the provisions of the Anti-Trust Law.⁸⁹

Federal courts and the law in the 1890's generally worked to the disadvantage of organized labor, "being better calculated to protect property, including the property of corporations, than to protect the wage earners in their union activities," as one historian explained.⁹⁰ Consequently, when Walker and Milchrist approached federal judges Peter S. Grosscup and William A. Woods, they found the judges fully cooperative; the judges even assisted the attorneys in perfecting the bill for an injunction.⁹¹

As noted earlier in this study, the injunction was extremely comprehensive. It applied to all persons within the jurisdiction of the court who were involved in obstructing the movement of mail or interstate commerce on almost every railroad connected with the G.M.A. One provision enjoined any striker or union official from persuading

any employee to quit his job. Any attempt to violate the injunction could result in a citation for contempt and summary punishment by the court.⁹²

According to historian Harry Barnard, this "omnibus" injunction was only a means to get the U. S. Army into Chicago.⁹³ All that was needed to justify the intervention of federal troops was a single, clear violation of the prohibition against interference with the mails. When the injunction was issued, Debs ignored it. But when U. S. Marshal Arnold read the court order to a large crowd at a railway yard, the crowd soon became an angry mob and deliberately blocked the rails with overturned boxcars. The mails were reportedly obstructed. On that basis President Cleveland sent in the regulars.

Despite the fact that there was nothing in any law, express or implied, that a mail train necessarily included Pullman cars, the Justice Department had ruled that a mail train comprised all cars hauled by such a train. Under this ruling railroad officials could claim that Pullman cars were normal components of mail trains. Federal officials, in turn, could declare that any person attempting to detach a Pullman car from such a train was guilty of obstructing the mail.⁹⁴

The A.R.U. claimed that the G.M.A. ordered Pullman cars attached to mail trains, which normally travelled without them, as a means of provoking trouble and arousing

public opinion against the union. This assertion is debatable. But there is some evidence that railroad officials were determined that no mail train would leave without its regular cars. Any interference with a Pullman car on such a train was construed as obstruction of the mails, in violation of the injunction. Offers of the A.R.U. to run mail trains that excluded Pullman cars were ignored.⁹⁵

As the strike developed labor unions adopted resolutions criticizing the policies of the federal government, condemning the injunction and the use of the U. S. Army. It appeared as though the government had combined with the corporations to crush labor.⁹⁶

One historian suggests the U. S. Government could have avoided taking sides by insisting that railroads move the mail on trains without Pullman cars.⁹⁷ Had this policy been followed, it would have been difficult to find strikers in violation of the injunction, hence, there would have been less justification for the use of federal troops.

The "omnibus" injunction not only prohibited interference with the mail, it also enjoined strikers and union officials from urging workers to join the struggle. Because Debs ignored this provision and continued to send out telegrams to local unions, on 17 July 1894 he was cited for contempt. The Strike Commission commented,

It is seriously questioned, and with much force, whether courts have jurisdiction to enjoin citizens from persuading each other in industrial or other matters of common interest. However, it

is generally recognized among good citizens that a mandate of a court is to be obeyed until it is modified and corrected by the court that issued it.⁹⁸

Federal Intervention

As the Pullman Strike evolved into a general strike, Governor Altgeld was closely monitoring the situation in Chicago. He was determined to use his full authority to maintain peace; he conferred frequently with officers of the Illinois militia and was prepared to send 100,000 men to Chicago if necessary.⁹⁹

One historian observed, "Altgeld showed his willingness to prevent any cases of actual rioting but refused to become a convenient pawn for the General Manager's Association."¹⁰⁰ The governor sought to pursue an impartial course, favoring neither labor nor capital.¹⁰¹ Perhaps, knowing this, the G.M.A. determined to seek the help of the federal government, rather than rely upon a governor known to have pardoned anarchists.

Though Altgeld opposed the use of troops for strikebreaking purposes, he had effectively deployed state militia during the coal strike which preceded the Pullman dispute. There is no reason to doubt that he would have sent state troops to Chicago if called upon to do so by local authorities. On 3 July 1894 Altgeld was unaware of any requirement for military forces in Chicago. At that time, despite the disturbance at Blue Island, there were no serious disorders at Chicago. Yet, when he was subsequently

convinced of the need for troops, the governor initiated the action that led Mayor Hopkins to request their support.¹⁰²

While Altgeld was preparing to send out the Illinois militia, U. S. Marshal Arnold wired Attorney General Olney that the U. S. Army was needed to ensure the passage of mail trains and enforce the injunction. The marshal had not asked local or state authorities for help. And he had made no mention of the availability of state troops in his telegram. Endorsing the message were three respected federal authorities: Judge Grosscup, U. S. Attorney Milchrist, and Special Attorney Walker, all of whom had perfected the injunction at the request of Olney and the G.M.A.¹⁰³

President Cleveland justified the use of the U. S. Army by an explanation that federal officials were determined

. . . to overcome by any lawful and constitutional means all resistance to governmental functions as related to the transportation of mails, the operation of interstate commerce, and the preservation of the property of the United States.¹⁰⁴

On the 4th of July 1894, citizens of Chicago discovered that some 1,200 U. S. Army soldiers had been moved into the city the preceding night. (Subsequent reinforcements brought the total up to about 2,000.) Sometime that day, Altgeld learned for the first time that these regulars had been called in. He was surprised and outraged.¹⁰⁵

Section 4 of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides that the federal government, at the

request of a state legislature or of the governor (when the legislature is not in session), shall protect that state against domestic violence.¹⁰⁶

It was not by invoking this clause that the President acted. The legislature of Illinois was not in session and Altgeld had not asked for federal aid. It was rather by virtue of the authority contained in Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes of the United States that the President sent troops to Chicago.¹⁰⁷

When Altgeld protested the use of the U. S. Army in Chicago, he said the statutes Cleveland had invoked to justify his military policy contemplated the use of federal troops in a state only after militia had been used first.¹⁰⁸

Section 5299 of the Revised Statutes states, in part, that federal intervention is justified when state authorities ". . . are unable to protect, or, from any cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people . . ." from domestic violence.¹⁰⁹ (Emphasis added.)

In explaining his replies to Altgeld, Cleveland justified his military policy as necessary, not only to protect mails and safeguard interstate commerce, but also because the governor had "refused" to deal with the Chicago situation. The President, however, gave no evidence to support this assertion.¹¹⁰ As indicated above, the evidence suggests a completely different conclusion—that Altgeld was fully prepared to send in state troops, for lawful purposes, upon request.

In responding to Altgeld's protests, President Cleveland ignored almost every argument against federal intervention. Almont Lindsey explained,

The President deemed it better strategy to convey to the nation that the present was no time to quibble over constitutional technicalities and that everybody should unite against the common danger of anarchy.¹¹¹

Commenting on Cleveland's position, another historian concluded:

Cleveland's account of the episode shows slight knowledge of the situation in Chicago, an utter disregard of the constitutional rights of Illinois, and the contempt which men who think they are right often show toward their opponents.¹¹²

Governor Altgeld was not the only Illinois official surprised at the arrival of federal troops in Chicago. In testimony before the Strike Commission, Mayor Hopkins commented,

I want to say that I was not advised or counselled with when they [the U. S. troops] were brought here, and up to that time nobody notified me they were not receiving adequate protection.

Like the governor, Mayor Hopkins believed that if troops were needed, state troops should have been used first.¹¹³

If U. S. Marshal Arnold or the railroads were having so much trouble with mob rioting, why did they avoid calling on the mayor for police protection? Why did the G.M.A. seek the support not only of federal troops, but also of U. S. deputy marshals?

According to Lindsey, the G.M.A. suspected Mayor Hopkins of sympathizing with the strikers. The managers

sought to build their case for the use of federal armed forces by portraying the mayor and his police as pursuing a very lax policy toward strikers. Special Attorney Walker, closely affiliated with the G.M.A., "endeavored to establish the complete failure of the local government to perform its duty during the early phases of the crisis."¹¹⁴

By discrediting the mayor and his police, the G.M.A. evidently hoped to convince the public of the need for U. S. troops to suppress the disturbances.

Contrary to the claims of Walker and the G.M.A., Hopkins probably used every means at his disposal to preserve peace and end the strike. He fully mobilized his police force and issued a proclamation aimed at dispersing mobs. Twice he tried to settle the dispute, once by arbitration with the Pullman Company, and once as a mediator between the A.R.U. and the G.M.A.¹¹⁵

According to the Strike Commission, allegations of police negligence were not proved.¹¹⁶ Before U. S. troops arrived, city police evidently handled all difficulties with relative ease. Superintendent of Police Brennan told the Strike Commission, "In no case at any time during the strike were the police forces insufficient, wherever they went, to disperse any mob found."¹¹⁷

Even before Cleveland ordered federal troops to Chicago, Attorney General Olney had authorized a special force of U. S. deputies to help the G.M.A. Some 3,600 men

were hastily sworn in during early July. They were selected by the railroads and deputized by Marshal Arnold.¹¹⁸

The railroads even paid the salaries of these deputies. Olney, however, insisted that any railroads which had paid these officers must be reimbursed; he felt this was needed to protect the government from any charge of partiality. The cost of these Chicago deputies to the federal government was about \$125,000.¹¹⁹ The Strike Commission noted,

[Deputy marshals] acted in the double capacity of railroad employees and United States officers. While operating the railroads they assumed and exercised unrestricted United States authority when so ordered by their employers, or whenever they regarded it as necessary. They were not under the direct control of any Government official while exercising authority. This is placing officers of the Government under control of a combination of railroads. It is a bad precedent. . . .¹²⁰

Violence

After U. S. troops arrived in Chicago, the tempo of violence increased. Property damage, lawlessness, and injuries reached their peak on 7 July 1894. At least 12 persons in Chicago died in strike-related confrontations.

Contrary to popular expectations, the Strike Commission did not place responsibility for violence on strikers. It blamed the railroads, who were determined "to crush the strike rather than to accept any peaceable solution . . .;"¹²¹ and said,

. . . real responsibility for these disorders rests with the people themselves for not adequately controlling . . . corporations, and for failing to reasonably protect the rights of labor and redress its wrongs.¹²²

A report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969) concluded the single most important cause of labor violence in America has been the refusal of management to recognize labor unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.¹²³

In more specific terms, this report declared:

The responsibility for violence rests largely on the behavior of George Pullman. . . . He was unwilling to allow his workers the slightest influence upon the decisions of the company which greatly affected their welfare.¹²⁴

From Pullman's refusal to arbitrate with his men arose the sympathy of the A.R.U. and its decision to boycott.

The A.R.U. decision, in turn, provoked a strong reaction from the G.M.A., which viewed the boycott as an attack on vested railroad interests in Chicago. The 1969 report to the National Commission (Violence in America) asserts, "The immediate cause of violence was the determination of the General Manager's Association to defeat the sympathy strike."¹²⁵ The G.M.A. decided to fire any employee who refused to handle Pullman cars.

The special federal deputies--selected and paid for by the railroads under the supervision of the G.M.A.--may also have contributed to the violence in Chicago. According to testimony before the Strike Commission, police officers

caught several deputies engaged in acts of lawlessness and incendiarism. Superintendent of Police Brennan testified that frequently his force had occasion to arrest deputies for indiscriminate shooting.¹²⁶

Apparently, in the haste of recruiting, many applicants were accepted on the sole basis of their appearance, without even a check to determine their citizenship. As a result, many thugs, drunks, and other disreputable persons were sworn in. On July 9 U. S. Attorney Walker even reported that most of the deputies were "worse than useless."¹²⁷

The rioters were not, in most cases, strikers or former railroad employees. Most of the violence, said the Strike Commission, was due to the work of the "lawless elements," augmented by "shiftless adventurers . . . criminals and objectionable foreigners."¹²⁸ Unemployment, insecurity, and accumulated resentment against corporate employers apparently combined to form a spirit of restlessness among these "lawless elements." The arrival of U. S. troops probably aroused the indignation of these people and may have provoked the formation of aggressive crowds.¹²⁹ As the Strike Commission noted, "The strike presented an opportunity to these elements to burn and plunder, and to violate the laws and ordinances of the city, State, and nation."¹³⁰

The Strike Commission blamed the strikers for such offenses as detaching, side-tracking and derailling railroad

cars; it concluded that "strikers were concerned in the outrages against law and order, although the number was undoubtedly small as compared with the whole number out."¹³¹

Despite evidence that few strikers were involved in rioting and property damage, the G.M.A. credited the strikers with full responsibility for all violence. According to Lindsey, not only the G.M.A., but also the press deliberately built up the impression that strikers instigated violence and anarchy.¹³²

As for the A.R.U., the Strike Commission said there was no evidence that the officers of the A.R.U.

. . . at any time participated in or advised intimidation, violence, or destruction of property. They knew and fully appreciated that as soon as mobs ruled the organized forces of society would crush the mobs and all responsible for them in the remotest degree, and that this meant defeat.¹³³

When Mayor Hopkins testified, he even said the A.R.U. had helped the city arrest those who were doing violence.¹³⁴

The role of the U. S. Army in quelling the disturbances was not extensively discussed by the Strike Commission.

Following the strike, the Commanding General of the Army commended the troops for their "vigorous action . . . and . . . great forbearance . . . when subjected to all sorts of insults and indignities, designed to provoke retaliation. . . ."¹³⁵ General Miles said the action of federal troops in Chicago, "where mob violence and a reign of terror existed . . . saved this country from a serious rebellion when one had been publicly declared to exist."¹³⁶

Governor Altgeld, however, agreed that federal troops and their officers were no doubt good men. But he also said,

So far as can be learned, their persistence did not prevent the burning of a single freight car in Chicago . . . yet during all this time the impression was made on the country that President Cleveland and the federal troops were saving Chicago!¹³⁷

Altgeld might have added that it was the Illinois militia who, on July 7, shot at a mob killing several and wounding more. After that confrontation, violence in Chicago declined.

End of the Strike

The Pullman Strike died during the period July 18 through August 2. According to Debs, the federal injunction caused the A.R.U. defeat. As he declared during his trial,

The strike was broken . . . not by the Army and not by another power but simply and solely by the action of the United States Court in restraining us from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of our employees.¹³⁸

Contributing to the end of the strike were several other factors. First, a large number of men were unemployed; railroads were able to recruit freely among these jobless workers, thereby replacing A.R.U. members who were fired or joined the strike. Second, many of the skilled workers such as the brotherhoods and Knights of Labor opposed the boycott. Third, organized labor was decidedly a minority interest; most Americans were unwilling to accept unions such as the A.R.U. and evidently suspected them of harboring

subversives and agitators. Fourth, the armed forces, primarily the Illinois troops, were a potent factor in ending the strike.¹³⁹

The leadership that directed the organized effort to crush the strike, however, originated in the G.M.A. Had it not been for the initiative and determination of that organization, the strike might have remained non-violent; and employees might have gained a voice in corporate decision making.

It was the G.M.A. which brought the federal government to bear upon the strike. Neither the G.M.A. nor the government made any attempt during the strike to create a negotiated settlement.

The Strike Commission described the G.M.A. in these terms:

The Association is an illustration of the persistent and shrewdly devised plans of corporations to overreach their limitations and to usurp indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in their charters and not obtainable from the people or their legislators.¹⁴⁰

The refusal of the G.M.A. to negotiate with the A.R.U., said the Strike Commission, ". . . seems arrogant and absurd when we consider its standing before law, its assumptions and its past . . . action."¹⁴¹

As for the government's evident disinterest in ending the strike peacefully, one historian suggests,

It can only be assumed that Attorney General Olney in 1894 wanted to do more than merely end the disorders; he wanted them halted by giving the railroads a complete victory over the A.R.U.¹⁴²

As noted earlier in this study, it was Olney who, in an apparent effort to arouse public opinion against the strikers, deliberately linked the strike with anarchism.

CHAPTER III--FOOTNOTES

¹Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 38-39. Strike Report, pp. XIX, 347, 352.

²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 280.

³Buder, Pullman Experiment, pp. 187, 194.

⁴Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 46-47. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 288-90.

⁵Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 47. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 288-90.

⁶Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311.

⁷Strike Report, pp. IX-XVIII.

⁸Ibid., pp. L, LII-LIII.

⁹Ibid., p. LIV.

¹⁰Ibid., p. LVIII.

¹¹Ibid., p. LIV.

¹²Ibid., p. LIV.

¹³Ibid., p. XLIX.

¹⁴Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 312. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 16.

¹⁵Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311. McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. 282.

¹⁶Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 311.

¹⁷Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 2, 244-45.

¹⁸Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Milton S. Eisenhower, Chairman, Vol. 1: Violence in America (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 292.

¹⁹Strike Report, pp. XXIII, 572-73.

- ²⁰Ibid., pp. XXXII, 579, 584.
- ²¹Ibid., pp. XXXII-XXXIII, 603-4.
- ²²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 97.
- ²³Ibid., p. 97.
- ²⁴Strike Report, p. XXXII.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. XXXII.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 582.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. XXXIV.
- ²⁸Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 100.
- ²⁹Strike Report, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, p. 424.
- ³⁰Strike Report, p. XXXIV.
- ³¹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 98-99.
- ³²William H. Carwardine, The Pullman Strike (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1894), p. 71.
- ³³Strike Report, testimony of George Pullman pp. 566-67.
- ³⁴Strike Report, p. XXXV.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. XXXVII.
- ³⁶Carwardine, op. cit., p. 68.
- ³⁷William T. Stead, Chicago Today: The Labor War in America (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969; reprint of 1894 edition), p. 181. Stead was the editor of the London version of the Review of Reviews.
- ³⁸Strike Report, p. XXV, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, p. 420. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 92. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 160.
- ³⁹Strike Report, pp. XXXV, 580, 585.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. XXXV.
- ⁴¹Carwardine, op. cit., p. 97. Strike Report, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, p. 425; p. XXXV.

- 42 Strike Report, p. XXXV.
- 43 Ibid., p. XXXVI.
- 44 Ibid., pp. XXXIV, XXXVI, testimony of Thomas W. Heathcoate, pp. 426, 428.
- 45 Strike Report, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII.
- 46 Ibid., p. XXV. Carwardine, op. cit., p. 50.
- 47 Carwardine, op. cit., pp. 91-108, quotation, p. 109.
- 48 Strike Report, p. XXXVI.
- 49 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 95.
- 50 Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 143.
- 51 Strike Report, pp. XXXVI-XXXVII.
- 52 Strike Report, testimony of Thomas H. Wickes, p. 186; pp. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
- 53 Cited in Miller, Great Debates, p. 388.
- 54 Strike Report, testimony of George Pullman, pp. 556-57.
- 55 Strike Report, p. XXVI.
- 56 Ibid., testimony of George Pullman, p. 556.
- 57 Cited in Miller, Great Debates, p. 389.
- 58 Strike Report, p. XXVII.
- 59 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 90-91. Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 154.
- 60 Carwardine, op. cit., p. 24.
- 61 Strike Report, p. XXII.
- 62 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 70.
- 63 Ibid., p. 72.
- 64 Ibid., pp. 72-74. Strike Report, p. XXII.
- 65 Carwardine, op. cit., p. 51. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 90.

- 66 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 61-63, 76-79, 86.
- 67 Ibid., p. 64.
- 68 Strike Report, pp. XXI-XXII.
- 69 Ibid., p. XXVII.
- 70 Ibid., p. XXXIX.
- 71 Ibid., pp. XXXIX, XLII-XLIII.
- 72 Ibid., pp. XIX, XL, XLIII.
- 73 Ibid., p. 6.
- 74 Ibid., p. XXXIX.
- 75 Ibid., p. XLII.
- 76 Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 156-57. The sample contract is presented in the Strike Report, pp. 547-48.
- 77 Strike Report, p. 223.
- 78 Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 157.
- 79 Strike Report, p. 227.
- 80 Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 157.
- 81 Strike Report, p. 158.
- 82 Ibid., p. XLVII.
- 83 Ibid., p. XIX-XXX.
- 84 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 142.
- 85 McMurry, Burlington Strike, pp. 280-81.
- 86 Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 157-58.
- 87 Olney, cited in Cooper, "Military Intervention," p. 228.
- 88 Eggert, Labor Disputes, pp. 162-63. Darrow quotation, p. 163.
- 89 Ibid., p. 163. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 158.
- 90 McMurry, Burlington Strike, p. vii.

- ⁹¹Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 167.
- ⁹²Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 156, 161-62; Strike Report, court injunction, pp. 179-80.
- ⁹³Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 288.
- ⁹⁴Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 151.
- ⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 143, 152, 241. Buder, Pullman Experiment, p. 183.
- ⁹⁶Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 322-23.
- ⁹⁷Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 160.
- ⁹⁸Strike Report, p. XL.
- ⁹⁹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 182, 200. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 291. Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 299.
- ¹⁰⁰Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 300.
- ¹⁰¹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 200.
- ¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 172, 180-85. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, pp. 273-79.
- ¹⁰³Telegram, Arnold to Olney; Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 25-27.
- ¹⁰⁴Cleveland, Chicago Strike, pp. 18-19.
- ¹⁰⁵Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 184.
- ¹⁰⁶Strike Report, p. XX.
- ¹⁰⁷These statutes are printed in the Strike Report, p. XX.
- ¹⁰⁸Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 188.
- ¹⁰⁹Strike Report, p. XX.
- ¹¹⁰Cleveland, Chicago Strike, p. 39.
- ¹¹¹Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 189.
- ¹¹²Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, note 32, p. 177.
- ¹¹³Strike Report, p. 352.

- 114Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 183-84.
- 115Hopkins' efforts to cope with the strike are described in his testimony, Strike Report, pp. 344-53.
- 116Strike Report, p. XLIV.
- 117Ibid., p. 354.
- 118Ibid., p. XLIV; testimony of Chief Deputy U. S. Marshal John C. Donnelly, p. 340-42.
- 119Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 168-69.
- 120Strike Report, pp. XLIV-XLV.
- 121Ibid., p. XIX.
- 122Ibid., p. XLVI.
- 123Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Milton S. Eisenhower, chairman, Vol. I: Violence in America (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 292.
- 124Ibid., pp. 233-34.
- 125Ibid., p. 233.
- 126Strike Report, p. 355. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 217. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 312.
- 127Walker, cited in Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 167.
- 128Strike Report, p. XLIII; related comments, pp. XLV-XLVI, XIX.
- 129Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 205. Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 311.
- 130Strike Report, p. XLIII; related testimony, pp. 341, 357.
- 131Ibid., p. XLV.
- 132Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 218, 275.
- 133Strike Report, p. XLV.
- 134Ibid., pp. 349-50.
- 135U. S., Congress, House, Executive Docs., Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1894, Vol. IV, No. 1, Part 2, 53d Cong., 3d Sess., 1894-95, p. 58.

¹³⁶Ibid., Report of Major General Nelson A. Miles,
1894, p. 109.

¹³⁷Altgeld, cited in Barnard, Life of Altgeld,
pp. 310-11.

¹³⁸Debs, cited in Wish, "Industrial Warfare," p. 310.

¹³⁹Strike Report, p. XLII. Lindsey, Pullman Strike,
pp. 213-14, 267-68, McMurtry, Burlington Strike, p. 279.

¹⁴⁰Strike Report, p. XXXI.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. XXXI.

¹⁴²Eggert, Labor Disputes, p. 189.

CHAPTER IV

THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIKE:
IMMEDIATE AND UNDERLYING ISSUES

In its opening article on the Pullman Strike, Harper's Weekly remarked, "Such rebellions against social order and the principles of civilization will grow more dangerous, unless the intelligence of the country shall come to understand their causes and find ways to remove them."¹

This chapter is a discussion and analysis of the adequacy and extent to which the journals attempted to interpret the immediate and underlying issues of the Pullman Strike.

Immediate IssuesWage Reductions

Why were the workers at Pullman dissatisfied with their wages? Harper's Weekly gave this explanation:

Possibly the workmen at Pullman have been made too comfortable, and have been cared for too well. They have come to believe implicitly in the stories of the enormous profits of their employer. They doubtless argued that as long as wages had been kept up to a certain scale throughout the past depression, they should be now maintained until better times. This false reasoning was undoubtedly at the bottom of the general dissatisfaction.²

Nation, however, explained that wages had declined in response to market conditions associated with the depression and the "iron law of wages." The conditions of

the market are sometimes hard: "Anybody who fights against them, or who assumes they do not exist . . . will go supperless to bed and . . . get no other rewards for his pains." Pullman has no control over the wages of his employees, hence, it is in their best interest to "grin and bear" the wage cut.³

Several journals evidently used a Pullman Company press release explaining how the corporation was losing money. According to the Review of Reviews,

Mr. Pullman's works . . . had taken several contracts at exceedingly low prices in order to keep the wheels moving. Wages had been cut down on the theory that work at reduced pay would be more acceptable to the Pullman employees than a period of no work and no pay.⁴

Harper's Weekly reported the company "reduced wages, and accepted orders . . . which could not be filled without a severe loss, but which would serve at least to keep the working force employed so as to bridge over the hard times."⁵ Forum gave a similar account and commented, "The attempt to make any employer pay wages for producing things which he can sell only at a loss is not commendable. It is a ruinous policy."⁶

In a separate article, however, Forum did mention the fact that salaries of Pullman managers were not reduced when employee wages were sharply cut.⁷

Could the Pullman Company have drawn from its corporate profits or reserve funds to increase wages? Outlook summarized what Pullman said before the Strike Commission:

"The . . . Company has a surplus of more than \$16,000,000; . . . it has declared this year a dividend of \$2,800,000 on its capital stock of \$36,000,000. . . ." Outlook suggested that Pullman's testimony, having indicated such large corporate profits, did much to arouse sympathy for striking workmen.⁸

The Nation, however, denied that Pullman could have drawn upon his profits to increase wages:

Mr. Pullman has no right to make gratuities of the money of his shareholders, who are largely . . . persons of slender means. . . . he is a trustee and . . . has no right to take an unbusinesslike step . . . he must be the judge of what is business-like and what is not.⁹

Those who believe that workmen are rightly entitled to a share of the profits of their labor, declared Nation, have assumed a belief professed by the "ethical school" of political economy. This doctrine has had a great deal to do with arousing discontent among wage earners; when it became diffused among them, "they at once felt that they were suffering great injustice. . . ." because their share of the profits was not larger.¹⁰

Concerning the weak financial condition of the construction department, Nation declared:

No argument for raising wages in a non-paying business can be derived from the fact that some other branch of business [i.e., the operating division] carried on by the same company makes a profit.¹¹

In similar tone, expressing full support of the Pullman Company, Independent commented:

The wages offered seem to be all that could be afforded. It was a kindness to the workmen for the company to accept orders at a loss, simply to keep them employed. It makes no difference that the company was still paying large dividends. No dividends could be paid on these [construction] contracts. The dividends were paid on . . . the profits of running Pullman cars already built. This is an entirely different kind of business and has a right to a large profit. . . . [These] comfortable dividends . . . have absolutely nothing to do with the wages to be paid to workmen in the car shops.¹²

Both Nation and Harper's Weekly expressed the view that if Pullman had simply closed his shops there would have been no strike.¹³

The Weekly put it this way:

If the Pullman Company, instead of offering their working-men . . . employment at a reduced rate of wages, had simply said to them, "We are sorry our business has so fallen off that we no longer have employment for you; we are compelled to close the works, and you will have to shift for yourselves until we get profitable orders enabling us to take you back"—if the company had done this . . . in a cold businesslike way, there would have been no trouble.¹⁴

Outlook concluded its discussion of wages with an opinion similar to that of the Strike Commission, that the men had no right to demand employment at higher wages when the company was losing money.¹⁵

Harper's Weekly asserted, "The Pullman corporation has always treated its workmen well . . . they have no [sic] real grievance and no justification for the demand they have recently made."¹⁶ Whether Pullman workers were justified in demanding the wages of 1893 is a matter of opinion. But whether the employees had a "real grievance"

is a matter of fact. Clearly, the men at Pullman had several genuine complaints.

Rents

The Review of Reviews explained that

The chief complication seems to have arisen out of circumstances that . . . [Reduced wages did not bring reduced rents. . . . practically twelve thousand Pullman tenants are at the mercy of their employer, who is also their landlord.]¹⁷

Harper's Weekly again suggested that workers had little to complain of: "Rents were calculated on a five-
[sic] per-cent basis, and were lower [sic] than rates current for dirty, unsanitary houses in the slums of Chicago."¹⁸ (According to the Strike Commission rents were 25 per cent higher, and were expected to earn the company six per cent.)

Nation claimed that rents in Pullman were about the same as those in adjoining towns. From this false premise, Nation explained why the company could not have reduced its rents: if the corporation had lowered its rents for those who lived in Pullman, in fairness it would have been bound to make an "equivalent present" to those who lived elsewhere. Neighboring landlords would then have had a grievance, and

. . . would have had a just claim on the Pullman Company for a sum equal to their diminished receipts. In short, there would have been no end to the absurdities and injustices which would have resulted from any such attempt to make up to the men in rent what they were losing in wages.¹⁹

According to Independent, it is very likely the rents were too high: "They always lag behind a falling or a rising market; but that is not peculiar to Pullman and will cure itself."²⁰ (Contrary to this assertion, the evidence clearly indicates that the Pullman corporation determined the rents with no regard for the current market.)

Nation and Independent each expressed the official corporate view; as Nation declared, it was a "fact that no workman was compelled to stay in Pullman. . . ." Independent added, "If the rents are too high tenants need not remain."²¹ While this view was, no doubt, a policy of the Pullman Company, the evidence shows that the men believed they were under pressure to reside in the "model" town.

None of the journals commented on such rental abuses as the requirement that tenants must perform all repairs, even those the company chose to have done, or the so-called "ten-day" clause. Nor was there any mention of the pay system by which worker-tenants received two checks, one of which was for rent, the other for the remaining wages.

When Debs asserted that Pullman was starving his employees to death (probably in reference to workers who received wages of several dollars or less on paydays), Nation called his statement "a deceptive lie." In a similar vein, Forum concluded: considering the advantages of the town of Pullman, "and the present low prices of the ordinary requirements of life, it can scarcely be said that the employees were working at 'starvation wages'."²²

Samuel Gompers, in an article for North American, explained why the workers decided to strike. The grievance committee had shown Pullman "that it was absolutely impossible to live on the wages offered; that a middle ground should be sought; that if wages were to be reduced the rents should also come down." When Pullman refused to consider the request, and several men of the committee were fired, the strike was declared.²³

Review of Reviews expressed an attitude similar to that of the Strike Commission (though published in advance of the Strike Report):

A temporary reduction of rents on the same percentage as the reduction of wages would have seemed to some employers a kindly concession that would have been repaid by the increased fidelity of the employees. But it could not be demanded as a right.²⁴

Shop Abuses

Only one journal reported shop abuses as a significant complaint among the workers, and did so only after hearings by the Strike Commission had begun. From monitoring testimony of witnesses, Independent noted that

. . . the under officials especially, the foremen, bosses, etc., were very harsh and cruel in their treatment of the laborers, while it was practically impossible to gain access to Mr. Pullman himself and the higher officials; . . . every effort to set forth the actual state of things resulted in the black listing of the complainants. . . .²⁵

The lack of reporting concerning these abuses by the journals may be an indication that little effort was expended

in trying to uncover the immediate issues prior to the A.R.U. boycott in June. As noted earlier in this study, once the railway strike was underway, at least one journal said all discussion of the issues involved must wait until the "rebellion" was suppressed.

Pullman's Refusal to Arbitrate

Why did the Pullman workers insist on arbitrating with the company? According to Arena, the men at Pullman were seeking something more than simply higher wages and reduced rents: they "claim that in the consideration of the distribution of their joint product, they shall be consulted . . . They demand that as producers of wealth they shall possess some degree of rational control over the distribution of that wealth."²⁶ If this interpretation is correct, then as Nation pointed out, workers were indeed professing the doctrine of the "ethical school" of political economy.

Pullman, in refusing to comply with requests to arbitrate, said the company could not pay more for the manufacture of a car than the price he could obtain for it from the railroads. A writer for North American accepted this assertion uncritically and declared, "Every business man must admit that this answer is conclusive and logical."²⁷

Nation was absolutely positive there was no way Pullman could have arbitrated the matter of wages:

A decision in favor of the employees would not put the company in funds. It would not furnish new orders for cars at higher prices than before. As a decision adverse to the company could not be be complied with in any event, an arbitration would have been not merely useless but a downright mockery. . . .²⁸ (Emphasis added.)

It was fortunate, reported Nation, that Pullman refused to arbitrate with his men; had he not rejected the "anarchistic conceptions" of the grievance committee, it

. . . would have turned the whole controversy into a question of details—as, for instance, whether the rents of the houses were fair or not, whether the company could have paid higher wages than it did pay, or whether it would have been safe to draw from its reserve fund. . . .²⁹

Several journals commented on Pullman's rejection of subsequent proposals to arbitrate. On each occasion, as Forum noted, "The company declared that there was no question that it could submit; that the men demanded higher wages, and that it could not pay them except at a serious loss."³⁰

None of the conservative journals, naturally, presented much in the way of investigative reporting aimed at assessing whether or not it was true that higher wages for the men would entail a "serious loss."

Once the railway strike had begun, Nation suggested that any attempt to secure arbitration in the midst of such a "social convulsion" was absurd: there was

. . . intense excitement throughout the whole country, and the general feeling that the existence of the Government and society was at stake . . . to give in to the strikers . . . at any point would be a deadly blow to the liberty and rights of property. . . .

Hundreds of thousands of the best American citizens, declared Nation, rejoiced that Pullman was unyielding.³¹

Harper's Weekly explained that if the Pullman workmen had not heeded the advice of labor agitators, "most of whom have nothing to lose by the disturbances they foment, some sort of an agreement would be readily reached between them and their employer."³² This particular judgment is clearly deviant from available evidence; in view of Pullman's deep-seated antagonism to organized labor, it seems highly unlikely that Pullman would ever have reached such an agreement.

Why, even when the mayor of Chicago asked Pullman to arbitrate, was the offer flatly refused? The answer, according to Nation was that "labor disputes are generally very simple, and nobody can possibly settle them but the parties to them." Specifically, the question of how much loss the company could safely incur in any given period, "must necessarily be left to the judgement of those who are charged with the responsibility for its affairs, and not to a mayor and a board of aldermen or any popular assemblage."³³

Review of Reviews disagreed with Nation:

Mr. Pullman owed it to the country to keep on good terms with his employees: . . . upon the request of the Mayor and the Common Council of Chicago, he should have been quite willing to consider some plan of arbitration of differences.³⁴

Both Pullman and his associate, Wickes, stressed that they would not arbitrate because a principle was involved: a man should have the right to manage his own property. This theme was prevalent among conservative journals. Independent expressed it this way:

The Pullman company cannot and ought not to be compelled to arbitrate. . . . A man who intends to submit to the decision of arbitrators cannot be forced to accept arbitration. One must decide for himself the conditions on which he will work or pay for work; otherwise we have no liberty.³⁵

In contrast to the interpretations of Nation, Independent, and Harper's Weekly, which viewed the strike from a laissez-faire perspective, were several journals which regarded the dispute from a more "liberal" editorial posture. These tended to be the Review, Arena and Outlook. They argued on both moral and practical grounds that Pullman ought to have, and could have arbitrated. Their interpretations tend to match more closely those of the Strike Commission.

Review of Reviews stressed Pullman's moral obligation to arbitrate:

There can be no doubt whatever as to the logical soundness of Mr. Pullman's point of view. But there are times when it is an exceedingly gracious thing to waive one's rights. . . . From his own unbending and consistent standpoint, Mr. Pullman could not have consented to arbitration. . . . Under public laws permitting the creation of commercial corporations, the Pullman Company was invested with various privileges. The extension of the Pullman car service to more than a hundred thousand miles of roads was made possible by the public franchises granted to railway corporations. . . . To very many people it seemed clear that he ought not to have allowed his local quarrel to go

on unsettled . . . until it had assumed continental proportions and brought wide-spread loss and harm to the nation which had enriched him and his company.³⁶

Arena asserted that Pullman had no excuse for not helping his men financially. The corporation was not "unable" to raise pay or lower rents. Pullman could have drawn from

. . . that immense reserve fund and those large dividends just paid, created out of the whole Pullman community in previous years of undenied prosperity, remaining solely in the hands of Pullman and his associates. . . .³⁷

Outlook, after summarizing the reasons Pullman refused to arbitrate (from a press release issued by the company), commented:

Mr. Pullman's statement leaves some vital facts out of consideration. . . . Are there one, or two or three corporations? Does one and the same organization . . . constitute the Pullman Palace-Car Company . . . the Pullman Manufacturing Company . . ., and the Pullman Landlord Company . . .? If the latter be the case, it will be very difficult for Mr. Pullman to persuade the public that he and his associates were acting otherwise than in a wholly selfish way in reducing the wages of their men 25 per cent, and upwards, while keeping the rents of their men unreduced, and declaring a quarterly dividend on their stock of 2 per cent.

. . . it would appear that the Pullman Company imposed the losses of a hard season on its working-men without taking its fair proportion of them itself. . . . This does not . . . give the employees a right to demand arbitration. . . . But it does subject the corporation which . . . takes the profits of good times for itself, to public obloquy.³⁸

As noted in the preceding chapter, the Strike Commission was critical of Pullman for his refusal to

recognize and deal with organized labor, the implication being that had he arbitrated with the grievance committee, the strike could have been avoided. Arena suggested that Pullman gave his men no alternative but to join the A.R.U.:

. . . laboring men have discovered that . . . [like the company] they also must act corporately as an individual instead as individuals if they wish to obtain any consideration at the hands of corporate capital. . . . Labor organizations are as legitimate as any other social institution. . . .³⁹

Underlying Issues

Paternalism

The extent to which inhabitants of the "model" town felt the effects of corporate control was described by Independent in these terms:

So far as Pullman is concerned, we suspect the real trouble is that the tenants felt that they were too much taken care of and had too little liberty. Pullman has been held up as a model town; but tenants would rather have their own way, than be compelled to submit to the better way of some one else. . . . It was as if the State owned the land and houses, and ruled the people.⁴⁰

. . . [Workmen] felt themselves to be mere parts of a machine, which, however kind in its intention, was remorseless in its action. . . . Many employees felt that they were in a sort of serfdom, the natural result of which was to aggregate every wrong suffered and to intensify every feeling of dissatisfaction.⁴¹

Samuel Gompers, in the North American, said that employees were forbidden to join labor unions and were entirely dependent "upon Mr. Pullman's generosity and foresight in all things."⁴²

Nation printed a lengthy letter to the editor,

which explained the influence of the corporation upon tenants and their frustrated desire to own land:

The general complaint seemed to be that they were too much under Mr. Pullman's thumb; there was no room for individuality or independence. There was a gentle but never ceasing Pullman pressure. . . . The workman owned nothing except the clothes on his back and the furniture in his rented house. . . . The cause of the discontent was lack of individual freedom, and opportunity to acquire something of one's own. . . . to have and control a bit of land was impossible. . . .⁴³

Review of Reviews surprisingly defended the town as a worthy idea, splendidly executed, and supported the company's refusal to permit home ownership:

It is natural for men to wish homes of their own; but that is no reason why the Pullman Company should sell its houses. Hundreds . . . of the Pullman workmen have been incited to thrift and to a higher standard of living by their experience in the town of Pullman, and have gone forth . . . to labor in other fields and to own homes of their own. . . .⁴⁴

Providing a more general defense of corporate paternalism was Harper's Weekly, which declared:

The village of Pullman has been criticized by many. . . . It has been said that the company interfered too much with the personal freedom of the inhabitants, and that many of the rules and regulations in force tended to destroy their independence. . . .

The town is managed as a private estate, and the rules and regulations are of about the same character as those voluntarily assumed by residents in choice restricted suburban neighborhoods. . . . Moreover, none of the workmen is required to live in the village.⁴⁵

None of the journals commented on such grievances as inadequate medical care or company spying. Nor was there

any specific mention of the "ten-day clause" to which renters were subject.

Absence of Democracy

Accounts differed as to whether Pullman maintained coercive political control over the town.

Harper's Weekly reported:

Mr. Pullman himself is a Republican in politics. Yet in the town elections the Democratic candidate is nearly always elected. The men are absolutely free to vote as they choose, although canvassing upon either side is discouraged.⁴⁶

A letter to the editor of Nation, however, more accurately explained:

The promptness with which the whole town, previously Republican, voted the Democratic ticket when Mr. Pullman expressed a desire that they should vote the Republican ticket, was no surprise to observers who knew the employees personally.

The author of that letter also pointed out that town residents "had nothing to do with the local government. . . ." ⁴⁷

There was no discussion in any of the periodicals concerning the evident lack of freedom of expression for those who might wish to speak out against company policies.

Forum presented an article which suggests the Pullman Strike was essentially the product of faulty public relations on the part of corporate managers, who failed to heed the warning signals provided by employee "feedback." Directors of the company, "if they have one ear open to the claims of the workmen . . ., listen with a hundred ears to the demands of the stockholders whom they represent."⁴⁸

This article said that if the company had provided its employees more of a sense of democratic participation in the policy making process, the strike might have been prevented. The directors

. . . do not study the human hopes and needs which agitate their employees. . . . If earnings decline, no cut is made in the salary of the officers, but they are instructed to reduce expenses. This means a reduced force, or wages or both. The reduction follows the line of least resistance. It falls upon the powerless employee. . . . The employee . . . is under the domination of an employer with whom he has no voice, and from whom he can expect no consideration. . . . Is it not easy to comprehend that lack of genuine interest and ultimate antagonism are bound to take root where the tie of employment is a cold balance-sheet on the one hand and an uncertain monthly wage on the other?⁴⁹

Analysis

Weeklies

In general the weeklies concentrated on the immediate issues and neglected underlying issues.

Harper's Weekly, Independent, and Nation approved of the Pullman Company and argued in these terms: a declining market caused Pullman to lose construction contracts and reduce the price of cars. Wages fell. Under no circumstances could Pullman have drawn upon corporate reserves or the dividends of stockholders to increase wages. That would have been bad business.

Pullman carefully regulated his town for the benefit of employees. They had no real complaint. Rents were fair. Workers were free to live elsewhere.

For Pullman to have arbitrated would have been absurd. He was losing money on his contracts and labor agitators were trying to foment a revolution. Furthermore, as a property-owner, Pullman had the right to run his business as he saw fit. No one else had a right to tell him to arbitrate or pursue a financially ruinous policy.

These, essentially, were the arguments made by the "conservative" weeklies. They interpreted the immediate issues from a laissez-faire theoretical framework. In their enthusiastic defense of Pullman, however, they deviated from historical evidence presented in Chapter III.

I. Harper's Weekly included these distortions in its interpretation of the immediate issues; the Weekly

- (1) implied Pullman was not making enormous profits;
- (2) asserted workers had no real grievance;
- (3) gave erroneous facts concerning rents;
- (4) suggested Pullman would have arbitrated, had it not been for labor agitators.

II. Independent

- (1) stated wages "seem to be all that could be afforded," yet gave no factual evidence in support of this view;
- (2) suggested that rents would decline as the market fell, a prediction that omitted Pullman's intent to earn six per cent, regardless of market conditions;
- (3) reported Pullman's contention that workers were not

compelled to live in the company town, ignoring the employees' belief to the contrary.

III. Nation

- (1) asserted Pullman had no control over employee wages, yet provided no supporting evidence;
- (2) implied that workers did not have starvation wages, yet many employees were left with only several dollars after rent was paid;
- (3) said rents were as high as adjoining towns and workers were free to live elsewhere;
- (4) declared Pullman "could not" arbitrate, an argument based purely upon laissez-faire theory, unsubstantiated by financial data.

Concerning the underlying issues, Harper's Weekly was inadequate in two respects: (1) implying that town regulations were no more severe than those in other "quality" communities; and (2) implying that town inhabitants were not pressured to vote in accordance with Pullman's desires.

The conservative weeklies were not, however, completely inadequate in explaining the issues. Independent, for example, was the only journal to explain the shop abuses experienced by Pullman workers. Furthermore, it gave an excellent summary of paternalism.

Nation did not comment directly on the underlying issues. Nevertheless, by printing a letter to the editor, Nation helped to explain both paternalism and Pullman's influence on voting.

Outlook differed sharply from the other weeklies. A "progressive" journal, it emphasized humanitarian over economic values.

In many respects, Outlook's tone and reasoning was similar to that of the Strike Commission. Outlook (1) emphasized the weaknesses in Pullman's reasons for refusing to arbitrate; (2) reported the extensive profits earned by the company; (3) explained why it appeared as though Pullman passed his losses on to his men without the company bearing its fair share; (4) suggested that Pullman could have adjusted wages or rents.

On the other hand, Outlook, in contrast to the other weeklies, completely failed to discuss any of the underlying issues.

Monthlies

In comparison to weeklies, the monthly journals devoted proportionately far less discussion to the issues.

Arena and Samuel Gompers in North American explained the strike from the laborer's viewpoint, but both articles lacked the depth needed for a full understanding of the issues.

The Review was "moderate" in perspective. Forum, with articles from several authors, had no consistent editorial viewpoint. Neither journal gave sufficient attention to all the issues. The Review emphasized arbi-

tration; Forum provided a thorough discussion of the lack of democracy in Pullman.

Arena interpreted the strike primarily in one lengthy article by Walter Blackburn Harte. Discussion of the immediate and underlying issues was extremely limited. (Harte concentrated his analysis upon the related issues emerging from the subsequent railroad boycott and strike.) In commenting on the "original" strike, Arena basically made two points: (1) that Pullman could have given his employees a financial reprieve by drawing upon corporate reserves, and (2) that Pullman's aloof intransigence, in effect, compelled his men to join the A.R.U.

The Review of Reviews explained the issues in "Progress of the World," by the editor, Albert Shaw. From his detached perspective, Shaw presented a balanced discussion. He was mainly concerned with the effect of the strike on the entire nation.

The Review did not question Pullman's arguments for reducing wages; nor did it analyze the financial condition of the company to determine whether Pullman could have adjusted wages or rents. It even defended Pullman's refusal to allow private ownership of property. Nevertheless, the Review argued editorially that Pullman ought to have arbitrated with his men, that some reduction in rent should have been made.

North American covered the strike in a four author symposium. Only one article, by Samuel Gompers, even

mentioned the issues. At best his explanation was extremely shallow.

Forum also conducted a symposium. With the exception of one article, however, discussion of the issues was quite superficial. One author pointed out that while employee wages declined, the salaries of managers were unreduced. Another writer denounced the assertion that workers were paid starvation wages. Nevertheless, of all the journals, Forum presented the most comprehensive analysis of a major source of discontent--the inability of employees to have a voice in managing the corporation.

General Inadequacies

Aside from Outlook, the journals avoided any serious interpretative reporting that could have assessed the full financial condition of the Pullman Company. Such an analysis would have contributed toward answering the question of whether Pullman could have raised wages or reduced rents.

Two factors may have inhibited such a discussion. First, the prevailing free enterprise ethic, so prominent among conservative journals, may have restrained any reporter or author from initiating the difficult task of procuring the necessary information. In 1894, muckraking was still a latent force in journalism. A "full-blown" expose of the Pullman Company's economic posture may have been inconceivable to most editors.

Second, none of the journals were so financially secure themselves that they could afford to field the quality or number of reporters that might be required to conduct such an investigation.

It is doubtful that any of the weeklies even assigned reporters to Pullman, Illinois, during the early phases of the strike. None of the journals discussed such abuses as the "ten-day" rental clause, the "two-check" pay system, or other related particulars, even though voting and home ownership received some attention. Moreover, there was no discussion of restraints to freedom of expression, another indication that few, if any, reporters seriously investigated conditions in the company town.

CHAPTER IV---FOOTNOTES

¹"The Boycott of the Pullman Company," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (7 July, 1894), 627.

²T. C. Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

³"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5.

⁴"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 135-36.

⁵"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

⁶D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 642-43.

⁷Louis R. Ehrich, "Stock Sharing as a Preventive of Labor Troubles," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 434-35.

⁸"Mr. Pullman's Testimony," Outlook L (1 September, 1894), 339.

⁹"The Week," Nation LIX (6 September, 1894), 166.

¹⁰"New Theory of Wages," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 59.

¹¹"The Week," Nation LIX (6 September, 1894), 166.

¹²"Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.

¹³"The Week," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 19.

¹⁴"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

¹⁵"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 86.

¹⁶Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 686.

¹⁷"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 136.

- 18 Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.
- 19 "The Week," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 56.
- 20 "Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.
- 21 Ibid.; "The Week," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 56.
- 22 "The Week," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 1; D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 634.
- 23 Samuel Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 202.
- 24 "The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 136.
- 25 "The Pullman Investigation," Independent XLVI (23 August, 1894), 1087.
- 26 Walter B. Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 502-3.
- 27 Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191.
- 28 "The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5.
- 29 "The Week," Nation LIX (30 August, 1894), 151.
- 30 Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 636.
- 31 "The Report on the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376.
- 32 Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.
- 33 "The Report on the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376; "The Week," Nation LIX (30 August, 1894), 151.
- 34 "The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 134-35.
- 35 "Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.
- 36 "The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 135.

³⁷Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94,"
Arena X (September, 1894), 508.

³⁸"The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 86.

³⁹Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94,"
Arena X (September, 1894), 512.

⁴⁰"Pullman," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 923.

⁴¹"The Pullman Investigation," Independent XLVI
(23 August, 1894), 1087.

⁴²Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North
American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 202.

⁴³E. L. C. Morse, "Pullman and Its Inhabitants,"
Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 61.

⁴⁴"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X
(August, 1894), 137.

⁴⁵Crawford, "The Pullman Company and Its Striking
Workmen," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 687.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Morse, "Pullman and Its Inhabitants," Nation LIX
(26 July, 1894), 62.

⁴⁸Ehrich, "Stock Sharing as a Preventive of Labor
Troubles," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 434-35.

⁴⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIKE:
RELATED ISSUES

The Pullman Strike became a topic of major importance after the American Railway Union and the General Manager's Association turned it into a nationwide boycott and railway strike.

Literary Digest on 21 July 1894 commented, "No strike within recollection has involved so many important questions, legislative, Constitutional, industrial and sociological, as has the strike of the American Railway Union."¹

This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of the journals in explaining the related issues emerging from the original strike at Pullman, Illinois.

Related IssuesThe Chicago Boycott and Strike

How did the A.R.U. arrive at its decision to boycott? General Miles, writing in North American, asserted that members of the union had been "misled by the harangues of professional agitators. . . ." into an attitude of insurrection. Forum said the A.R.U. convention failed to give other interested parties (e.g., representatives of government and

the travelling public) a hearing prior to the boycott decision.²

Evidently, Miles considered presentation of grievances against Pullman to be a "harangue." The Forum writer's criticism of the A.R.U. convention was apparently based upon a belief that the union deliberately planned to paralyze transportation, thereby interfering with the rights of the public and the government's obligation to protect interstate commerce. There is no basis in historical evidence for such a belief.

Harper's Weekly, Nation and Independent declared that Debs ordered the boycott and/or strike.³ Outlook initially reported the A.R.U. decision was a "decree" formulated by a "secret committee." In a later account, however, Outlook said "the strike [boycott] was not ordered until the delegates of four hundred local unions had unanimously approved of it. . . ."⁴

Once the boycott began the G.M.A. resisted and a strike followed. Three journals gave relatively accurate assessments concerning the causes of the strike.

As the Arena pointed out, a basic reason for the strike was sympathy among the railroad workers for Pullman employees.⁵

A.F.L. leader Samuel Gompers in North American suggested this was the only reason: railroad employees attempted

. . . to redress grievances not of their own, but of other workmen, who, having become thoroughly enervated and impoverished, without organization or previous understanding, in sheer desperation threw down their work. . . .⁶

Outlook correctly reported, however, that relations between railroads and their employees had been previously strained, "partly by acts of real injustice perpetuated by some corporations . . ., partly by the fact that the law provides no remedy for such injustice except through a labor organization. . . ."⁷

Gompers also suggested, as the Strike Commission observed, that the government was responsible for the strike, since it had failed to regulate corporations and remedy labor abuses. In North American, Gompers wrote,

Labor has no standing nor protection in the economy of our life. . . . If the state refuses to deal out some degree of justice and guarantee protection to labor, what interest has the laborer in the state?⁸

The Strike Commission suggested that both Pullman and the G.M.A. were partially responsible for the railway strike.

As indicated above Arena and Gompers implied the A.R.U. strike/boycott would have been avoided if Pullman had acted to resolve his workers' complaints. The Review of Reviews also blamed Pullman; as noted in Chapter IV, the Review commented, "He ought not to have allowed his local quarrel to go on unsettled . . . until it had assumed continental proportions. . . ."⁹

The Review did not hold the G.M.A. responsible. Outlook, however, suggested the strike could not have

happened if railroad managers had been fair to their employees. As will become evident, Arena was the one journal to explain the G.M.A.'s role in precipitating the strike.

Who ordered the strike? Historical evidence indicates the strike was not ordered, but was a spontaneous phenomenon among local unions and individual railway employees. It appears to have been triggered by G.M.A. decisions to fire men who would not handle Pullman cars, to import replacements, and to hire deputies. Contrary to this evidence, the journals--except Arena, Outlook and Compers' North American article--asserted that Debs and/or the A.R.U. "ordered" the strike.¹⁰

Even Review of Reviews, normally somewhat sympathetic to labor, declared, "Mr. Debs, as autocrat of the new American Railway Union, adopted the policy of extending the strike and of attacking the unoffending railway corporations and the . . . world of traffic and travel. . . ." Debs injured the public.¹¹

The historical record shows the purpose of the boycott was to penalize Pullman until he would arbitrate. G.M.A. resistance brought on the strike, which was partially responsible, with mob violence, for impeding the movement of trains. As noted earlier in this study, the managers deliberately aggravated transportation tie-ups in order to

create an impression that strikers were totally responsible for inconvenience to the public.

An article in Forum, whether intentional or not, seems to have clearly articulated the impression which the railroads sought to establish:

The leaders of this Union [A.R.U.] issued an order to their followers to refuse to work for railroad companies that should . . . continue to haul the Pullman cars. As no railroad companies ceased to carry out their contracts with . . . Pullman . . . , some of the trainmen . . . obeyed the order, and refused to move trains to which Pullman cars were attached. For this reason the railroad companies discharged them, and tried to fill their places. Thereupon a general strike was ordered by the Union, with the intention of putting a stop to all railroad traffic until their demands were complied with.¹² (Emphasis added.)

North American interpreted the strike in a symposium by four authors. Samuel Gompers presented the labor viewpoint. General Miles explained the dispute as an insurrection against government authority requiring armed forces. Two other writers discussed the strike from the viewpoint of the railroad managers: Wade Hampton, U. S. Commissioner of Railroads, and Harry P. Robinson, editor of Railway Age.

Two monthlies (Miles, Hampton, and Robinson in North American, and one Forum article) and three weeklies (Nation, Independent, and Harper's Weekly) seriously misinterpreted the nature and "intent" of the strike.

Robinson, for example, rejected the reasons for the strike given by Gompers, Arena and Outlook. He said the cause of the dispute was neither sympathy for the men at Pullman, nor grievances felt by railroad workers. Rather,

the strike was a pre-planned decision to precipitate

. . . a general industrial rebellion, through which . . . the labor organizations of the country proposed to obtain control of the legislative and administrative machinery of . . . government. . . . [The conflict was] an insurrection of certain sections of the wage earning class against constituted society.¹³

General Miles had a similar view; the strike was a contest between:

. . . anarchy, . . . unwritten law, mob violence, and universal chaos under the . . . flag of socialism . . . ; [and] the side of established government, supremacy of law, maintenance of good order, universal peace, absolute security of life and property. . . .¹⁴

Hampton, in a slightly less extreme position, said the intention of the striking A.R.U. members "was the destruction of the railroads and of property of all other descriptions."¹⁵

Similar to Miles, Robinson and Hampton in viewpoint were Nation, Harper's Weekly, and Independent.

Nation asserted the strike was a contest between the A.R.U. and federal authority for "national supremacy," and charged the union with levying a public war to redress a private grievance.¹⁶

Harper's Weekly reported the avowed aim of the A.R.U. was "to subjugate the people of the United States, to extort from the nation the control and management of its highways. . . ." The union intended to paralyze industry "in order to make its agents dictators in place of the

lawful authorities . . . ;" and the A.R.U. was doing all this "on the pretext that the railroads might thus be coerced into compelling the Pullman Company to open its shops at full wages. . . ."17 (Emphasis added.)

Independent, following this view of the strike, claimed that A.R.U. members had no complaint against the railroads; "The only reason for the strike was that the companies would not agree to refuse to haul Pullman cars." Moreover, the purpose of the strikers "was to stop every railroad train, to prevent the resumption of passenger and freight traffic until their demands were granted." The A.R.U. undoubtedly hoped "to construct . . . a combination of labor organizations powerful enough to resist both State and National authority."18

In the following paragraph, Forum summarized on behalf of the railroads, an analysis nearly identical to the interpretations of Miles and Robinson in North American, and the views of Nation, Independent, and Harper's Weekly.

. . . the railway unionists . . . took the position that they would interrupt the business of the country, subject thousands of innocent passengers to delay and annoyance. . . . Their attitude was essentially that of anarchists. . . . They demanded that their will . . . be recognized as superior to the law of the land, and this revolutionary demand, together with the evident sympathy and practical encouragement of the State and city magistrates, is what gave the strike its significance.19

In summary, five journals (excluding Gompers' article in North American) asserted that Debs had ordered

the strike in a pre-planned, deliberate attempt to paralyze traffic and obtain national supremacy over government authority. But these journals failed to substantiate their claim with facts.

Thus far, discussion has centered upon why A.R.U. members declared a boycott and went on strike. The journals also explained why the G.M.A. fought the A.R.U.

Independent gave several reasons for G.M.A. resistance: (1) the railroads were asserting their right to manage property for the benefit of the public and the stockholders; (2) it would have been in violation of moral obligations to join in such a boycott; (3) "it would have been a violation of contract;" (4) it became evident to the managers that the purpose of the A.R.U. was "to use the Pullman controversy as a pretext for forcing upon the railroads recognition of its Union. . . ." ²⁰ (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, commented Independent, the G.M.A. did not exist solely for the purpose of "subduing attempts of the employed to better their condition." Rather, the fundamental idea of the association was arbitration. "It is only when there is no possibility of averting trouble that the committee whose duties are the handling of strikes and disturbances is called to take charge." ²¹

Independent's analysis of G.M.A. resistance to the strike is obviously inconsistent with the evidence. Clearly, the "Pullman controversy" was not a pretext, but was the

central reason A.R.U. delegates voted to boycott Pullman cars. Furthermore, as the Strike Commission concluded, the fundamental purpose of the G.M.A. in 1894 was to "crush" organized labor; at no point did the managers consider negotiating their opposition to the boycott with Debs.

Outlook reported the G.M.A. resisted the A.R.U. because of its "preposterous" demand to nearly all the railways to join in the boycott of the Pullmans, under penalty of a tie-up.²²

Review of Reviews explained that the managers were "compelled . . . to conspire . . . against labor unions" because the A.R.U. had conspired to paralyze traffic.²³

Four journals argued strongly that the railroads had no alternative but to resist the strike because contracts with Pullman were involved. Forum said it would have been impossible for the companies to accede to the boycott; such an act would be "unlawful and subject them to damages. . . . The companies . . . were therefore required to put themselves in distinct opposition. . . ."²⁴ (Emphasis added.) Independent, Outlook and Hampton's article in North American made similar arguments.²⁵

According to the evidence, the railroads were by no means "required" by contracts to haul Pullman cars. This argument originated from the G.M.A. in an apparent attempt to gain public support.

Why was the General Manager's Association apparently

so successful in getting its views into print? Aside from the probability that conservative journals would be particularly interested in seeking out the G.M.A. rationale, the managers had an excellent public relations apparatus. As the Independent noted, the G.M.A. fought the strike with an efficient press bureau.²⁶

There is no evidence that Debs had such a means of publicity. Perhaps this might explain why comparatively little of the A.R.U. interpretation of the strike appeared in print. Of all the journals, only Outlook presented both Debs' defense of the union strike as well as the G.M.A.'s reasons for opposing it.²⁷

The "Omnibus" Injunction

As might be expected, the "pro-labor" Arena, in Walter B. Harte's lengthy analysis, presented an extremely critical interpretation of the federal injunction. Gompers' North American article, and Albert Shaw's commentary in Review of Reviews also denounced the injunction.

Outlook devoted little attention to the injunction but was opposed to its use "for the purpose of punishing a crime against the peace and order of the community."²⁸

Among the other weeklies, surprisingly the Nation was as outspoken against the injunction as were the more "progressive" journals.

Harper's Weekly, Independent and Forum scarcely discussed this issue.

How adequately did the journals explain the background of the injunction? The Review, North American (Gompers' article) and Arena argued against applying the Interstate Commerce Law to restrain organized labor.

The Review argued in these terms:

The Interstate Commerce law was in fact not enacted to restrain labor but to restrain capital. Its object was to bring railway management under control in the public interest. Yet the railway managers have notoriously and habitually violated its provisions. It would be a strange reversal of the purpose and the spirit of that law if the Federal Courts should join hands with the railway managers to use it as an instrument to destroy labor organizations.²⁹

This particular analysis, though it fails to completely make a positive connection between the court and the G.M.A., seems quite perceptive when compared to the evidence.

Gompers, in North American, said it was strange that the Interstate Commerce Law

. . . should be perverted from its true purpose, and made to do service as an instrument to oppress the parties to whom it was never intended to apply, workmen engaged in a contest to redress grievances.³⁰

Arena declared the A.R.U. "is not in any sense a restraint of trade; it is simply a moral union, to sustain wages, the minimum at which men will permit control of their labor and faculties."³¹

As noted earlier in this study only slight coverage was given to the appointment of Egan as strike manager and Walker as special U. S. attorney. None of the journals pieced together the full extent to which Olney, Walker,

the G.M.A. and the federal judges collaborated in creating the injunction.

North American (Gompers' article), however, suggested a similarity in values between the G.M.A. and Judge Grosscup: the U. S. Army was ordered into Chicago,

. . . by the order of the President to enforce injunctions, restraining "everybody" from even writing a letter, issued by the judge who only a few days before expressed the conviction that the growth of labor organizations must be checked by law.³²

(Judge Grosscup, on 30 May 1894, had declared that "the growth of labor unions must be checked by law.")³³

Godkin's Nation attacked the "omnibus" nature of the injunction and alluded to the fact that it created an impression the court was a tool of the railroads--an impression the Nation wanted to dissipate. The injunction was issued not only against specific persons, but also against the members of the A.R.U. "to the number of thousands, and 'all other persons whomsoever'. No satisfactory precedent exists for injunctions of such wide scope as this." The true reason for issuing such a court order was to meet the Chicago emergency, because the process of arrest and indictment was slow.³⁴

Nation feared

. . . that many of the common people . . . entertain the belief that the courts have allied themselves with the great corporate interests of the country . . . It is eminently desirable that this belief should have no sound basis.

If there is no other way of repressing crime except by treating it as contempt of court, our jurisprudence must be reconstituted upon models . . . which prevail under despotic governments.³⁵

Nation suggested that the injunction, as a means of inducing federal armed intervention, may have been "wholly superfluous." Since federal statutes authorized the President to use the U. S. Army in quelling domestic violence, there was no need to have relied upon an injunction restraining such activities. The use of regulars by the President, in "the prompt discharge of his constitutional duty," was a legal remedy for the situation that was quick and adequate.³⁶

There was little discussion among the journals concerning the relationship between the injunction and the mails. None of the periodicals suggested the clause prohibiting obstruction of mail was not needed when the injunction was drafted. The first occasion on which the mails were probably seriously obstructed was after the injunction was read by Marshal Arnold to the crowd at Blue Island. None of the journals reported (as the evidence indicates) the section concerning U. S. mail was probably deliberately included by Walker to provide the official excuse--sought by the G.M.A.--for federal armed intervention. In general, the journals seem to have accepted the common assumption that the mails were being obstructed, hence that troops were needed.

Arena, however, made this interesting interpretation concerning the mail:

Neither law nor society can enjoin a man from throwing up his employment, and persuading others

to do likewise, whether such action inconveniences society or interferes with contracts between government and certain railroad corporations or not. In case the withdrawal of men prevents the railroads from carrying the mails according to contract, then the government has a purely civil case for breach of contract against the railroads, and the latter must find new agencies for the fulfillment of their contracts with the government.³⁷

Arena was the one journal to emphasize that aspect of the injunction which stated that it was a conspiracy to induce men by persuasion to quit work or refuse to handle Pullman cars; in this respect, Arena's position foreshadowed that of the Strike Commission:³⁸

This judicial muzzle was a menace . . . an audacious threat from the state; . . . it denied the laboring poor the right . . . to meet and exchange ideas, to find and make a community of social opinion by the ordinary methods of discussion . . .; it denied the right of free thought and free speech.³⁹

Federal Intervention

Did the journals comment upon the relationship between the railroad managers and the federal armed forces?

None of the journals pointed out that special U. S. deputies had been authorized by Attorney General Olney, selected and paid for by the railroads.

Concerning the use of federal troops, however, Arena criticized the government for acting as though the railroads alone had "rights." Arena pointed out that the "function of federal jurisdiction is most essentially that of a judge or umpire between all parties, and between parties and the

state. . . ." The government acted unjustly because it sought to guarantee freedom of contract to capitalists and deny it to laborers.⁴⁰

Arena's explanation of federal armed intervention closely approximates the historical record. Once the railroads experienced lawlessness and difficulty in running their trains, said Arena, they

. . . should have immediately notified the properly constituted municipal and state authorities and placed the protection of their property in their hands. By not doing so they seemed to indicate that they did not regard themselves amenable to the state authorities.⁴¹

In perhaps a slight overstatement, Arena clearly revealed the connection between the G.M.A. and federal attorneys. Instead of appealing to local or state officials for assistance,

. . . the railroad companies through their attorneys, who were in constant consultation with the United States district attorney, made a requisition upon the federal government for United States regular troops. The President at once responded, thus recognizing the claims of the railroad companies as superior to the rights and dignity of . . . Illinois.⁴²

More accurately stated, Arena could have pointed out that U. S. Marshal Arnold, acting on behalf of federal attorneys (who were in constant contact with the G.M.A.) neglected to appeal to local authorities but instead requested federal troops.

Despite Outlook's support for Cleveland's policy of intervention, this weekly printed a letter to the editor

which expressed the view that the government was not wise in the way it intervened. Federal authorities

. . . ought to have been wise enough to see that back of the riot and violence on the part of the mob there was a lawful and law abiding action on the part of the workingmen against the railroads. The workingmen may have been in the wrong; but they who, at least outwardly had not broken the law should not have been practically identified with the lawless, and condemned before they were tried.

The Government . . . should have said: "Of the real question between the railroads and the men we cannot at this time judge; there is evidence of a large following on each side of the case; the presumption is that there is truth on both sides. . . . But of that we cannot now judge. Our first duty is to preserve the peace. We shall then appoint . . . a committee of investigation or arbitration. . . ." If Government had said that . . . [it] would not be . . . declared by thousands . . . of peaceful workingmen to be a mere tool and creature of the corporations. . . .⁴³

How did the journals, which supported President Cleveland's policy, justify federal intervention?

According to historical evidence, the situation in Chicago on July 3 did not warrant a call for federal or state troops. The principal disturbance had been at Blue Island--beyond the limits of Chicago. Some property damage and violence had broken out after the G.M.A. inspired injunction was read to the crowd. Police were available but not requested.

In contrast to the evidence, Independent claimed that

. . . on July 3d all the roads were experiencing more or less trouble in moving trains and many of them were completely tied up. All attempts at

moving freight had been abandoned and officials . . . were making heroic attempts to keep the through passenger trains moving. . . . Riotous mobs, supposedly led by the strikers, began to destroy property, derail trains and block the tracks with overturned cars.

Thus it came about that the railroad[s] presently found their property in the hands of the mobs; their men at the mercy of thugs; . . . the municipal authorities temporizing, and anarchy imminent. Then it was that appeals were made to President Cleveland to send the soldiers.⁴⁴

On what basis did the Independent arrive at this assessment of the situation? One answer was suggested in a Forum article. The author declared, "In view of the reports then [July 3] appearing in all the newspapers, it was evident that disorder did exist to a serious extent.

. . ."⁴⁵ If, indeed, newspapers were the major source of news from which the journals derived their stories, what was the quality of newspaper reporting during the boycott?

According to Almont Lindsey, "The newspapers of the nation were inclined to be very hostile toward the American Railway Union;" sensationalism and misrepresentation were common in metropolitan newspapers. "Controlled by capitalistic influence, these publications were unable to view the struggle in a detached or disinterested frame of mind."⁴⁶

Similarly, in John Finnegan's study of the newspaper press and the strike, he characterized strike reporting as sensational, non-objective and often erroneous.

Many of the errors in strike reporting probably were the result of confusion, sloppy reporting, inexperienced men and deliberate lies told by news sources. . . . The statements of parties involved

in the strike were run verbatim with no apparent effort to verify the facts. News copy was pumped full of speculation, rumor and personal bias.⁴⁷

Finnegan concluded that by the time violence broke out in Chicago, the newspapers had already "convicted" Debs and the A.R.U. Similarly, Lindsey reported the press shamefully distorted the facts and greatly magnified trivial incidents; by these means the newspapers were able to generate far more support for intervention than circumstances justified.⁴⁸

If newspaper accounts of the situation in Chicago were exaggerated, distorted and based to some extent upon news releases prepared by the G.M.A. press bureau, a public impression could easily have been formed that circumstances clearly demanded the use of troops, and that Governor Altgeld failed to act accordingly.

Altgeld, in his July 5 protest to President Cleveland, commented on the situation in Chicago prior to the arrival of federal troops:

. . . troubles were local in character and could easily be handled by State authorities. The newspaper accounts have in many cases been pure fabrications, and in others wild exaggerations.⁴⁹

The author of the Forum article, who based his analysis upon newspaper stories, asked how it was that Altgeld came to be ignorant of "the fact" that disorder did exist to a serious extent.

The only possible answer is that the governor did not consider the presence in the railroad yards

and about the trains, of crowds of men . . . as anything unlawful. . . . Such being the case, it would have been a futile proceeding for the railroad companies to appeal to the governor for the assistance of troops.⁵⁰

Because Altgeld issued a second protest on July 6, when violence increasingly justified the use of troops, the Review of Reviews probably reflected public sentiment when it declared:

Governor Altgeld . . . cut no enviable figure in writing elaborate arguments to President Cleveland against Federal interference at the very moment when rioters were in control of the railroad yards, were stopping mails and were burning loaded cars.⁵¹

How did the journals interpret the legal issue of federal intervention?

Arena argued strongly that Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution was applicable and ought to have been the basis for President Cleveland's action. As Arena remarked, "Mr. Olney's and Mr. Cleveland's whimsical ideas of their functions and authority are at variance with the constitution of the United States."⁵²

Arena sharply attacked one presidential reply to Altgeld as "perhaps the most absurd and unworthy utterance made during the whole conflict." Cleveland could not satisfy the constitutional objections raised by Altgeld; the President "puts his scorn upon temperate discussion and reason in order to carry out his will."⁵³

President Cleveland, by forcing troops into states without any demand from and against the will of the governors of the states, violated the spirit if not the letter of the constitution. He out-Hamiltoned Hamilton.⁵⁴

One North American article countered the argument that Cleveland should have relied upon the Constitution:

. . . those who criticize the acts of the President forget that Congress has enacted laws which confer on the chief magistrate larger and wider powers than those given to Congress by the Constitution. The authority for the exercise of these powers is found in Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes.⁵⁵

Outlook, Forum and Nation, in varying degrees of detail, also discussed these statutes, but made no mention whatsoever of the applicable section of the Constitution.⁵⁶

Nation, supporting Cleveland, commented,

Section 5299 . . . was fortunately framed so as to meet a contingency which could hardly have been foreseen--the occupation of the governorship by a man who sympathized with the law breakers and who would not use the power of the State against them.⁵⁷
(Emphasis added.)

Nation failed to substantiate this assertion with facts. To say that Altgeld "would not" use state troops is to imply that, knowing troops were needed, the governor deliberately refused to provide them. Historical evidence provides no support for this interpretation.

Forum commented, "it is obvious that the proper authorities to act first in suppressing a riot are those that are present at the scene. . . . The President suppressed lawlessness because the governor and the mayor did not.

. . ."⁵⁸

Harper's Weekly reported that Altgeld opposed the use of federal troops "because he wanted to stand well with the lawless men who had incited riot, and to secure their votes."⁵⁹

The Review asserted that Cleveland was guilty of no usurpation. "His use of federal troops was strictly within the bounds of federal authority."⁶⁰

Evidently the journals, with the exception of Arena, were little inclined to question the G.M.A./newspaper rationale that circumstances dictated the use of federal troops since local officials had ignored or "refused" to cope with the situation.

Violence

Historical evidence suggests that violence in the strike was an effect, resulting from the irritating injunction, the presence of U. S. troops, frustration with railroad management and mob contagion. But most journals explained violence as a planned means to obtain the goals of the A.R.U.

Independent said the leaders of the A.R.U. intended to paralyze the traffic of the nation by exploiting mob violence:

Debs did not expect to gain his purpose without violence. He sympathized with the violence which prevented the operation of the railroad trains. He wanted that violence to succeed; and the brain of an idiot ought to have seen that neither nation nor State could permit anything of the sort.⁶¹

Forum expressed the same view. Harper's Weekly remarked that Debs' announcements that the A.R.U. intended no violence were impudent falsehoods, "taken seriously by some journalists, whose credulity is too great to be sincere." Moreover, while Debs was making these pronouncements, he was "all the time secretly instigating outrage and brutality."⁶²

Outlook declared that Debs may not have deliberately planned to use violence, but the tragedies of July 5 to 7 fully prove that violence was at least the ally of the union.⁶³ Outlook's explanation of the conflict was among the least emotional of all the journals.

These views are a direct contrast to the finding of the U. S. Strike Commission—that officers of the A.R.U. did not advise or participate in violence and property destruction.

As for the strikers, Nation called them "rioters and incendiaries, lawbreakers, and trainwreckers." According to Hampton's North American article, when the G.M.A. decided to resist the A.R.U., strikers became "enemies of the public peace, and resorted to violence, robbery, and bloodshed, to enforce their lawless demands."⁶⁴

Most of the journals, however, credited the so-called "lawless elements" with contributing to the violence.

Harper's Weekly, in an initial sensational account, reported that strikers "established a reign of terror. . . .

On every line affected by the strike violence was used or threatened. . . ." Subsequently, in a more dispassionate tone, the Weekly commented, "The discontented working-man, the fanatical trades unionist, the enemy of social order . . . the criminal . . . all saw the opportunity to . . . win advantage by rushing to the attack upon wealth."⁶⁵

Likewise, Independent reported that all rioters were not strikers, but many strikers were rioters. It should not "be assumed that all or even a majority of the strikers countenanced . . . violations of the law." Nevertheless, many members of the A.R.U. did not even pretend to maintain law and order (as Debs had urged), "but were unmoved lookers-on, connivers with the actors, and abettors of all the mischief. . . ."⁶⁶

Forum explained that the criminal classes and some of the strikers began to destroy cars and other property; these lawless elements had been "tempted by the impunity with which they had trespassed upon the property of the railroad companies and interrupted the movement in trains. . . ."⁶⁷

Much of the violence that attended the strike, according to the Review, was the work of "a bad class of immigrants," an assertion also made by the Strike Commission. Nevertheless, the Review did not exonerate Debs. To attribute acts of lawlessness

. . . directly to Mr. Debs and his associates would be altogether wrong in the absence of conclusive

evidence. But the dangerous incitement that his . . . strike would give to cranks and Anarchists was one of the things that Mr. Debs ought to have taken into account.⁶⁸

The Review's interpretation of strike violence differed little from that of the Outlook. Both journals expressed concern, and avoided the excessive emotionalism that characterized the analyses of other periodicals.

General Miles, in North American, expressed the view that violence was instigated by strikers, and executed by foreign born anarchists. Mob violence, said Miles, was so severe that it necessitated the use of federal and state troops. "Now the people can judge whether the acts which drew forth these expressions are in the interest of organized labor, or whether it is red-hot anarchy, insurrectionary and revolutionary!"⁶⁹

None of the journals suggested that violence was indirectly a consequence of Pullman's refusal to arbitrate, or, more directly, to the determination of the managers to defeat the strike.

Outlook, however, featured a letter to the editor which asserted that labor "has a right to a living wage," and that the cause of violence was labor's inability to gain its right reward. The writer blamed Pullman and other millionaires for their refusal to pay fair wages and called these corporate leaders "the mainsprings of anarchy."⁷⁰

Perhaps an interpretation relatively close to the historical record was provided by Arena, which suggested

the role of the federal judicial authorities in precipitating violence. The threats to freedom of assembly and expression contained in the court injunction,

. . . provoked and exasperated the lawless and destitute and ignorant elements of society in Chicago to that blind resentment that defeats its own ends in the destruction of property. . . .⁷¹

End of the Strike

Harper's Weekly, Independent and to a lesser extent, Nation discussed reasons for the strike's end. Among the monthlies, North American and Forum also contributed explanations. In combination, the interpretations of these journals generally parallel those of the historical record. Reasons given for the collapse of the strike were:

- (1) The action of the federal courts, the injunction, the arrest and confinement of Debs (Independent).⁷²
- (2) Circumstances did not favor a strike; a large number of men were out of work and sought employment (Independent, Harper's Weekly).⁷³
- (3) The A.R.U. failed to obtain the full support of the brotherhoods and other unions (Independent, Harper's Weekly). North American explained that "the leaders of some of the other organizations, while entirely in sympathy with the aim of the American Railway Union, doubted the wisdom of making the insurrection general."⁷⁴
- (4) Organized labor constituted only a comparatively small fraction of the American people; they "instinctively

sympathize with labor so long as labor is just in its demands and law-abiding in its conduct. . . .," declared Harper's Weekly. But the strikers failed to gain the sympathetic support of public opinion. The conservative forces of society were determined to end violent interference with lawful pursuits. As Nation put it, the patriotic response of the American people, swift and unmistakable, "quelled and conquered the frenzied mob."⁷⁵

(5) The armed forces played a crucial role in ending the strike. According to Nation and Independent, the U. S. troops were decisive. For Harper's Weekly it was the state militia which "with one volley cut the spinal cord of the riot;" and secondarily, the police under the direction of Mayor Hopkins. One writer in Forum said police were unable to control the violence, implying that troops, either state or federal had ended the strife.⁷⁶

(6) The General Manager's Association, a primary cause of the violence, was given full credit for its role in forcibly ending the strike. Harry P. Robinson, editor of The Railway Age, had contributed to the North American symposium. A short time later, he also wrote in Forum, again expressing full support for the railroad managers:

[H]ad the lines in Chicago failed to "act unitedly" as they did, the destruction of life and property and the danger to society would have been incalculably worse than they were. Next to the President . . . and the military which did its duty in Chicago, it is to the General Manager's Association that the gratitude of the American people is chiefly due.⁷⁷

AnalysisWeeklies

Harper's Weekly, Independent and Nation viewed the strike from a conservative perspective. In general, they seriously misinterpreted the nature and origin of the strike. They sympathized with the railroad managers and the national government. To these weeklies the strike was a threat to free enterprise and to "law and order."

Taken as a group, these journals explained the strike essentially in these terms: the American Railway Union was, in effect, a subversive organization bent on obtaining national supremacy, replacing government authorities with union "dictators." The union, therefore, used the Pullman dispute as a "pretext" for attacking the railroads. In a deliberate attempt to paralyze national transportation, Debs declared a nationwide insurrectionary strike. He intended to obtain this objective by having his strikers incite violence among the "lawless elements."

Under these circumstances, it would have been absurd for the G.M.A. to arbitrate with the union the issue of hauling Pullman cars. Governor Altgeld, who had pardoned anarchists, was in "complete sympathy" with the A.R.U. and the rioting mobs. Despite the "fact" that riots and property damage were "prevalent" in Chicago on July 3, Altgeld "refused" to take action to restore order. Chicago

railroads and federal officials, therefore, had no other choice but to seek federal assistance.

In effect, this was the interpretation given by the weeklies, with the exception of Outlook.

Having shown great interest in suppressing the strike, Harper's Weekly, Independent, and Nation (along with North American and Forum) explained why the strike had failed. Collectively they pointed out that the federal injunction, armed forces, the large number of unemployed, the conservative labor unions and the weight of public opinion all contributed to defeating the strike.

Aside from the similarities in their interpretations of the dispute, each of these weeklies had its peculiarities.

Harper's Weekly pointed out that police and militia were instrumental in ending the strike.

Independent argued that Pullman contracts were a reason for G.M.A. resistance to the A.R.U.

Nation criticized the federal injunction as an "omnibus" that applied to nearly everyone remotely associated with the strike. Nation was also the only conservative weekly to explain the federal statutes which authorized President Cleveland's intervention.

Outlook was unique among the weeklies for its over-all rational, comparatively unemotional discussion of strike-related issues. Outlook's interpretation was not comprehensive, but included several explanations not contained in other weeklies.

Although it confused the strike with the boycott, Outlook pointed out that the course of action decided by the union was not due to an order from Debs, but to a vote of union delegates. Second, Outlook reported that grievances among railroad employees were a factor contributing to the strike. Third, it printed both Debs' defense of the boycott/strike, as well as G.M.A. reasons for opposing the union. Fourth, unlike the other weeklies, Outlook suggested that violence was probably an "ally" of the A.R.U.—not its primary method of operation.

Outlook also printed two letters to the editor, each of which contributed to an understanding of the issues. One letter said that Pullman's failure to pay his men a "living" wage was responsible for the violence; the other pointed out that the federal government created an impression it was a "tool" of the railroad corporations.

One significant weakness in Outlook's commentary was omission of any explanation of Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution. Emphasis was placed exclusively upon Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Federal Statutes.

Outlook, like Independent, also printed the apparently common assumption that Pullman contracts required the managers to resist the boycott.

Monthlies

Forum and North American, despite their intent to present symposiums, were only slightly successful in

providing diverse interpretations of the strike. The combined articles of both journals, with the exception of Gompers' analysis in North American (which is examined separately), were similar in tone, viewpoint, and explanation of the strike.

Essentially, Forum and North American interpreted the strike in a manner identical to Harper's Weekly, Independent and Nation: the strike was basically a contest with government authorities for national supremacy. Contracts required G.M.A. resistance. Federal statutes authorized the President to intervene.

North American, of these two monthlies, was unique in that it explained that the A.R.U. lacked the support of other labor unions.

Forum argued that Altgeld knew the situation in Chicago required troops, yet failed to provide them. Moreover, according to Forum, the American people should be grateful to the G.M.A. for firmly resisting the dangerous A.R.U.

The only contrast to these interpretations was provided by Samuel Gompers in North American. Despite his mistaken assertion that sympathy for Pullman workers was the only reason for the railroad strike, Gompers made several useful points: (1) the Interstate Commerce Act was not intended to be used against organized labor; (2) the "State"

had failed to treat laborers with justice; (3) Judge Grosscup, who helped prepare the injunction, was "anti-labor."

The Review of Reviews had the best explanation of Pullman's responsibility for the railway strike. Aside from Pullman, however, the Review blamed Debs for expanding the strike. But the Review did not suggest the A.R.U. intended to overcome national authority. Nor did it assert that Debs pursued a deliberate plan of violence, though it criticized Debs for having initiated a strike when conditions favored violence. The Review opposed the strike primarily because it inconvenienced the "unoffending" public.

Like Gompers, the Review objected to use of the Interstate Commerce Law to restrain labor unions. In tone and perspective, the Review was far less emotional in explaining the strike than most other journals. It discussed neither the applicable constitutional provision, nor the federal statutes, but supported the President's policy as legally authorized.

Arena was nearly as emotional in defense of the A.R.U. and Altgeld as the conservative journals were in denouncing the "rebellion." Nevertheless Arena made several valid points concerning the collaboration between railroads and federal authorities: (1) the failure of the railroads to ask help from local or state authorities; (2) the government could have required railroads to fulfill their

mail contracts by means other than rail; (3) the federal injunction enjoined union officials from even persuading others to participate in the boycott; (4) the injunction played a role in precipitating mob violence; (5) railroad officials via federal attorneys requested federal troops.

One significant weakness in the Arena's interpretation was its exclusive emphasis on Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution. The author made no mention of the federal statutes under which Cleveland intervened.

General Inadequacies

Most of the journals failed to distinguish between the boycott and the strike. None suggested that the hostility of the managers toward the union, and the actions taken by the G.M.A. to defeat the boycott, precipitated the strike and subsequent violence. Despite Arena's analysis, most of the journals failed to clearly explain the inter-relationship among U. S. attorneys Walker and Milchrist, the federal judges, Marshal Arnold, and the railroad managers.

Although Gompers, Arena and Outlook asserted that the federal government was apparently allied with the railroad corporations, there was no suggestion that perhaps the federal government ought to have (1) consulted Altgeld prior to sending in federal troops, or (2) lent moral support to arbitration when it became evident the A.R.U. might expand the dispute.

Even the relatively "progressive" journals failed to document such evident facts as (1) Altgeld's readiness to send troops upon request; (2) the relatively low level of disorder in Chicago prior to July 4; or (3) Attorney General Olney's authorization of federal deputies, selected and paid for by the railroads.

CHAPTER V--FOOTNOTES

¹Literary Digest IX (21 July, 1894), 322.

²Nelson A. Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 186-87; Thomas M. Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 10.

³"The Situation in Chicago," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 655; "The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5; "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 859.

⁴"The Real Issue in the Strike," Outlook L (7 July, 1894), 9; "The Week," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 85.

⁵Walter B. Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 514.

⁶Samuel Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 201.

⁷"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 90.

⁸Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 204.

⁹"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 135.

¹⁰"The Pullman Boycott," Nation LIX (5 July, 1894), 5; "A Senseless Strike," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 858; "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (5 July, 1894), 859; "Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191; D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 635.

¹¹"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 132.

¹²Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 635.

¹³Harry P. Robinson, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 195; 197.

¹⁴Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 187.

¹⁵Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191.

¹⁶"The Nation and the New Slavery," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 22.

¹⁷"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; "Monopoly," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 675; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

¹⁸"Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 924; "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; Joseph Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013.

¹⁹Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 638-39.

²⁰"Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503; C. B. Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

²¹Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

²²"The Week," Outlook L (7 July, 1894), 5.

²³"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 133.

²⁴Cooley, "The Lessons of the Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 6. See also Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 638-39.

²⁵W. J. Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946; Austin Abbott, "The Legal Aspects of the Disorder at Chicago," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 55; Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 191.

²⁶Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

²⁷"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46. (See Appendix II.)

²⁸"The Week," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 126.

²⁹"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 134.

³⁰Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 204.

³¹Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 515.

³²Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 204.

³³Ibid., p. 201.

³⁴"The Debs Case," Nation LIX (13 September, 1894), 190.

³⁵Ibid., p. 191. See also, "The Limits of Arbitration," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 42.

³⁶"The Debs Case," Nation LIX (13 September, 1894), 191.

³⁷Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 516.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 517-19, 522.

³⁹Ibid., p. 520.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 524; p. 517; related comments, p. 515.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 525.

⁴²Ibid., p. 526.

⁴³"Our Next Duty," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 158.

⁴⁴Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239.

⁴⁵Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 636.

⁴⁶Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 308.

⁴⁷Finnegan, "Press and Pullman Strike," p. 242; see also p. 206.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 167. Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 147.

⁴⁹Cited in Barnard, Life of Altgeld, p. 297.

⁵⁰Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 636.

⁵¹"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 133.

⁵²Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 530.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 527-28.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 504.

⁵⁵Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 193.

⁵⁶Abbott, "The Legal Aspects of the Disorder at Chicago," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 54-55.

⁵⁷"Governor Altgeld and the President," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 23.

⁵⁸Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 638. For a similar argument, see Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 12.

⁵⁹"State Rights and State Duties," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

⁶⁰"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 133.

⁶¹"The Conversion of Debs," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1023; see also "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

⁶²H. P. Robinson, "The Humiliating Report of the Strike Commission," Forum XVIII (January, 1894), 530; "Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

⁶³"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46.

⁶⁴"The Week," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 55; Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 192.

⁶⁵"Suppress the Rebellion," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 650; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

⁶⁶Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013; Palmer, "How the Railroads Fought the Strike," Independent XLVI (27 September, 1894), 1239; Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

⁶⁷Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 635.

⁶⁸"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 134.

⁶⁹Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 186.

⁷⁰"Has Labor a Right to a Living Wage?" Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 112.

⁷¹Harte, "A Review of the Chicago Strike of '94," Arena X (September, 1894), 525.

⁷²"The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013.

⁷³"The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; "Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699.

⁷⁴"News of the Week: Domestic," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 921; "A Word to the Workingman," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698; Robinson, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 199.

⁷⁵"A Word to the Workingman," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 698; "A Lesson in Patriotism," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 40.

⁷⁶"The Law of Strikes," Nation LIX (18 October 1894), 281; "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; "Men in Evidence," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 679; "The Situation in Chicago," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (14 July, 1894), 655; Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 7.

⁷⁷Robinson, "The Humiliating Report of the Strike Commission," Forum XVIII (January, 1895), 529.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter evaluates the performance of the journals of opinion in their coverage and interpretation of the Pullman Strike and the issues as compared to the historical standard. Differences between monthlies and weeklies are noted; concluding observations concerning the social role of the periodical press are discussed; and suggestions for future research are presented.

Evaluation of Coverage and Interpretation

A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Mass Media and Violence) declares, social strife must be set in context; "the public must be given a representative view of events and an explanation of their significance."¹ Similarly, professors William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm say that "above all, the news media must focus on why there is unrest, and well before rioting breaks out."²

Compared to this standard, the journals generally failed to explain the Pullman Strike in its full historical context. Beginning with the New York Times on June 27, the metropolitan daily press in big cities across the nation began to report the boycott and railway strike. In

early July, when federal intervention and violence were the key issues, weeklies began coverage. By then readers of the journals had been given little, if any, historical perspective of the strike. Monthlies first commented on the dispute in August.

Extent of Coverage--
Significant Omissions

The journals of opinion did not fully assess the underlying issues. The journals generally neglected to convey to readers the workers' frustration in dealing with the corporation; they failed to communicate the depth, severity, variety and pervasiveness of Pullman's paternalism. Omitted were explanations of such grievances as the "ten-day clause," the two-check pay system, company espionage, and obstruction of free expression. Independent, Forum, and a letter to Nation were the primary sources of accurate comment on underlying issues.

Weeklies commented more extensively on immediate issues than monthlies.

Despite Outlook's assessment, the journals as a group were deficient in analysis of Pullman's financial situation. Such an evaluation, as performed by the Strike Commission, would have enabled a more realistic appraisal of Pullman's ability to settle the economic questions--wages and rents--involved in the dispute.

Shop abuses were an issue ignored by all but

Independent, which gave its interpretation only after the Strike Commission had elicited relevant information.

Concerning related issues, the background and historical perspective of the situation prior to federal intervention was either ignored or distorted. The journals failed to comment on Governor Altgeld's record during the coal strike and the measures he had implemented to insure preparedness to cope with strike violence as of July 3.

With the exception of Arena and a letter to Outlook, the journals made no evident attempt to explain the inter-relationship between the railroad managers and federal attorneys in devising the legal rationale and court injunction used to justify federal armed intervention.

Furthermore, in reporting the strike the journals omitted two key stories: (1) the violation of Debs' constitutional rights involved in the illegal seizure of his personal papers by federal agents; and (2) President Cleveland's apparent disinterest in resolving the strike by avoiding any attempt to urge a negotiated settlement--either before the use of federal troops, or after the request of the A.F. of L.

Outlook, Harper's Weekly and Independent were the primary journals to report the landmark history of the strike during the period June 26 to July 18. Nevertheless, these weeklies neglected to report several important events. Omitted by Outlook were: the destruction of the World's

Fair buildings and the congressional resolutions. Harper's Weekly and Independent failed to report the appointment of Edwin Walker as special U. S. Attorney, and the efforts of mayors Hopkins and Pingree to induce Pullman to arbitrate. Independent also neglected to mention Altgeld's second protest and his use of Illinois militia.

Distortions and Inaccuracies

Immediate issues—wages, rents, and arbitration—were thoroughly discussed; but the judgments of Harper's Weekly, Nation and Independent concerning these complaints were generally oversimplified and inconsistent with the historical record. These weeklies asserted that workers had no real grievances: rents were fair, wages were all that Pullman could afford and were sufficient to prevent starvation. Pullman was suffering a financial loss in order to keep workers employed. He was unable to arbitrate; even if he wished to adjust wages or rents, he had no right to do so.

Concerning related issues, these weeklies and most articles in Forum and North American generally misreported the situation in Chicago before the 4th of July and/or misinterpreted the nature of the railway boycott/strike. These journals tended to view the strike as a rebellion against society. They explained that Debs ordered the strike with the intent to subvert national authority, and

that he planned to paralyze railway transportation by deliberately inciting and exploiting violence.

Independent justified federal intervention with the claim that strikers had destroyed property at the rate of two or three million dollars a day. This appears to be a gross exaggeration. The only significant property damage before U. S. troops arrived on July 3 was at Blue Island, where several overturned cars obstructed the rails. Serious property damage began the following day and climaxed on July 6.

Furthermore, Independent inaccurately used the word "soldiers" without clarification in its story on the July 7 incident when state troops fired at a mob. (Review of Reviews, the only monthly to report a chronology of major events in the strike, made the same error, but used the word "regulars.") To readers it would seem the U. S. Army had quelled the disturbance.

Coverage provided by Outlook and Harper's Weekly revealed lesser inaccuracies. Outlook appears to have been inaccurate in its report that a mob of 25,000 obstructed tracks. (The evidence suggests mobs never exceeded about 10,000.) Contrary to the historical record, Harper's Weekly asserted that Governor Altgeld had been reluctant to provide Mayor Hopkins with state troops.

Objectivity and Fairness

Journalism professors Rivers and Schramm have said that interpretation is objective if the reader "cannot discern from the report where the journalist stands with respect to the issue or personality he is presenting. . . ."3

With the possible exception of Outlook and the Review, the journals were far from objective in their appraisals of the strike; interpretations were generally loaded with editorial opinion.

Harper's Weekly, Nation, Independent and most articles in Forum and North American were generally emotional--occasionally even sensational--in their explanations. These journals, for the most part, approved of the Pullman Company, the G.M.A., Cleveland and the federal attorneys, but disapproved of the Pullman workers, Debs, the A.R.U., and Altgeld.

Arena was nearly as emotional as the conservative journals in its defense of Debs and the workers; it was alarmed at Cleveland's circumvention of the Constitution.

Discussion of the legal basis for intervention was extremely unbalanced. Most journals discussed the applicable statutes but ignored the Constitution. Arena emphasized Article IV but ignored the federal laws.

In contrast to the other journals, Outlook and the Review revealed a tone of concern; they were less intense and more moderate in their expressions of partisan support.

They approved of the G.M.A. and federal authorities for trying to end violence, but disapproved of Debs and Altgeld for seeming to condone it. On the other hand, Outlook and the Review were somewhat favorable toward the cause of the Pullman workers, but disapproved of George Pullman for his refusal to settle the dispute before it became a national disaster.

Of the four weeklies, Outlook provided the clearest and most objective reporting. Despite an editorial stand against the A.R.U., it tried to present the strike from the perspectives of both labor and management. For example, though disagreeing with Sovereign, Outlook gave his reasons for urging the Knights of Labor to join the strike. Moreover, Outlook printed verbatim explanations of the dispute from both Debs and the G.M.A. (See Appendix II.)

Incomplete Interpretations

Compared to the historical standard, Outlook, Arena and the Review failed to adequately explain all the issues. Nevertheless, these journals contributed interpretations that were largely in accord with the evidence.

Outlook presented the most effective analysis of Pullman's financial situation and suggested he could have afforded his workers some economic relief. Outlook also discussed the A.R.U. delegate vote, railroad employee grievances, and strike violence with comparative accuracy.

Arena gave the clearest explanation of the G.M.A.'s covert maneuvering to create federal intervention and its subsequent collaboration with the government officials to suppress the strike. Arena's emphasis on the G.M.A.'s responsibility in provoking and exacerbating the railway dispute approximated that of the Strike Commission.

The Review neither misinterpreted the strike to the same degree as most Forum and North American articles, nor analyzed the issues to the same depth as Outlook or Arena. Basically the Review explained that Pullman was responsible for having allowed the strike to evolve to the point where the American public became the chief victim.

Differences between Monthlies and Weeklies

Weeklies discussed the immediate issues to a greater extent than monthlies. However, except for Outlook's analysis of Pullman's financial situation, and Independent's discussion of shop abuses, the weeklies largely misinterpreted the issues of wages, rents and arbitration.

Weeklies provided far more reporting of the major developments--the landmark history--than monthlies. Outlook excelled in accuracy and completeness of coverage, followed closely by Harper's Weekly. Independent's reportage was mediocre. Nation provided the least coverage.

Weeklies and monthlies were nearly equivalent in the extent and adequacy with which they explained the related

issues. Three weeklies (Harper's Weekly, Nation and Independent) and most articles in two monthlies (North American and Forum) generally failed to effectively interpret these issues. On the other hand, one weekly (Outlook) and two monthlies (Review and Arena) provided partial analyses with far less distortion than the other journals.

In summary, there appear to be a few significant qualitative differences between weeklies and monthlies. Neither of these media was particularly effective in explaining the strike in its full context. This finding lends support to a conclusion stated in Robert Harper's study of twentieth century interpretative reporting. Harper concluded the chief weakness of the press appears to have been its failure to place events in historical perspective.⁴

An Explanation for Inadequate Coverage

This study suggests that four factors may have contributed to the inadequate interpretations of the journals of opinion: (1) inaccurate, distorted or biased sources of news information; (2) readership expectations; (3) editorial values; and (4) interest in advocacy rather than objective interpretation.

Sources of Information

The journals first began their coverage of the strike in early July. There is little evidence that reporters from

weeklies, or writers for monthlies, covered the situation in Pullman prior to the railway boycott. Although Harper's Weekly covered the situation in Chicago, in part by dispatches from correspondents such as Frederic Remington, and Outlook probably had its own reporter, this study suggests that the journals relied heavily on two sources of interpretation: (1) press releases issued by the Pullman Company and the G.M.A.; and (2) newspaper accounts of the strike.⁵

Pullman's press release explaining how he kept his plant open for the benefit of his employees was evident in several journalistic reports. The publicity bureau established by the G.M.A. appears to have been the source of much misinformation about the intentions of the A.R.U. and contracts between Pullman and the railroads.

One Forum writer said he based his understanding of the situation in Chicago prior to July 3 from newspaper stories. Finnegan and Lindsey characterized these accounts in the daily press as highly sensational and distorted.⁶

At least one weekly also relied on newspaper stories.

Independent explained its difficulty in obtaining accurate information about the strike:

The newspapers were filled with daily reports of the occurrences and rumors of occurrences; but it was difficult, if not impossible, to learn from their voluminous and often contradictory accounts exactly what occurred and what did not occur, to judge in what degree the grievances of the strikers were justified, and in what they were not.⁷

In addition to corporate press releases and newspaper accounts, a third source of interpretation--after the strike--was provided by the hearings of the Strike Commission. Independent and Outlook relied on testimony from hearings for part of their understanding of the strike. Independent obtained information about shop abuses and paternalism from the testimony of Pullman workers. Outlook gained its analysis of Pullman's financial condition partially from his statements to the Strike Commission.

Readership Expectations

A second possible reason for less than adequate interpretative reporting may have been the nature of the audience, the characteristics of those who read the journals. Frank Luther Mott points out that the American middle class was generally alienated from the labor movement in the mid-nineties.⁸ Editors and publishers, in order to attract and hold their readership, may have been inclined to explain the strike the way they thought the majority would agree with. It seems likely that most middle class readers of journals in 1894 would be receptive to a conservative interpretation of the strike such as that provided by Nation.

Editorial Values

Whether intentional or not, the editors and writers of the journals seem to have "selectively perceived" and interpreted the strike according to their values. Con-

servative editors who valued free enterprise and "big business," for example, seem to have accepted information from Pullman, the G.M.A. and the daily press that fit their mental stereotypes, rejecting or distorting information that would cast corporate leaders in a less favorable light. Conservative journals, for instance, neglected to mention that Walker was legal counsel to the G.M.A. when appointed to represent the U. S. government.

An indication of the values of the journals can be inferred not only from their coverage of the strike, but also from editorial reactions to the Report of the Strike Commission, which was relatively progressive in tenor.

Harper's Weekly, Nation, Independent and most writers in Forum and North American defended the status quo and the prevailing values in laissez-faire economic theory. They emphasized: (1) "law and order;" (2) property rights; (3) business prerogatives; (4) the use of force, rather than negotiation, in controlling social disorder; and (5) the rights of the stockholder as superior to the rights of the laborer. These journals collectively criticized the Report of the Strike Commission as "socialistic," "dangerous," "biased" and "untrustworthy."⁹

Outlook and the Review valued "law and order;" but they also valued arbitration, social justice and the rights of society. When the Report of the Strike Commission was made public, Outlook quoted extensively from its conclusions

and suggested the commission's recommendations were sensible. The Review neither supported nor rejected the findings of the commission, but urged its subscribers to read the Report for themselves and "to ponder each paragraph."¹⁰

Arena was more insistent than Outlook and the Review in emphasizing the rights of labor as paramount. Had the Arena carried an editorial column, it probably would have endorsed the Report of the Strike Commission as did Eugene Debs.¹¹

Advocacy vs. Objective Interpretation

Journalism professor John Schacht has said the major purpose of a journal of opinion is "actively to shape the course of the events it reports and comments on. . . ." Each journal has "a well-defined political, cultural and sociological point of view, a theoretical concept to which the journal hopes to make public practice approach and ultimately conform."¹²

This study supports Schacht's conclusion and suggests that the journals of opinion in 1894 interpreted the Pullman Strike, not as a journalistic "end," but as a means of advocating their own ideological or theoretical concepts. The evidence indicates that each editor intended to promote his values, to change--or preserve--society on the basis of his particular interpretation of events.

Conservative weeklies sought to keep labor subject

to the "iron law of wages," to preserve the status quo and to prevent progressive reform.

The editors of Forum and North American presented symposiums through which, supposedly, a diversity of views would be expressed. In their editorial selection of authors, however, these monthlies emphasized the same perspective of the strike as conservative weeklies.

On the other hand, Outlook and the Review appear to have been more open-minded about the strike, viewing the dispute from the perspectives of both labor and management. These journals seem to have advocated a theory of social responsibility in which both parties to a strike were responsible to insure their conflict did not impinge on the rights of society.

At an extreme position, Arena almost exclusively sought to promote the rights of labor and a theory of social and economic justice.

In summary, advocacy, rather than objective interpretation, seems to have been the primary editorial intention of the journals of opinion.

The Social Role of the Journals of Opinion

Before and During the Strike

The authors of Mass Media and Violence comment on the role of the press during civil disturbances:

Whether conflict is resolved by violence or cooperation will depend in part upon the actors' perceptions of the world about them. Providing an accurate perception of that world is the media's most important responsibility.¹³

This study has shown that several journals of opinion attempted a retrospective analysis of the immediate and underlying issues after the railway strike had begun. Nevertheless, to a great extent the journals failed to provide readers with an accurate, complete explanation of the historical background of the situation at Pullman and later at Chicago.

When Debs testified before the Strike Commission, he declared:

I am impressed with the conviction that if the people of America had understood the truth, if the press had given them the truth and the facts, the people of this country would have been overwhelmingly with us [the A.R.U. and Pullman employees] from beginning to end.¹⁴

To the extent that Debs' charge may have been directed at the journals of opinion, which is not probable, it seems likely that even if they had interpreted the strike with complete accuracy and fairness, the public still would not have supported the A.R.U. The national mood in 1894 seems to have been sufficiently against organized labor to have precluded any such "overwhelming" support for the strikers.

Moreover, the journals cannot be blamed for not having covered the conditions in Pullman prior to the May 11 strike. Only if editors had been clairvoyant would they

have recognized that a major civil disturbance was in the making. However, if the editors had been monitoring the Chicago press from May 12 to mid-June, prior to the railway boycott, it seems likely that they would have detected sufficient social unrest to merit coverage.

This study suggests that if the journals had alerted their readers to the situation in Pullman and Chicago during the month preceding the boycott, when discontent was mounting, the subsequent violence might have been prevented. Investigative reporting during the early phases of the dispute could have provided readers with an understanding of: (1) the nature and severity of grievances felt by Pullman employees; (2) whether workers had been reasonable in trying to negotiate their complaints; (3) whether Pullman could have met and resolved the grievances.

Even though only a relatively few readers of the total population might have read the articles, presumably the "opinion leaders" might have generated sufficient interest in the general public to create a climate of concern for the workers. An aroused public opinion might have prodded officials into correcting economic and social injustice before the A.R.U. decision to boycott.

Full coverage of events during the period June 26 to July 3 would have resulted in a more accurate public understanding of provocations directed at union members; it would have suggested that the G.M.A. played a crucial

role in precipitating the railway strike and stimulating violence.

By neglecting the historical context, and during the strike, by largely misinterpreting the related issues, the journals appear to have helped structure a public opinion which supported resisting the strike by means of force.¹⁵

After the Strike

As the strike began to collapse, the journals increasingly turned to a discussion of proposals aimed at improving labor-management relations. Inspection of Appendix III, "Recommendations Made by Journals to End or Prevent Labor Disputes," reveals that a majority of the weeklies, and articles in monthlies, suggested or endorsed proposals, the balance of which were relatively progressive.

Harper's Weekly, Nation and North American continued to emphasize economic values and business prerogatives.

Independent, which had interpreted the strike in much the same manner as Nation and Harper's Weekly, shifted somewhat to a more progressive orientation. After the strike, Independent continued its support for free enterprise, but suggested more humanitarian means of dealing with employees; businessmen could do as they pleased so long as they were fair with their workers.

Similarly, Forum, which had interpreted the strike

mainly by conservative writers, continued its symposium but included authors that advanced more progressive recommendations.

Outlook and the Review continued to emphasize the rights of society. These journals sought to protect the public from the inconvenience of railway strikes; and they favored proposals aimed at a balance of power between labor and management.

Arena's single recommendation emphasized the rights of labor over those of management.

As a group the journals seem to have contributed substantially to the discussion of proposals designed to prevent or minimize the effects of future strikes. Six proposals would perpetuate the prevailing laissez-faire values; but twelve suggestions advocated more humanitarian treatment of employees, a greater balance of power between labor and management, and respect for the rights of society as a whole.¹⁶ A majority of the recommendations were aimed at recognizing and dealing with employee grievances before violence became inevitable.

The Journals of Opinion in the Mid-1890's

In 1894 the journals pointed out that the Pullman Strike was a symptom of serious discontent. They suggested that corporations, as well as laborers, were responsible for that discontent. And they advanced various proposals to minimize future social strife.

During the mid-nineties, the journals of opinion seem to have contributed to the social education of the American people. One Forum writer summed up the effects of the journals for the decade preceding 1898: "Higher views of industrial relations, of education, of political rights and duties are gaining ground. . . ."17

Historian C. C. Regier notes that the magazines of the 1890's displayed tendencies toward muckraking that became so conspicuous in the next decade.¹⁸ Outlook's analysis of Pullman's corporate wealth, and Arena's expose of the G.M.A. seem to resemble closely the style of journalistic attack for which muckrakers later became noted.

According to David Chalmers, the muckrakers after 1900 were greatly concerned with "the public," whose interests had to be protected against both labor unions and capitalistic trusts.¹⁹ This same concern for the public was evident in Outlook and the Review in 1894.

Theodore Peterson asserts that magazines have been "responsible in some measure for the social and political reforms of the first fifty years of this century." He further states that the magazines which carried on where the muckrakers left off were chiefly the journals of opinion.²⁰

This study suggests that several of the journals of opinion in the mid-nineties, those which exposed Pullman and the G.M.A. as well as those which advanced progressive labor relations proposals, may have provided the catalyst or foundation from which reform-minded muckrakers emerged.

To the extent that public opinion and government action shifted after 1900 away from the axioms of laissez-faire and in the direction of progressive reform, these journals of opinion in the mid-nineties may have played a significant role in paving the way for that change.

Suggestions for Future Research

The interpretative and social functions of the periodical press have not been sufficiently studied, particularly from an historical perspective.

Interpretative Function of the Periodical Press

Robert Harper has suggested there may have been different forms of interpretation prior to World War I.²¹ This study has evaluated the interpretative reporting of the journals of opinion in 1894. The journals appear to have explained cause and effect relationships in the manner best suited to promote various editorial social theories. More research is needed to determine the existence of other forms of interpretation.

Several scholars have noted that magazines often provide a fuller interpretative treatment of news than other media.²² But there is a need for more intensive study of magazine interpretation, particularly during the period 1900 to 1920, an era during which "objective" forms of news analysis seem to have emerged.

The extent to which trained reporters are used in covering an event seems to be an important factor in effective news interpretation. Harper believes that reporters may have provided the same interpretation of events after 1918 which press releases and official investigations had presented before World War I.²³ This study suggests that few reporters were used by the journals in 1894 to cover the Pullman Strike. More research is needed to assess the developing role of the interpretative reporter.

Social Role of the Periodical Press

The journals of opinion in this study evidently relied extensively on the daily press as a source of information for interpretative treatment. The relationship between the daily and the weekly press needs to be more fully assessed. Each medium plays a role in shaping public opinion; but little is known about the interaction of these media. How extensively does the daily press influence the weekly press? Do the interpretations generated by journals of opinion filter into the dailies of mass circulation, and thus to a vast reading audience?

This study also suggests there may have been a close relationship between certain journals of opinion and subsequent muckraking magazines of mass circulation. A comparative historical study assessing similarities and differences in content between these two types of magazines in the early 1900's might clarify this relationship.

John Schacht has asserted that journals of opinion seem to play an important role in social change.²⁴ The periodicals in this study suggested a number of progressive reforms. A follow-up study could attempt to assess the apparent social effects of these proposals, determining if and when they were discussed in the daily press, and in Congress; and what specific legislation may have indirectly been a product of these recommendations.

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CHAPTER VI--FOOTNOTES

¹Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. XI: Mass Media and Violence, Milton S. Eisenhower, chairman (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 148.

²William L. Rivers and Wilbur Schramm, Responsibility in Mass Communications (Rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969), p. 187.

³Ibid., p. 154.

⁴Robert B. Harper, "Reporting Social Strife in Five Labor Conflicts," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 182.

⁵Pullman's press releases are reprinted from newspapers in W. J. Ashley, The Railroad Strike of 1894 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Church of Social Union, 1894), pp. 25-38; Chicago Herald, 26 June, 1894; New York Sun, 5 July, 1894; New York Tribune, 14 July, 1894.

⁶See Chapter V.

⁷"Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503.

⁸Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905, Vol. IV (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 216.

⁹"Plaything Labor Commissions," Nation LIX (26 July, 1894), 58; "The Report of the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376; "Report of the United States Strike Commission," Independent XLVI (22 November, 1894), 1503; H. P. Robinson, "The Humiliating Report of the Strike Commission," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 531; Robinson, editor of Railway Age, had written earlier in North American and seriously misinterpreted the "intent" of the strike; "Revolutionary Statesmanship," Harper's Weekly XXVIII (24 November, 1894), 1107.

¹⁰"Report of the National Commission," Outlook L (24 November, 1894), 840-41; "Report of the Chicago Strikes," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 604.

812. ¹¹Cited in Public Opinion XVII (22 November, 1894),

¹²John H. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage: An Assessment (New York: Magazine Publishers Association, 1966), p. 2.

¹³Mass Media and Violence, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁴Strike Report, pp. 157-58.

¹⁵This analysis is based upon principles for press coverage and demonstrations discussed in Mass Media and Violence, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

¹⁶The six "laissez-faire proposals" refer to Appendix III, recommendations numbered 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, and 23. The twelve "progressive suggestions" refer to numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, and 22. (Numbers 7, 8, 20, and 21 are considered essentially neutral; number 19 is a duplication of 11.)

¹⁷Charles Henry Eaton, "A Decade of Magazine Literature," Forum XXVI (October, 1898), 216.

¹⁸C. C. Regier, The Era of the Muckrakers (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957), p. 22.

¹⁹David M. Chalmers, The Social and Political Ideas of the Muckrakers (New York: The Citadel Press, 1964), pp. 111-12.

²⁰Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), 393.

²¹Harper, op. cit., p. 181.

²²See Introduction.

²³Harper, op. cit., p. 176.

²⁴Schacht, op. cit., p. 79.

APPENDIX I

LANDMARK HISTORY OF THE
PULLMAN STRIKE AND BOYCOTT
(26 June-18 July, 1894)First WeekTuesday, June 26

- (1) The A.R.U. orders a boycott of Pullman cars.
- (2) The G.M.A. decides to fire employees who boycott Pullman cars.
- (3) A sympathetic strike begins on the Illinois Central.

Wednesday, June 27

- (1) The boycott is extended to all the principal railroads entering Chicago.
- (2) Chicago police are ordered to total readiness.

Thursday, June 28

- (1) The boycott is extended to the West, about 18,000 workers on strike.
- (2) The G.M.A. initiates measures to deal with the strike.
- (3) John Egan is appointed "strike manager" of the G.M.A.

Friday, June 29

(1) The G.M.A. decides to fight strikers with blacklists; to seek injunctions.

(2) U. S. District Attorney Milchrist cooperates with the G.M.A.

Saturday, June 30

Attorney General Olney appoints Edwin Walker as special federal attorney and authorizes appointment of extra deputies.

Second WeekSunday, July 1

(1) Walker and Milchrist draft federal injunction at the request of Attorney General Olney and the G.M.A.

(2) An estimated 50,000 men are on strike.

Monday, July 2

(1) U. S. Circuit Court issues a sweeping injunction against strikers.

(2) Debs ignores injunction.

Tuesday, July 3

(1) Federal officials in Chicago request U. S. Army troops to enforce court injunction.

(2) Cleveland orders troops from Fort Sheridan to Chicago.

Wednesday, July 4

U. S. troops are in Chicago under the command of Gen. Miles.

Thursday, July 5

(1) Governor Altgeld protests the use of federal troops. Cleveland replies.

(2) Rioting mobs are active along railway lines in Chicago; freight cars are overturned at stockyards, obstructing trains.

(3) Mayor Hopkins issues a proclamation.

(4) Seven World's Fair buildings are destroyed by fire.

Friday, July 6

(1) Altgeld wires second protest; Cleveland replies.

(2) Altgeld orders out state troops in support of the mayor.

(3) Fire destroys 700 cars; 13 Chicago railroads are obstructed.

Saturday, July 7

(1) Militia fire on a mob at Chicago: 4 killed, 20 wounded.

(2) Armed forces begin to clear the tracks.

Third WeekSunday, July 8

(1) President Cleveland issues a proclamation: rioters must disperse.

(2) Chicago trade unions vote to seek arbitration with Pullman.

Monday, July 9

(1) The Pullman Company refuses to arbitrate.

(2) Rioting and disorder begin to subside.

Tuesday, July 10

Debs and several other A.R.U. officials are arrested and charged with conspiracy to obstruct the mails.

Wednesday, July 11

(1) The Senate approves a resolution endorsing Cleveland's action in regard to the strike.

(2) About 25,000 members of Chicago trade unions strike.

Thursday, July 12

(1) Mayor Hopkins presents the Pullman Company with telegrams from 50 other mayors urging arbitration. Vice President Wickes refuses the offer.

(2) The A.F. of L. rejects Debs' request to convey an A.R.U. proposal to the G.M.A.

(3) Trains begin to move freely.

Friday, July 13

At Debs' request, Mayor Hopkins conveys to the G.M.A. an A.R.U. offer to declare the strike off if the railroads will rehire the strikers. The G.M.A. refuses to consider the proposal.

Saturday, July 14

The A.R.U. begins losing support.

Fourth WeekMonday, July 16

The House of Representatives adopts a resolution supporting the President's actions against the strike.

Tuesday, July 17

Debs and three other A.R.U. officers are arrested and jailed (after declining bail) on charges of contempt in having violated the federal court injunction.

Friday, July 18

The Pullman Company begins rehiring non-union men.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACT FROM OUTLOOK'S STRIKE COVERAGE*

"In order to give our readers the fullest statement from both sides of the present issue, we have obtained directly from Mr. Debs, the President of the American Railway Union, and from the General Manager's Association . . . their respective statements of the present strike. Neither statement differs from those already familiar to our readers through the daily press. We give, however, so much of the former statement as may be regarded as a defense of the boycott. After reciting the history of the Pullman strike, substantially as we gave it last week, Mr. Debs adds:

Convinced that injustice was being done to labor by the Pullman concern, the American Railway Union determined to come to the aid of the strikers by declaring a boycott upon Pullman cars. This we had hardly done when we discovered that all the railroads, those not using Pullman cars equally with those affected by our boycott, had entered into a combination, not merely to defeat our present purpose, but to smash labor organizations among railroad employees. The General Manager's Association makes no concealment of its purpose. Necessarily, therefore, the contest for justice to the Pullman employees has developed into a struggle for existence. We have had to extend the boycott until it now holds twenty-one lines in its grasp. We may have to call out allied workmen in the trades and on the inter-

*"The Week," Outlook L (14 July, 1894), 46.

urban railways. I have absolute confidence that we will win this battle, win it without violence and in spite of the obvious connivance of the United States authorities and courts. I understand how serious a disaster to our cause violence or lawlessness would be, and I am commanding upon all my lieutenants' regard for the law and respect for property rights.

"The General Manager's Association's briefer statement we give in full:

The General Manager's Association is fighting the strike instituted by the American Railway Union, because they fail to see the sense, reason, or justice of an attempt to club the Pullman Company over the heads of railroad companies which have no control over Mr. Pullman's affairs, either private or corporate, or any connection with the Pullman manufacturing interests. The question of Pullmanism is not recognized by the railroad companies. None of the railroad employees who have gone out on strike have any grievance that is known of against their employers. If they have any such grievance, they have not made it known to the railroad managers. The strike is purely a sympathetic strike. The General Manager's Association of Chicago does not propose to allow the American Railway Union to dictate how the railroad business shall be run, neither does the General Manager's Association propose to assist the American Railway Union in settling its difficulties with the Pullman Company. The General Manager's Association is a unit, and no man in it has any thought of compromise. The fight must be fought to a finish."

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY JOURNALS TO
END OR PREVENT LABOR DISPUTESI. LEGAL PROPOSALSRecommendation:Proponent
Journals:Proposals that would balance the power
between labor and management:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Accord labor unions the same rights and responsibilities as business corporations. ¹ | <u>Independent
Forum
North American
Review</u> |
| 2. Insist upon orderly alteration of the law to insure that statutes are just and not exceptionally favorable to employers. ² | <u>Independent</u> |
| 3. Require the use of binding contracts between employers and laborers; whichever party violates such a contract would be liable for damages. ³ | <u>Harper's Weekly
Independent
Nation
Forum
Review</u> |
| 4. Institute compulsory arbitration of labor disputes with decisions enforced by courts. ⁴ | <u>Outlook
Forum
Review</u> |

(Comment: Harper's Weekly, Independent, Nation, and two writers in Forum strongly opposed this recommendation.⁵ Conservative journals and authors also opposed other suggestions of progressive reform. Nation opposed

the "socialistic idea" of a minimum wage for employees. Moreover, Hampton, in North American was against any legislation that would attempt to remedy the condition of workers whose labor did not yield proper remuneration.⁶⁾

Proposals that would protect society from the inconvenience of railway strikes:

5. Amend the law to require railroad employees to give adequate notice before quitting work. ⁷	<u>Outlook</u>
---	----------------

6. Make it illegal for trainmen to quit work in a body for the purpose of stopping railroad traffic. ⁸	<u>Outlook</u>
---	----------------

Miscellaneous legal proposals:

7. Amend the law to eliminate the need for court injunctions in dealing with strikes. ⁹	<u>Nation</u> <u>Outlook</u>
--	---------------------------------

8. Amend the law to stop the importation of immigrant laborers. ¹⁰	<u>North American</u>
---	-----------------------

9. Authorize an increase in the strength of the U. S. Army. ¹¹	<u>Independent</u>
---	--------------------

II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENT

Proposals emphasizing economic values and business prerogatives:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>10. Government should ensure the supremacy of law and protect property at all hazards.¹²</p> | <p><u>Harper's Weekly</u>
<u>Independent</u>
<u>Nation</u>
<u>North American</u></p> |
| <p>11. When employees are dissatisfied with their working conditions or wages they should quit work. When they join in unlawful combinations and threaten the rights of others, they should be treated as criminals.¹³</p> | <p><u>North American</u></p> |

Proposals emphasizing humanitarian values and the rights of the public and labor:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| <p>12. Government should intervene not only to protect railroads against unjustified strikes, but to protect trainmen against unjust treatment by railroad corporations.¹⁴</p> | <p><u>Outlook</u></p> |
| <p>13. Government should intervene to prevent the disturbance of society. The individual who precipitates such inconvenience to the public should be held responsible to the government.¹⁵ (This could also be considered as a legal proposal that would protect society from the inconvenience of a railway strike.)</p> | <p><u>Forum</u></p> |

14. Government should compel railroads, Arena
as public servants, to run their
trains regularly and to serve the
people, regardless of what wages the
companies are obliged to pay in order
to retain trainmen and perform their
public duty.¹⁶

III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO MANAGEMENT

Proposals emphasizing economic values and business prerogatives:

15. Employers should treat workers Nation
as businessmen fully capable of
managing their own affairs.¹⁷
16. Railroads should never hire a Harper's Weekly
man who will not bind himself
absolutely to abstain from par-
ticipation in any "sympathetic"
strike.¹⁸

Proposals emphasizing humanitarian values

17. Employers should observe a con- Independent
ciliatory attitude toward their
employees and keep in touch with
their workers, not simply deal
with them through foremen.¹⁹
18. Corporations should enable em- Forum
ployees to become stockholders,
sharing in the prosperity and
adversity of the company, having
a voice in its management.²⁰

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO LABOR

19. When employees are dissatisfied with their working conditions or wages they should quit work.²¹
(This is also listed as #11.) North American

Suggestions to improve workers and unions:

20. The workingman should patiently build his individual character. He should be industrious, grow more skillful in his trade, acquire self-control, and make the best of such economic foothold as he may possess.²² Review
21. Labor unions should not encompass men of all trades. Each trade should have its own union. Each union should be locally self-governing and promote industry, not strike warfare.²³ Outlook

V. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

22. Councils of conciliation should be established for voluntary settlement of grievances.²⁴ Independent

A suggestion emphasizing laissez-faire values:

23. Society, in educating its young, should emphasize the importance of private property, contract, the manager's function, the law of natural selection, free enterprise, self-reliance, honesty and altruism.²⁵

Forum

APPENDIX III--FOOTNOTES

¹"A Strike or Rebellion?" Independent XLVI (12 July, 1894), 896; Carroll D. Wright, "Steps Toward Government Control of Railroads," Forum XVIII (February, 1895), 709; Samuel Gompers, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American CLIX (August, 1894), 205; Stockton Bates, "How to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts," North American Review CLX (March, 1895), 373; "The Rationale for the Boycott," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 190; "Ethical Significance of Labor Troubles," Review of Reviews XI (February, 1895), 214.

²W. J. Linton, "The Chicago Strike," Independent XLVI (26 July, 1894), 946.

³"Can the Boycott Be Made Impossible?" Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (28 July, 1894), 699; Joseph Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1013-14; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 24; Thomas M. Cooley, "The Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders," Forum, XVIII (September, 1894), 18-19; "The Rationale for the Boycott," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 190.

⁴"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 90; "Arbitration," Outlook LI (13 April, 1895), 590; Carroll D. Wright, "Steps Toward Government Control of Railroads," Forum XVIII (February, 1895), 713; "Compulsory Arbitration," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 666-67; C. C. Kingston, "Industrial Agreements and Conciliation," Review of Reviews X (December, 1894), 647-50.

⁵"Legislators and Organized Labor," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (11 August, 1894), 722; "Editorial Notes," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 924; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 24; "The Limits of Arbitration," Nation LIX (19 July, 1894), 42-43; "Reasonable Wages," Nation LX (7 February, 1895), 102; D. M. Means, "Principles Involved in the Recent Strike," Forum XVII (August, 1894), 640; Thomas M. Cooley, "The Lessons of the Recent Civil Disorders," Forum XVIII (September, 1894), 18.

⁶"The Minimum Wage," Nation LIX (4 October, 1894), 245; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 194.

⁷"Debs' Conviction," Outlook L (22 December, 1894), 1078.

⁸"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 90.

⁹"Government by Injunction," Nation LX (4 April, 1895), 253; "The Strikers in Court," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 126.

¹⁰Nelson A. Miles, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 185; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 190.

¹¹Joseph Cook, "Causes and Consequences of the Debs Strike," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1014.

¹²"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674; "The Collapse," Independent XLVI (19 July, 1894), 922; "The Settlement of Labor Troubles," Nation LIX (12 July, 1894), 24; Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 189, 192.

¹³Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 189.

¹⁴"The Strike: Suggestions of Remedy," Outlook L (21 July, 1894), 89-90.

¹⁵Carroll D. Wright, "May a Man Conduct Business as He Pleases?" Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 427-28.

¹⁶J. C. Buell, "A Partial Solution of the Railway Problem," Arena XII (May, 1895), 322.

¹⁷"The Report of the Chicago Strike," Nation LIX (22 November, 1894), 376.

¹⁸"Some Lessons of the Great Strike," Harper's Weekly XXXVIII (21 July, 1894), 674.

¹⁹"The Conversion of Debs," Independent XLVI (9 August, 1894), 1023.

²⁰Louis R. Ehrich, "Stock Sharing as a Preventive of Labor Troubles," Forum XVIII (December, 1894), 437.

²¹Wade Hampton, "The Lesson of the Recent Strikes," North American Review CLIX (August, 1894), 189.

²²"The Progress of the World," Review of Reviews X (August, 1894), 138.

²³"The Solidarity of Labor," Outlook L (28 July, 1894), 130.

²⁴"Boards of Conciliation," Independent XLVI (16 August, 1894), 1055.

²⁵Henry Holt, "The Social Discontent - II - Some Remedies," Forum XIX (March, 1895), 68; Henry Holt, "The Social Discontent - III - More Remedies," Forum XIX (April, 1895), 173-81, passim.

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